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Education or Welfare? American and British Child Care Policy, 1965-2004 
Anna K. Danziger Halperin  
The care and education of pre-school children presents a perfect storm of conflicts among 
the needs of women, children, and states, particularly in societies that maintain a sharp barrier 
between the private and public spheres such as the United States and Britain. American and 
British policymakers attempted to address these tensions in the early 1970s by proposing 
universal child care programs. In the U.S., the Comprehensive Child Development Act (CDA) of 
1971 passed both the House and Senate by overwhelming majorities but was vetoed by President 
Richard Nixon. Going further than any proposal before or since to establish a national public 
child care program, it would have made public child care centers universally available on a 
sliding-scale basis: free for children of the poor but available for a fee to middle and upper class 
children. The British Department of Education and Science, led by Secretary Margaret Thatcher, 
published a White Paper in 1972 calling for nursery expansion, but it was never fully 
implemented. It proposed a dramatic expansion of public nursery education, so that it might be 
available within a decade to all families with three and four year old children who chose to 
utilize it, with funds being made available first to local areas designated as most in need. 
My dissertation presents an in-depth account of the political bargaining that occurred 
during this period in both countries, and addresses the factors that contributed to the failure of 
these universal child care proposals. Although neither child care program was implemented (or 
fully implemented, in the British case), the proposals raise important questions about the 
relationship between the state and the family. It also analyzes the aftermath of these policies’ 
failure through to the end of Thatcher and Reagan administrations.  
 It then turns to the mid-1990s which represent a key divergence in the two nations’ paths, 
as Britain returned to its earlier nursery education initiatives for all children and the United 
States further entrenched its reliance on the private market for the provision of care. The passage 
in 1997 of the British National Child Care Strategy, a central component of New Labour’s War 
on Child Poverty, included a free and universal preschool provision for all three and four year 
old children. In the U.S., by contrast, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act expanded child care subsidies only for eligible low income children below 
the age of five, thus continuing the American reliance on the free market to provide this 
necessary service for most families.  
I argue that conflicting visions of child care as an educational intervention versus a 
welfare service—and as a universal provision benefitting all children and families versus a 
means-tested program targeted to low-income families—explain the differences between these 
two countries’ policy developments in the 1990s. Specifically, my dissertation examines how 
British and American conceptions of motherhood and child-rearing compare, and how 
policymakers viewed the role of the state in intervening with parental responsibilities. In the 
United States, Republicans balked at the idea of public child care provision for the nonpoor, yet 
British politicians of both major parties supported universal public interventions in the early 
years at various points across the period.
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INTRODUCTION 
Child Care: Education or Welfare? 
In the fall of 1971, with the promise of universal, public child care on the horizon, one 
Kentucky woman, Mrs. Carolyn M. Sears, was moved to write to one of the bill’s champions, 
New York Representative Bella Abzug, to show her support even though she was not one of her 
constituents. She wrote, “I am admittedly not a ‘welfare’ mother or a ‘Fem libber,’ but I am a 
mother who can see for myself the need for the building and funding of day-care centers on a 
massive scale. I am an intelligent, skilled worker who cannot find day-care which does not 
gobble up my salary, and I earn an average wage; what on earth does a woman less skilled than I 
do to meet the needs of employment?”1 Mrs. Sears saw her identity as setting her apart from both 
the low-income mothers who typically received government benefits, and from a new wave of 
women activists calling for a reassessment of gender norms and familial roles. Yet, she too 
asserted a need for public child care so that she could work outside the home and support her 
family financially.  
Child care can be defined in a myriad of ways, and Mrs. Sears’ letter reveals how its 
framing reveals the distinct purposes that child care can serve. She saw child care alternatively as 
a welfare service for low-income parents, a work support for higher income families, and a 
necessary provision for women’s liberation. In addition, child care can also be defined in child-
centric terms, as an educational intervention designed to promote optimal social, cognitive, and 
behavioral development.  In the decades since Mrs. Sears posted her letter, these purposes have 
been pitted against one another, inhibiting comprehensive solutions. The struggle parents face 
                                                
1 Columbia University Rare Books and Manuscripts Library, Bella Abzug Papers [Hereafter 
Abzug], Box 138, Child Care Correspondence 1970-1971, Letter to Abzug September 17, 1971. 
2 
accessing high-quality, affordable child care for their preschool children cuts across income 
strata. The number of families in which both parents work has increased dramatically since the 
1970s, increasing the demand for care. Women’s labor force participation rates increased across 
the period in both countries, and the growth is even more dramatic for married women: 43 
percent of all women and 34 percent of married American women worked in 1960, compared to 
68 and 66 percent respectively in 1990; similarly, 46 percent of all women and 35 percent of 
married British women worked in 1960, compared to 65 and 69 percent respectively in 1990.2 
For a moment in the early 1970s, policymakers in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom came close to bridging these divides: between women’s and children’s needs; between 
universal and targeted public provisions; between educational interventions and welfare services.  
***** 
Britain and the United States are characterized in the comparative social policy literature 
as liberal states reliant on the private market even in the aftermath of the Beveridgean and New 
Deal programs.3 Before the mid-twentieth centuries, both countries relied primarily on local, 
decentralized (and sometimes privatized) public services. Both countries had developed similar 
attitudes towards poverty, dependence on the state, and pauperism that contributed to a negative 
perception of the provision of public social services. Even after the implementation of social 
welfare policies that reached a broader population than previously in the twentieth century, 
namely Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1935 New Deal and William Beveridge’s 1942 blueprint 
                                                
2 Diane Sainsbury, Gender, Equality, and Welfare States (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996): 105. 
3 See, for example, Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990); Julia O’Connor, Ann Shola Orloff, and Sheila Shaver, States, 
Markets, and Families: Gender, Liberalism, and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great 
Britain and the United States (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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for the post-war British welfare state, these two states diverged from other industrial nations, 
such as France or Sweden, in their reluctance to intervene in the private market.   
In broad terms, the welfare state in both countries seemed to be thriving for much of the 
1960s. Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs launched a series of new social programs 
designed to address poverty and inequality, including the 1965 creation of Head Start, an early 
childhood intervention program originally designed to help disadvantaged children prepare to 
start school the summer before kindergarten. Policymakers saw childhood as a key period in 
which to focus anti-poverty efforts. In Britain, both of the major political parties were committed 
to an agenda of full employment and collective, social provisions to offset inequality. However, 
both political scientist Hugh Heclo and historian James Vernon point to social scientists’ 
findings in the late 1960s on the persistence of inequality and relative, rather than absolute, 
measures of poverty as unsettling the social democratic project.4 
The differences between social policies in the U.K and U.S. and those of other advanced 
economies became increasingly sharp in the 1970s, a period marked by global and national 
crises. Both contemporary observers and, more recently, historians who have begun to study this 
period have documented that changing economic fortunes, shifting geopolitical circumstances, 
and domestic political and social unrest led many citizens to doubt the state’s ability to control 
conditions affecting daily life and to maintain public order.5 Capitalizing on this disillusionment 
with the power and ability of the state to achieve domestic policy goals and resentment about 
                                                
4 Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1974): 324; James Vernon, Hunger (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University, 2007): 272. 
5 See, for example, Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for 
Finance in the 1970s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Bruce Schulman, The Seventies 
(Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001). 
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state encroachment, conservatives in both countries were able to bolster faith in the market’s 
ability to provide prosperity. Small as they might have been in comparison to their continental 
counterparts, the British and American welfare states were put on the defense, particularly after 
the elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.  
While this shift to the market in the 1980s may have contributed to overall economic 
growth, it did not provide shared prosperity, as material conditions for many families did not 
improve, and both countries experienced rising levels of poverty and inequality. For example, 
child poverty nearly doubled in both countries between 1969 and 1986, increasing from 5.3 to 
9.9 percent in the United Kingdom, and from 13.1 to 22.9 percent in the United States.6 Anglo-
American ideological frameworks elevate the values of personal responsibility and individual 
choice, disguising systemic inequalities of race, gender, and class. These logics tend to punish 
parents, particularly mothers, for forces largely outside of their control, and in doing so limit 
opportunities available to their children, perpetuating a cycle of intergenerational poverty. 
This shift to neo-liberalism, however, was not an inevitable turn. Rather, it was the result 
of deliberate choices made by policymakers who, as dynamic social actors, lived not knowing 
the future and chose among a broader range of possibilities than is often remembered. This 
dissertation demonstrates that the early 1970s, prior to the elections of Thatcher and Reagan, 
represent a crucial tipping point in the dependency policies of both states. In both, there were 
failed attempts at the national level to move one particular type of family policy towards more—
not less—state intervention: child care.  
                                                
6 Lee Rainwater and Timothy Smeeding, “Doing Poorly: The Real Income of American Children 
in a Comparative Perspective,” (Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series, Number 127: 
1995): table 2. 
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The care and education of pre-school children presents a perfect storm of conflicts among 
the needs of women, children, and states, particularly in societies that maintain a sharp barrier 
between the private and public spheres such as the United States and Britain. It also highlights 
the role that competing values about public versus private responsibility for child well-being play 
in shaping public policy. The rapid increase in mothers’ labor force participation in the decades 
after the Second World War in both countries exacerbated these pressures, as did concerns about 
possible negative the effects of maternal work on child development. Prevailing values and 
norms about family and parental care-giving responsibilities were thus called into question. 
American and British policymakers attempted to address these tensions in the early 1970s 
by proposing universal child care programs. In the U.S., the Comprehensive Child Development 
Act (CDA) of 1971 passed both the House and Senate by overwhelming majorities but was 
vetoed by President Richard Nixon. Going further than any proposal before or since to establish 
a national public child care program, it would have made public child care centers universally 
available on a sliding-scale basis: free for children of the poor but available for a fee to middle 
and upper class children. The British Department of Education and Science, led by Secretary 
Margaret Thatcher, published a White Paper in 1972 calling for nursery expansion, but it was 
never fully implemented. It proposed a dramatic expansion of public nursery education, so that it 
might be available within a decade to all families with three and four year old children who 
chose to utilize it, with funds being made available first to local areas designated as most in need. 
My dissertation presents an in-depth account of the political bargaining that occurred 
during this period in both countries, and addresses the factors that contributed to the failure of 
these universal child care proposals. Although neither child care program was implemented (or 
fully implemented, in the British case), the proposals raise important questions about the 
6 
relationship between the state and the family. It also analyzes the aftermath of these policies’ 
failure through to the end of Thatcher and Reagan administrations.  
It then turns to the mid-1990s which represent a key divergence in the two nations’ paths, 
as Britain returned to its earlier nursery education initiatives for all children and the United 
States further entrenched its reliance on the private market for the provision of care. The passage 
in 1997 of the British National Child Care Strategy, a central component of New Labour’s War 
on Child Poverty, included a free and universal preschool provision for all three and four year 
old children. In the U.S., by contrast, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act expanded child care subsidies only for eligible low income children below 
the age of five, thus continuing the American reliance on the free market to provide this 
necessary service for most families.  
My dissertation seeks to answer a series of questions; first, why did policymakers and 
advocates focus on universal public child care policy during the early 1970s? What historically 
contingent factors came together at this specific juncture, and what societal issues or problems 
did they believe this early intervention would solve—poverty, inequality, lack of opportunities 
for children, delinquency, mothers’ failures to properly raise their children, encouraging poor 
women to work? Why did these policies fail, and how are their failures similar or different? Why 
did advocates in both countries narrow their goals during the 1980s, accepting and normalizing 
precepts that privileged the private market over state provision? How did the two countries 
diverge in the 1990s, and why? 
I argue that conflicting visions of child care as an educational intervention versus a 
welfare service—and as a universal provision benefitting all children and families versus a 
means-tested program targeted to low-income families—explain the differences between these 
7 
two countries’ policy developments in the 1990s. Specifically, my dissertation examines how 
British and American conceptions of motherhood and child-rearing compare, and how 
policymakers viewed the role of the state in intervening with parental responsibilities. In the 
United States, Republicans balked at the idea of public child care provision for the nonpoor, yet 
British politicians of both major parties supported universal public interventions in the early 
years at various points across the period. 
Policies are never made in a vacuum. In addition to studying the machinations of the state 
administrations and influential policymakers, my dissertation examines how various advocacy 
groups contributed to the policy debates by interrogating the broader, transnational forces, 
including intellectual debates on child development, feminism, and conservative political 
movements, all of which made children’s early care and education such a contested policy arena 
during this period in both countries. It can be no mere coincidence that such similar proposals 
emerged within a year on both sides of the Atlantic during the 1970s, and that the two countries 
parted paths two decades later. 
For example, the contemporary scholarly literature in the child development field was a 
central factor in convincing both governments to consider child care proposals in the early 
1970s. This assertion challenges much of the prevailing historiography, which sees John 
Bowlby’s theory of maternal deprivation as a reason why neither country has a comprehensive 
child care program: Bowlby propagated the idea that a child’s optimal development relied on a 
secure attachment with his or her mother.7 However, his place in the field is overestimated by 
                                                
7 John Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health (New York: Jason Aronson, Inc: 1995; 
original edition 1952). 
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much of the historiography.8  As historian Angela Davis has argued, “at no point did Bowlby's 
theories hold sway over every psychologist and sociologist in post-war Britain, and by the late 
1960s and 1970s his views were increasingly being challenged.”9 By the late 1960s, there was a 
more nuanced understanding of infant-maternal attachment among academics than other scholars 
have noted, as well as a push for state-sponsored interventions in early childhood to promote 
optimal development and to combat a host of social ills (especially juvenile delinquency and 
social inequality). Child development experts, in addition to influencing parent practices, 
supported the child care proposals in both countries, and were centrally involved in the making 
of policy. The popularization of their theories also shaped the ways in which policymakers 
interpreted public opinion and values. 
Feminist groups, such as the American National Organization for Women (NOW), 
became increasingly vocal in the 1960s in both societies, and many viewed childrearing as the 
responsibility of society as a whole, rather than of individual families. They challenged the 
contemporary values gendering the division of parenting that made mothers solely responsible 
for the care of young children. Further, they advocated for women’s right to work outside the 
home, both responding to and spurring on women’s labor force participation and thus 
contributing to an increasing demand for child care services. Public discourse today on child care 
often assumes that claims for expanded public provision resulted from feminist activism: child 
care in the United States and Britain is envisaged as a service that primarily affects women, as it 
enables them to undertake paid labor outside the home. Thus, the terms of this debate focus on 
                                                
8 See, for example, Denise Riley, War in the Nursery: Theories of the Child and Mother 
(London: Virago, 1983). 
9 Angela Davis, Modern Motherhood: Women and Family in England, 1945-2000 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012): 113 
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women’s social citizenship and access to employment rather than on the direct benefits that early 
care and education could provide for the children themselves. However, in contrast to this 
conventional view, I find that structural obstacles within newly-formed feminist organizations, as 
well as racial and class tensions within and between various groups, hindered feminist groups 
from successfully advocating for their vision of child care. There is a fundamental disconnect 
between these current popular conceptions about the role feminists play in child care advocacy 
and the ambivalent, even half-hearted efforts made by many national feminist organizations in 
support of public child care policies since the 1960s. Ceding “family values” discourse to the 
right, and focusing instead on women’s freedom to compete within the marketplace, mainstream 
feminist activism has, as Nancy Fraser has argued,10 largely abandoned issues of social 
reproduction. In championing women’s public engagement outside of the home, and the right of 
women to be more than “just” mothers, feminists have, perhaps unwittingly, contributed to the 
further denigration of the private sphere, especially the importance of caregiving activities.   
Conservative reaction to feminism and other civil rights and liberation movements of the 
1960s also shaped the context of these policy initiatives in fundamental ways that operated very 
differently in each country. In the United States, a vehement reaction among right-wing 
politicians, media, and newly formed organizations succeeded in painting state-provided child 
care as a Soviet-like infringement on the rights and values of the private family. This 
outpouring—which child care advocates called a smear campaign—squelched the chances of 
further legislative efforts put forward after the failure of the CDA. In Britain, on the other hand, 
the push for nursery education in 1972 came from the Conservative Party itself, which prioritized 
                                                
10 Nancy Fraser, “Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History,” in Fortunes of Feminism: 
From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis (New York, NY: Verso Books, 2013): 
209-226. 
10 
spending on young children over spending on higher education and envisioned child care as an 
educational intervention that had little to do with women’s work or changes in family 
responsibility. The values embodied in the Conservative policy proposal instead were focused on 
fostering optimal child development by providing opportunities for socialization and early 
exposure to school settings. The Labour government of 1974 cut and readjusted the education 
budget to shift resources back to their original allocations—from nursery to higher education—
thus curtailing the expansion for under-fives that had been planned by Margaret Thatcher’s 
Department of Education. These differences were crucial in setting the foundation for the two 
countries’ divergence on child care policy in the 1990s.   
It is important to note that my focus in this dissertation is on the fate of two particular 
child care proposals that, if they had become law, would have served all children whose families 
desired care, and not all policies that serve preschool-aged children. The larger the population a 
particular social policy benefits, the harder it has been historically to dismantle. As Theda 
Skocpol has written, “entitlement status, or automatically renewable appropriations, [have] been 
important in ensuring the longevity of social policies.”11 For example, in the U.S., Social 
Security has been very difficult to modify, while in contrast, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) was frequently attacked and reviled, and the entitlement to cash assistance was 
eliminated by the 1996 welfare reform. I thus do not discuss at length other important public 
child care programs that were intended for a more targeted population, such as the Head Start 
program in the U.S. or day nurseries in Britain.  
                                                
11 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in 
United States (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1992): 522. 
11 
In addition, I purposefully use the vague, neutral term “child care” rather than separating 
out the “care” and “education” functions as advocates, policymakers, and scholars have been 
wont to do throughout the period covered by this dissertation. I seek to upend the philosophical 
distinction between the custodial and educational components of nonparental arrangements, as 
children themselves require both elements: high-quality, developmentally appropriate education 
that adapts to parents’ needs and work schedules. Some scholars prefer the composite term 
“early care and education,” but this construction reifies the separation between the two elements 
as distinct rather than offering a unified vision of children’s needs. 
It is also important to note that race and ethnicity play a crucial, but distinct, role in the 
framing of child care policy in each country at the time. In the U.S., the CDA developed out of 
attempts to extend Head Start, the War on Poverty early intervention program that was a site of 
civil right struggles, to a general population. Given the additional context of the Moynihan report 
and attempts to reform welfare in the 1960s, child care was framed as a pressing issue mostly for 
poor, black, and single mothers, and the idea that white middle class families would have access 
to public services was unacceptable to conservatives. In Britain, nursery education was 
understood as a public intervention that white, middle class families supported. “Child minding,” 
on the other hand, a more informal arrangement that was difficult for the government to track 
much less regulate, was instead coded as a racialized problem, particularly for West Indian 
populations. While policymakers believed that expanding nursery education would lessen the 
demand for informal care, and thus would serve some immigrant or nonwhite families, the 





Constructing the history of child care policy of these two nations, and more broadly the 
shifts in the values underlying dependency policies from the 1960s to the 1990s, requires 
connecting several disparate literatures. These include: scholarly debates on social welfare 
policy, to evaluate the political climate that shaped the possibility of implementing a child care 
policy; women’s labor history to assess the need for child care at a time when an increasing 
number of mothers were seeking paid employment; and popular, as well as academic, views 
regarding the care of children and the responsibility of families to examine how non-parental 
care was judged, and the values and norms shaping perceptions of children’s needs.  
My research contributes to the literature on welfare state typologies and the field of 
comparative welfare state development by highlighting the similarities and differences between 
two states usually treated as examples of a single liberal model.12 It highlights the problems of 
such models by comparing these real examples to an ideal type, and takes up Ann Orloff’s call 
for the study of welfare states to address domestic and caregiving labor.13  It illuminates the 
paths taken by these welfare states in the wake of their embrace of neo-liberalism, evaluating the 
economic and political climate that shaped the possibility of implementing a universal child care 
policy.  
                                                
12 See, Esping-Andersen. 
13 Ann Shola Orloff, “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of 
Gender Relations and Welfare States,” American Sociological Review, 58 (1993): 303-28.  
13 
There are some comparative analyses of the relationship between gender and welfare 
policy that discuss child care policy explicitly.14 For example, one analysis from the 1990s finds 
that there are two extremes of child care policies pursued by industrialized nations:   
At one extreme are those countries which adopt maximum public 
responsibility for child care . . . [such as] the Nordic countries . . . 
and France. At the other end of the continuum, where the United 
States and Britain are the best exemplars, maximum private 
responsibility for child care is imposed.15 
  
However, these studies tend to discuss policies at a macro-level, revealing much about how the 
U.S. and Britain compare with other welfare states, but little about how and why the country-
specific policies developed as they did, how they were implemented, and how they compare to 
one another. While the existing studies are helpful for understanding the differences among 
welfare states, it is also important to understand the logic that undergirds these kinds of welfare 
states and the differences between these two “liberal states.”   
As historian Sonya Michel writes, one of the key aspects of what makes a liberal welfare 
state “liberal” is that “it is assumed that citizens will provide for their own needs through 
employment; the government steps in only in the event of family breakdown or loss of 
employment.”16 While this is very different from corporatist or social democratic states, such as 
France or Sweden respectively, in practice the U.S. and Britain also differed to a great extent. 
                                                
14 Particularly O’Connor et al; Sainsbury (1996); and Diane Sainsbury, Gender and Welfare 
State Regimes (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
15 O’Connor et al, 78-79. This assessment of the differences between Britain and the U.S. and 
other welfare states is echoed in Esping-Andersen and Jennifer Marchbank, Women, Power, & 
Policy: Comparative Studies of Child Care (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000). 
16 Sonya Michel, Children’s Interests/Mothers’ Rights: The Shaping of America’s Child Care 
Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999): 9. 
14 
Further, new work by Orloff highlights the “uneven processes of change” 17 in terms of the 
progress of gender equality in welfare states. While women are increasingly engaged in the paid 
labor force in most advanced economies, societal norms that prescribe caregiving as a female 
endeavor, whether paid or unpaid, limit their advancement. 
Historian Daniel Rodgers does discuss differences between American and British social 
welfare policies, and the ways in which trans-Atlantic dialogue contributed to policy formation. 
He argues that the period between the 1870s and 1940s can be characterized as a “distinctive 
era,” in which “American politics was peculiarly open to foreign models and imported ideals.”18 
He posits that the Second World War marked “the closing of the American’s Atlantic social-
political era.”19 This periodization misses a key moment in transatlantic dialogue: the early 
1970s. Although American politics may not have been as open to foreign models then, as he 
shows it was during earlier periods, there remain interesting parallels between Britain and the 
U.S. that deserve increased attention from historians. Rather than ending, the directionality may 
have shifted, leading Britain to borrow policy proposals—namely Head Start in this case—from 
the Americans instead of the reverse. 
My research also contributes to the literature on the role of families within the welfare 
state. Tracing how perceptions about gender, children, and the family shifted after the 1960s, I 
                                                
17 Ann Shola Orloff, “Gendered Labor Policies in the United States and Sweden,” in The Many 
Hands of the State: Theorizing Political Authority and Social Control, edited by Kimberly J. 
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examine how non-parental care was judged, and the values and social and cultural norms that 
shaped the perceptions of policymakers regarding women’s work and children’s needs.  
The literature on the gendered nature of the British and American welfare states is well- 
developed. Suzanne Mettler, for example, has argued that social policy during the New Deal 
“elevated programs that targeted men to the detriment of programs” that served women, leading 
to a divided form of citizenship based on gender.20  She posits that “the gender-specific results 
were less the product of sexist intentions per se than of a combination of institutional and 
political biases that combined to advantage men.”21 Alice Kessler-Harris has argued that in the 
United States, conceptions of citizenship are tied to wages and thus “gendered imaginations” 
about what types of paid and unpaid work are “normal” for women and men are written into 
seemingly universal social policies.22 
Robert Self utilizes the term “breadwinner liberalism” to characterize how Great Society 
social policy programs promoted men’s employment as the best way to attack poverty, rather 
than programs to assist single mothers, on assumptions about the proper hierarchies of familial 
responsibility.23 Marissa Chappell’s analysis concurs with this assessment, as she argues that the 
1960s “antipoverty coalition's welfare reform and full employment campaigns reveal an 
underlying cultural conservatism that value social order and promoted traditional gender roles 
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and family structure . . . It was liberals' cultural conservatism with respect to gender and family 
structure that fatally undermined their generous social democratic vision.”24 Even the agenda of 
labor feminists, described by Dorothy Sue Cobble, “fell squarely within many of the cultural 
parameters of their time and place. They rarely questioned women's primary responsibility for 
caregiving and household labor, and they, like most Americans, evidenced a considerable 
amount of ambivalence about the wisdom of having young children cared for by anyone other 
than their mother.”25 
Similarly, in Britain one of the major criticisms of the Beveridge Report has been that the 
new programs established by Clement Attlee’s government reinforced gender inequalities, for 
example by ensuring women's continued economic dependence on men and on the state. Jose 
Harris maintains that the Beveridge Report and resulting policies solidified gender roles that 
already existed in the labor market and in the family by translating these into the realm of 
centralized social policy, thus further entrenching patriarchy. In other words, it “reinforc[ed] the 
confinement of women to motherhood and the home.”26 Despite this criticism, the Beveridge 
Report and the resulting creation of welfare state programs were wildly popular, even among 
women. Susan Pedersen has explained that examples like this of contemporary women’s 
perspectives on gendered family roles can be understood if we consider that:  
Labor market inequalities, gendered social policies, and the 
normative ideal of the male breadwinner model proved mutually 
reinforcing, turning sexually inegalitarian policies into ‘common 
sense’ . . . Inequalities like these structured not only choices but 
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desires and help us understand why even [left wing] women often 
viewed the role of housewife and mother as more rewarding (and 
as a source of greater domestic power) than that of wage earner.27
  
Indeed, contemporary statistics showed that seven-eighths of British married women were 
dependent on their husbands during the early 1940s and “made marriage their sole occupation.” 
Thus, Beveridge believed that “whether or not this was a good thing, social policy had to be 
geared to the needs of the majority and not to the needs of an atypical minority.”28 In this view, 
the proper responsibility of social policy is to respond to, rather than reshape, gender roles in 
society, no matter the inequities. As Pat Thane has argued “since state policies are necessarily 
outgrowths of the dominant culture, it is not surprising that a society in which gender inequality 
is pervasive produces social policies which replicate, even reinforce, that inequality.”29 
While the postwar period was marked by significant changes in family composition and 
increases in women’s paid employment, historians have characterized both countries as turning 
inwards in the immediate period after the war. For example, Elaine Tyler May describes the new 
American domesticity of the 1950s as an ideology of “containment,” in which “[many] worried 
that the real dangers to America were internal ones: racial strife, emancipated women, class 
conflict, and familial disruption. To alleviate these fears, Americans turned to the family as a 
bastion of safety in an insecure world . . . family stability appeared to be the best bulwark against 
the dangers of the Cold War.”30 On the other side of the Atlantic, Carolyn Steedman and Ina 
                                                
27 Susan Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and 
France 1914-1945 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 314. 
28 Harris, 95. 
29 Pat Thane, Foundations of the Welfare State (London, UK: Longman, 1996): 283. 
30 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1988): 9. 
18 
Zweiniger-Bargielowska have shown how postwar austerity and rationing had the 
counterintuitive effect of leading to increased demands for consumption of domestic goods, 
particularly among women.31  
Both countries also experienced similar demographic changes in the mid-twentieth 
century, including married women’s increasing labor force participation. Fertility rates in both 
countries have remained fairly parallel as they fell across the period: women in both countries 
had an average of 2.9 children in 1965, and this fell to 2 children for American women and 1.8 
for British women by 2004.32 Divorce rates also increased in both countries, although single 
mothers were more likely to work in the U.S. than in Britain; for example, in 1980, 68 percent of 
American single mothers worked, compared to 49 percent of British single mothers.33 This 
period also encapsulates emerging feminist movements, and the so-called “sexual revolution.” 
These demographic changes and social movements called into question prevailing norms about 
family and parental care-giving responsibilities, making ordering much of economic and public 
life by sex illegal and actionable. Furthermore, the widespread student-led protests of 1968 
contributed to an increased concern about the contemporary status of youth, and may have 
exacerbated concerns about children and delinquency. Such sentiments can be found, for 
example, in Nixon’s statement before the 1970 White House Conference on Children and Youth 
that: 
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Never has this White House Conference come at a time of greater 
national questioning. Long held attitudes on such subjects as 
family planning, pornography, health services, school curricula, 
sex education, family structure, drug abuse, moral standards, 
governance of higher education, responsiveness of government—
all are now openly challenged and debated.34 
 
Perceptions of an impending crisis to the health and welfare of the population inspired calls for 
drastic actions to curb possible negative effects. At this White House conference, “the need for 
child care was identified as the number one problem facing the American family”35 because the 
early years were seen as crucial for preventing such public health problems.  
The 1972 publication of Britain’s National Child Development Study, a longitudinal 
study of children born in 1958, attracted much media attention to the relationship between 
social class and child behavioral, health and educational outcomes. As the study’s director put it 
in retrospect, “the extent of the social, health and educational differences which were already so 
starkly apparent in the nation's children” by age seven shocked many, and “prompt[ed] 
politicians of both major parties to look at the possibilities of offering nursery education.”36 
Public intervention in the early years was thus seen at this juncture in the early 1970s as a 
solution to contemporary social and demographic dilemmas in both nations, especially for low-
income or working-class families. 
However, the 1970s were also marked by a sense of decline in both countries. For 
example, Natasha Zaretsky argues that fears about family decline in the U.S., especially the crisis 
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of the nuclear family and the increase in divorce and non-marital childbearing, were at the center 
of fears about national decline in 1970s, and that these worries were mutually constitutive.37 The 
anxieties about the health of the American family were heightened by the sheer number of crises 
facing the nation: the Viet Nam war; rising inflation and unemployment, along with increased 
global competition; and the oil crisis, with its accompanying shock that the economy was 
dependent on a commodity that could not be counted upon reliably. Zaretsky concludes that such 
concerns led to a reemergence of support for “traditional” family values among politicians and 
the public, and a refocusing on the family as a private sphere that needed protection from state 
infringement. 
However, privacy—understood as the absence of government intervention in the family 
and the primacy of parental authority—need not be categorized in the same way in the U.S. and 
Britain, and this dissertation provides a new lens on distinctions in how contemporaries judged 
the proper scope for the state’s responsibility for child well-being. Carolyn Steedman, in the 
famous memoir of her working class childhood during the early days of the British welfare state, 
highlights how government intervention on all children’s behalf was not only normalized but 
also psychically powerful. As she writes, “in a covert way,” the universal provision of “orange 
juice and milk and dinners at school” had “told” her of her “right to exist” and be “worth 
something.”38 Introduced in 1946 for large families with two or more children and extended in 
1956 to all children, family allowances also provided a universal financial support for British 
children, and the National Health Service provided universal medical services after 1948 as well. 
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In the U.S., however, legal theorist and anthropologist Khiara Bridges has argued that 
privacy is contingent on socioeconomic status, and thus on race as minorities are 
disproportionately represented among the poor.39 Put bluntly, “poor mothers have been 
dispossessed of privacy rights.”40 Bridges elaborates: 
The state presumes that the risk of poor mothers abusing and 
neglecting their children is high, and this presumption of high risk 
has very little to do with the fear that poor mothers will not be able 
to provide for their children’s basic needs. Instead…the 
presumption of high risk has everything to do with the moral 
construction of poverty—the idea that people are poor because 
they are lazy, irresponsible, averse to work, promiscuous, and so 
on.41 
 
Because poverty is seen by most Americans as the result of personal, individualized failures, 
rather than of systemic injustices, the poor are subject to far greater government regulation and 
surveillance into the private sphere of family life than higher-income families, who retain 
privacy rights because “these rights are conditioned on the rightsbearer being presumed to 
possess a good moral character.”42 This dichotomy fosters racial and class inequalities in which 
“wealthier women bear this fundamental right as a matter of course, [while] their poor 
counterparts bear nothing.”43 
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My dissertation explores the intersection of women’s and children’s history by focusing 
on how perceptions of children’s needs changed over time in relation to women’s labor force 
participation. Much of the prior literature on social policy and gender provides only one piece of 
the puzzle. It tends to focus primarily on women’s access to paid employment and opportunities. 
As a result, the effects on children of maternal employment are either pushed aside as 
inconvenient to a triumphalist narrative of women’s emancipation,44 or used as fodder to decry 
feminist accomplishments of the late twentieth century. A more balanced approach is needed. 
Jocelyn Olcott presents a compelling methodological approach for discussing such 
tensions, albeit in the context of Latin American history. She describes “reproductive labor” and 
“domestic labor” as overlapping but distinct terms, and makes a plea to “restart a conversation 
between feminists and labor historians” about the separation of “public from private, production 
from consumption, and labor from love.”45 Further, she explains that “gender roles or cultural 
mores create expectations that obfuscate the lines between love and labor . . . [However,] we 
gain the greatest understanding about human experience not by separating out love from labor, or 
life from work, but rather by understanding them as a dyad.”46 Dichotomies between 
commodified and uncommodified labor have often led to the devaluation of caregiving labor, 
such as the care and education of small children, in favor of paid employment, and this can have 
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real consequences, both for children’s material and developmental well-being, and in keeping 
women who perform such undervalued work in poverty.  
Sonya Michel is thus correct in framing her analysis of American child care policy as 
pitting women’s rights and children’s interests against one another. She rightly warns against 
this, arguing that “children's interests and mothers' rights are not irreconcilable but 
synonymous.”47 As long as women are socially constructed as children’s primary caregivers, 
women and children’s seemingly divergent needs are inextricably intertwined. However, Michel 
does not focus on changing conceptions of children's needs to a great extent. For example, she 
does not examine trends in child developmental expertise, and although she mentions the quality 
of child care, she does not assess what constitutes quality or how views about quality have 
changed over time. For Michel, child care is primarily about women's social citizenship and thus 
access to employment. While she does briefly discuss the split between early childhood 
education and nursery education, most notably in relation to the Emergency Nursery Schools set 
up during the New Deal era, she does not assess the extent to which perceptions of children's 
developmental needs were transformed during this period.  
Many historians of childhood have taught us that definitions of a “proper” childhood are 
always contested and in flux over time.48 Martin Woodhead analyzes how children’s needs are 
socially constructed: although children’s needs are often presented by policymakers and 
advocates as timeless and universal, he argues that “concealed beneath the apparent simplicity 
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and directness of 'need' statements is a highly condensed combination of both empirical and 
evaluative claims.”49  
Thus, focusing on how scientific understandings of child development have shifted over 
time can illuminate the various values and norms undergirding our understanding of child well-
being. Several historians have described the twentieth century as a period of medicalization of 
caregiving practices, with an increasing perception that mothers alone are not sufficient 
caregivers. As Rima Apple explains for the American context, “as education and literacy spread” 
in the twentieth century, “the literature on child care and childrearing grew” but importantly, the 
“tone of this counsel slowly shifted. No longer were women depicted as capable of reading and 
evaluating this information for themselves. Now they were told they need to follow the direction 
of experts.” Women were seen as “passive learners” and the “patriarchal autocratic physician 
who insists that female patients must heed his every instruction” emerged as a new authority 
figure, especially for working class women.50 She further posits that “an ideology of scientific 
motherhood insisted on the primacy of scientific and medical experts and expertise in child care 
and the need to educate mothers. By the 1940s and 1959s psychology had become an even more 
important component of its advice.”51 Similarly, Denise Riley has written that beginning in the 
1930s British psychologists:  
Turned not only to the clinical practices of psychoanalytic 
treatment but to the business of giving advice to parents, 
broadcasting on national radio programs, writing articles in 
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newspapers and women’s magazines, and generally hurling 
themselves with apparent enthusiasm into the dissemination of 
their theories.52 
 
Fitting this trend, the proposed universal child care programs would have extended child 
development experts’ influence over American and British children to an unprecedented level. 
Other historians have argued that conceptions of the family also shifted after the Second 
World War, transforming it into a site of repression rather than a bastion of protection for the 
individual family member, especially for children. In her analysis of British norms of privacy, 
Deborah Cohen includes a discussion of how some of the psychologists of the British Tavistock 
Clinic, where John Bowlby was employed, contributed to changing perceptions of the family 
during the 1960s. She describes a cultural zeitgeist in which secrecy within the family, for 
example, homosexuality or adoption of illegitimate children, shifted from being seen as a private 
sanctuary to repressive and harmful.53 Similarly, Rebecca Jo Plant describes an anti-maternalist 
critique as figuring prominently in postwar psychological literature and popular culture. In 
particular, she points to works such as Philip Wylie’s Generation of Vipers (1943), Edward 
Strecker’s Their Mother’s Sons (1947), and David Levy’s Maternal Overprotection (1966) as 
painting mothers as overbearing and emasculating within the home.54  
Examining how child development experts’ advice was internalized, Angela Davis’ 
analysis of the oral history testimonies of Oxfordshire mothers reveals how damaging this new 
genre could be:  
                                                
52 Riley, p. 85 
53 Deborah Cohen, Family Secrets: Shame and Privacy in Modern Britain (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
54 Rebecca Jo Plant, Mom: The Transformation of Motherhood in Modern America. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
26 
Women recalled childcare experts in an ambivalent manner and 
indeed held contradictory feelings about their advice. There was a 
conflict between the confidence the experts' guidance gave women 
and the anxiety it brought for those who felt they did not live up to 
the standards expected of them…Whatever the message, and 
despite the changes in accepted beliefs of what was best practice, 
the advice given to women was offered in a consistently 
prescriptive manner. While the way they addressed mothers may 
have been more or less friendly, all the authors discussed here 
employed the imperative mood, so their recommendations took the 
form of orders - for example ‘let the baby sleep’ or ‘feed them on 
demand’ - rather than suggestions. The experts also highlighted the 
extreme consequences they believed would result if mothers did 
not follow the methods of childrearing that they advocated, 
exacerbating the guilt that mothers could face. And the levels of 
behaviour they set for both mothers and babies were often 
unattainably high, meaning women could be left feeling like 
failures when these targets were not achieved.55 
 
Child development experts were of course not alone in seeking to define caregiving 
practices in the postwar period: the feminist movements of both nations that emerged in the 
1960s incorporated new rhetoric on child care and parental responsibility for children’s well-
being. The slogan “the personal is political” suggests the centrality of women’s practical and 
personal everyday experiences to political life. In other words, women’s liberation movements 
challenged the separation between the private and public spheres. The “bedrock” of the women’s 
liberation movement was consciousness-raising in small, local groups, where women would 
gather for collective discussion. As the British historian Eve Setch explains, this activity was 
about more than just “the contemplation of one’s navel;” rather, establishing “sisterhood was 
about both understanding oppression [and patriarchy] and relating to and interacting with other 
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women.”56 Many of these discussions challenged the assumptions that caregiving was solely 
women’s responsibility. 
In Britain, child care was an issue for feminists during this period, but was not a top 
priority. Randall writes, “Although second-wave feminism was emerging by the late 1960s and 
one of the four demands of the ‘founding’ Women’s Liberation Conference of 1970 was for 
‘twenty-four hour nurseries,’ the issue was a divisive one, raising many ideological and practical 
problems . . . no national campaign came together until the 1980s.”57 O’Connor, Orloff, and 
Shaver find that feminists were more concerned with advocating for reproductive freedoms 
during the 1970s than for the public provision of child care, as they saw this as a more immediate 
barrier to women’s participation in the public sphere.58 They further argue that “the structure and 
values of British politics tended to isolate feminists from the political mainstream and from 
potential allies,” and thus that the women’s movement had very little influence on child care 
debates within “a relatively impenetrable administrative and political environment.” 59 
One of the ironies of this period is that British feminists were not at the forefront of 
advocacy on this very issue, which by all definitions seems to belong squarely within the 
feminist wheelhouse. Thatcher’s push towards an expansion of nursery education, as mentioned 
above, was spearheaded not by the women’s liberationists but by the Ministry of Education itself 
and an advocacy group called the National Campaign for Nursery Expansion.  This was not the 
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kind of child care provision women’s liberationists would have necessarily have had in mind as 
it was a part-day, not full-time, program. As a result, it was not designed to directly support 
women’s labor force participation. This proposal largely came out of a movement for what were 
called “play groups,” in which groups of mothers would come together with their children, 
providing socialization for the young children as well as the mothers, who by virtue of staying 
home had been fairly isolated. The focus was not on women’s emancipation writ large, but on a 
demand for increased attention to the needs of mothers and children.  
Similarly, while child care was nominally, and superficially, an important issue to the 
American National Organization of Women (NOW), it was not enough of a priority at that time 
to garner the attention of the organization’s small official staff. I focus on NOW because its 
members were at the forefront of women’s advocacy at the national level during this period and 
because it was the most visible women’s group in the advocacy coalition pushing for the 
enactment of the CCDA. My research into other women’s groups at the time, however, suggests 
that they shared similar attitudes about and actions on child care. Historian and legal theorist 
Deborah Dinner has written about how a more diverse set of feminist activists conceptualized of 
child care, highlighting their shared characteristics as well as the very real distinctions among 
them.60 Part of this ambivalence is due to NOW’s racial and class composition, which divided its 
vision of child care into a public provision for the poorest families, and a federal tax deduction 
for the purchase of market-based child care for the wealthiest families. Its membership thus did 
not press fully for the universal program embodied in the CDA, and was placated by Congress’ 
similar division of the issue, with direct public provision limited to the poor through Head Start 
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and tax credits for those earning incomes high enough to pay taxes. More concerned with other 
priorities, NOW’s leadership left advocacy around the CDA to volunteers who were poorly 
organized and under-funded, and thus were not capable of either shaping the legislation to their 
desires or lobbying Congress enough to overturn Nixon’s veto.  
The secondary literature on the history of child care policy interventions specifically is 
small in both countries, in part because this is such recent history. As a result, much of the 
relevant literature on its history comes from other disciplines, such as political science, 
psychology, public policy, or sociology. And, works that do discuss the history of child care 
policies of the U.S. or of Britain do not cover my period in full, nor do they discuss the 
similarities and differences between these two nations.61 For example, Vicky Randall provides 
perhaps the best survey of British child care policy during the post-war period, but does not 
focus on the 1972 White Paper in any detail.62 Utilizing oral history interviews of practitioners, 
mothers, and children now grown themselves, Angela Davis provides a fascinating examination 
of how child care was experienced and understood during this period in three English locations, 
but she does not discuss how policy was developed.63 Maris Vinovskis discusses the origins of 
Head Start, but ends at the start of the Nixon administration, and is primarily an account of the 
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administrative battles behind the scenes of Head Start’s creation.64 Sonya Michel’s excellent 
analysis of American child care policy ends with the CDA, the very point where I begin my 
narrative. In addition, new archival material has become available since her book’s publication. 
More has been written about the Nixon veto of the CDA than about Britain’s white paper. 
Mary Frances Berry notes that the 1960s and 1970s presented “the greatest challenge to the 
preference for mother care and the idealized traditional family,”65 but that the CDA failed during 
this period because feminists “ran headlong into conventional wisdom about the importance of 
mother care for children. It was one thing to encourage middle-class women to get a job; it was 
quite another to challenge societal expectations of gender roles.”66 In her view, feminist actions 
during the 1960s and 1970s were effective in terms of women’s increased labor force 
participation, but did not adequately challenge the perception that children’s care was a mother’s 
sole responsibility. The following chapters will reveal my far greater degree of ambivalence 
about the effectiveness of feminist advocacy regarding child care. 
Sonya Michel argues that Nixon’s veto led to clefts among the child care constituency, 
ending all hope for universal child care. Michel argues that in vetoing the CDA “Nixon 
succeeded in tainting the concept of universal child care to such an extent that for years to come, 
few Republicans dared to support it.”67 Without bipartisan support, there was little hope for 
passing any universal child care provision thereafter. Further she argues that the constituency for 
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child care became fragmented along class lines, as direct services were increasingly targeted to 
low-income families and welfare recipients, and tax deductions placated higher-income families.  
Similarly, Deborah Dinner has argued, “Nixon exploited the association between 
feminism and universal childcare to legitimate his veto of the bill, and the veto, in turn, 
contributed to a decline in rights-based childcare activism.”68 Kimberly Morgan writes “the 
child-care lobby had reached its zenith in 1971 as disparate groups with various motives came 
together around the common goal of passing the CDA. In the years following the veto, the 
coalition fragmented as its latent divisions came to the fore.”69 The child care measures passed 
during the years after the veto—for example, the reauthorization of the Head Start program, 
targeted to the poor, and tax credits for higher income families to use for private day care 
services—were fraught with these racial and class tensions on both sides of the political 
spectrum. Andrew Karch has argued that "the venue shopping,” or advocates turning to other 
institutions, especially state governments that occurred after Nixon’s veto “generated policy 
feedback that both contributed to the contemporary fragmentation of American preschool 
education and constrained reformers' options as they sought major policy change." In other 
words, "subsequent political discussions therefore occurred on a different political terrain than 
had the discussions of the late 1960s and early 1970s."70  
The key difference between the two welfare states during the early 1970s, and what led to 
their divergence in the 1990s, was that the British Department of Education conceived of nursery 
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education as serving a developmental and educational purpose for all children, quite separate 
from welfare provisions for poor families. In contrast, the Nixon administration—despite the 
explicitly universal provision of the CDA—conceived of child care as simply another welfare 
program, of use primarily for poor working mothers.  
In the United States, child care interventions appeared less controversial to policymakers 
and the public when they were targeted to low-income families, for whom it was thought that 
state guidance was appropriate, but deemed unacceptable when applied more universally, as it 
was thought that middle class families knew what was best for their children. The public 
backlash against the CDA, accompanied by Nixon’s veto and Congress’ failure to override it, 
demonstrates that for these stakeholders, the care for middle class children during the early years 
still belonged in mothers’ private sphere of influence, despite claims that all children would 
benefit from early education services.  
This was not true, however, for Britain, where nursery education was promoted as an 
explicit mechanism for bridging class divisions and promoting child well-being. Shortages in 
funding, rather than philosophical opposition to state intervention in the family, explain why the 
British policy was not implemented. Reflecting earlier social welfare trends on mothers’ 
pensions and family allowances, British policymakers were more comfortable following the 
recommendations of child development experts to consider childrearing as a public 
responsibility. In contrast, American political leaders have always been reluctant to intervene in 
the private sphere when it came to the general population. Investigating why such differences in 
the perceptions about child care and welfare more broadly occurred is a central goal of my 
project, as is tracing how these differences manifested themselves in the two decades following 
the failure to implement universal provisions. 
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The 1970s themselves thus are a key hinge in the historical periodization of American 
and British social policy. Ann Shola Orloff has characterized the decade as “pivotal” in that 
“events led to the replacement of support to men’s breadwinning and women’s housewifery with 
backing to employment for all,”71 and both countries were poised to realign this particular form 
of dependency policy. In Britain, this was still a period of consensus in terms of social 
democracy: this particular child care policy came from the Conservatives, who valued child care 
in part as a way to equalize the playing field at the start of children’s lives and promote 
opportunity. In the U.S., the context of the War on Poverty is crucial: childhood was seen as a 
key period in which to focus anti-poverty efforts, but a growing chorus of conservative attacks 
on the newly developed social programs would prove insurmountable. Although these proposals 
failed in both countries, their lack of success was not inevitable, and exploring how and why they 
were proposed provides insights to a broader range of what seemed possible at the time. 
 
Outline 
In the narrative that follows, Chapter 1 examines the child development literature that set 
the stage in both countries for national proposals for universal child care interventions in the 
early 1970s. It reconstructs transnational debates among child development experts in an effort to 
understand why such similar interventions seemed remotely possible in these countries. Past 
scholars have focused on John Bowlby’s theory of infant attachment and maternal deprivation as 
a barrier to national policies, as this was uniquely popularized, widely disseminated, and highly 
visible within public discourse. Yet, these scholars typically overestimate his influence. By the 
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late 1960s, there was a more nuanced understanding of attachment, as well as a push for state-
sponsored interventions in the early years to promote optimal development and combat a host of 
developmental problems that were seen as contributing to social ills. 
Chapters 2 and 3 then discuss the American and British failures in turn. Chapter 2 
discusses the American failed attempt: the Comprehensive Child Development Act that Nixon 
vetoed in 1971. Because it was framed as an extension of welfare services for the poor, rather 
than as a universal educational intervention, the ascendant right-wing of the Republican Party 
rejected the language promising access for all children. Conservatives claimed that the bill would 
encroach on the sanctity of middle-class family life—and overstep what they saw as 
government’s proper role of intervening only in the private lives of the poor. This chapter also 
considers the advocacy efforts of the National Organization for Women and the National 
Welfare Rights Organization. While the broad advocacy coalition pushed for services to be 
targeted to those most in need, NOW and NWRO, which represented very different 
constituencies, both supported universal provision benefitting all children and families and 
balked at the bill’s means-tested targeting of services to low-income families, largely non-white 
single mothers. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the 1972 White Paper published by the Department of Education 
under then-Education Secretary Margaret Thatcher, titled “Education: A Framework for 
Expansion.” The White Paper presented a potent Conservative argument for universal public 
nursery provision. Thatcher conceived of nursery education as serving a developmental and 
educational purpose for all children, quite separate from welfare provisions for poor families or 
work supports for women. It is this crucial, albeit arbitrary, distinction which explains how 
nursery education was envisaged as an exception to her advocacy of cutting welfare spending.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 comparatively analyze the aftermath of these failures, and then their 
divergence in the 1990s. Chapter 4 examines the period from the mid-1970s until the late 1980s, 
highlighting the distinctions in how child care was framed in both countries.  In the U.S., child 
care was always depicted as a means-tested welfare program, and, as a result, any extension of 
public services to middle-class families was reviled by conservatives as interfering with private 
familial responsibilities. In contrast, in Britain child care was considered as an education 
program and never attacked as vehemently by the Conservative Party. It also examines the ways 
that advocates shifted their approaches during the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, for 
example focusing on campaigns for the expansion of employer-provided child care. 
Chapter 5 juxtaposes New Labour's War on Child Poverty, which included a universal 
child care component, with the creation of the American child care subsidy program for low-
income families in 1990, and its expansion in the 1996 welfare reform, further entrenching 
American reliance on the provision of services by the the private market. It argues that because 
Conservative rhetoric never denounced nursery education in Britain in the same manner as 
conservatives in the U.S. did, the Conservative Party was more willing to accept the universal 
provision that the Labour Party introduced. In the U.S., on the other hand, child care advocates 
were more limited in the provisions that were politically possible because Republicans had so 
delegitimized universal options in previous decades. 
Understanding changes in this particular form of dependency policy illuminate shifts in 
the relationship between the British and American welfare-states and the family. Contemporary 
child care policy has been molded by changing and competing values about public versus private 
responsibility for the care and education of young children. In the current political landscape, 
marred by the aftermath of an economic recession and continuing calls for austerity, yet also 
36 
marked with renewed calls for universal child care services such as pre-kindergarten, we should 
look back to the similarities of the 1970s and examine how the consequences of policy choices 
affected children’s prospects. It is only by understanding how the present landscape was 
influenced by past perceptions of the public role in the care and education of young children that 
policymakers can move forward with an inclusive approach to our child care dilemma to assist 




Child Development Experts and the Origins of Proposals for  
Early Education Interventions in the United States and Britain 
Richard Nixon, then in the first months of his presidency, professed his administration’s 
new commitment to the first five years of a child’s life.  The impetus for the shift in policy, he 
declared, was “one of the most characteristic developments of the modern age: new knowledge, 
new facts.” This new scientific research, he continued, had revealed “that the process of human 
development is in certain fundamental ways different from what it has been thought to be. Or 
perhaps it is the case that mothers have always understood, but that only men have failed to take 
notice: We have learned, first of all, that the process of learning how to learn begins very, very 
early in the life of the infant child.”1 Not only did research reveal that the early years were 
critical to development, but, Nixon continued, “It is just as certain that we shall have to invent 
new social institutions to respond to this new knowledge.”2 A year later Margaret Thatcher, who 
was not yet Prime Minister, similarly declared that “the crucial importance of the early years in 
the development of children's abilities is now universally recognised.”3 For both of these 
politicians, a new consensus among child development experts provided the justification to alter 
the government’s relationship with the family, and to take on new responsibility for their 
nation’s youngest children. The mother-child relationship was no longer seen as sacrosanct—the 
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state had an important role to play in promoting optimal development, and mothers alone were 
insufficient. 
********** 
Why would universal child care proposals be introduced in the United States and Britain 
in the early 1970s? Given both countries’ historical reliance on the private market and the 
strength of ideologies about early childhood as a protected domain of the private sphere for 
nonpoor families, the fact that the Comprehensive Child Development Act passed Congress by 
large margins and that the 1972 White Paper was published are extraordinary, unlikely events. 
Although these proposals failed, their lack of success was not inevitable, and exploring how and 
why they were proposed gives insight to a broader range of what seemed possible at the time—a 
transitional period before ideas about state retrenchment gained a foothold among policymakers.  
The historiography of these failed proposals tends to focus on child care as it affected 
women’s social citizenship and access to employment rather than on the direct benefits that early 
care and education could provide for the children themselves.4 Yet, although women’s increased 
labor force participation was a factor in bringing child care to the fore of policy agendas, it was 
not feminist activism that brought it there: Chapters 2 and 3 will show that there is a fundamental 
disconnect between these popular conceptions and feminists’ ambivalent advocacy efforts for 
child care proposals. Further, the 1972 White Paper did not reflect feminist priorities in Britain, 
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and in the U.S., racial and class tensions led feminists to back away from supporting the 
proposed child development legislation. 
I argue instead that a growing academic literature in child development studies after the 
Second World War undergirded much of the support for the proposed interventions in the United 
States and Britain. Child development experts provided both the impetus and rationale for a 
radical change in policies toward families. Indeed, many were involved behind the scenes 
offering advice to those who drafted new policies, or even directly employed by, their 
governments.5 This chapter will explore the scholarly literature that pushed both governments to 
consider child care proposals in the early 1970s, reconstructing debates among British and 
American child scientists in an effort to understand why such similar interventions seemed 
remotely possible in these countries. In particular, it focuses on child development experts’ 
perceptions of family, childrearing, and the proper role of state intervention. An analysis of 
changes in how scientific understandings of child development have shifted over time can 
illuminate the various values and norms undergirding perceptions of child well-being and 
motherhood.  
I am using the term “child development expertise” to refer to fields of knowledge across 
a range of disciplines in natural and social sciences that focus on children as objects of their 
inquiries. As the editors of one anthology on the role of science in influencing child development 
put it, “there is no one science of childhood; there are many. A small sample would include 
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psychology, medicine, sociology, economics, anthropology, and political science.”6 Individuals 
working in several disparate, but interrelated, disciplines who contributed to a burgeoning 
understanding of child development within the first five years of life will be examined here. 
A major shift in child development expertise occurred in the 1970s, as mothers went from 
being seen as the only proper child caregivers to being seen as inadequate on their own. 
Although the influence of John Bowlby’s theory of maternal deprivation is often cited as an 
obstacle that prevented both countries from developing comprehensive child care programs 
during the postwar period, his place in the field is overestimated by the historiography.7 By the 
late 1960s, there was a more nuanced understanding of maternal deprivation, as well as a push 
for state-sponsored interventions in the early years to promote optimal development as well as 
combat a host of social ills (especially juvenile delinquency and social inequality).  
Child development experts such as Edward Zigler in the U.S., and Jack and Barbara 
Tizard and Tessa Blackstone in Britain, supported the child care proposals in both countries, and 
were central in guiding policymakers (as will be discussed further in chapters two and three). 
Zigler, a Yale psychologist, was brought into the Nixon Administration in order to direct the new 
Office of Child Development, which would have been the administrative home for the new 
universal child care program. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Tizards (married in 1947) and 
Blackstone all held appointments at London University’s Institute of Education during the 1960s, 
and Jack Tizard became the first director of the Thomas Coram Research Unit in the early 1970s. 
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Barbara Tizard took the helm of the research group after his death in 1979. All three appear 
repeatedly in government working groups on nursery education during the late 1960s and 1970s. 
These individuals played a much more direct role in the policymaking process than the feminists, 
for example, to whom other scholars have attributed responsibility for pushing child care to the 
forefront of the social policy agenda in the early 1970s. 
Several fine analyses of child development experts themselves and their research exist, 
but none examine the origins of universal child care proposals in a comprehensive or 
comparative way. On the British side, Michal Shapira studies the role of the Second World War 
on psychoanalysis in Britain, arguing that “psychoanalytic experts made the understanding of 
children and the mother-child relationship key to the successful creation of ‘social democracy’” 
in part by making “the state increasingly responsible for the mental health and family life of 
citizens.”8  On the American side, Maris Vinovskis discusses the origins of Head Start. His 
narrative ends at the start of the Nixon administration, and is primarily an account of the 
administrative battles behind the scenes of Head Start’s creation.9 Edward Zigler has also written 
informative personal and analytical recollections of his experiences.10  
Other historians have argued that conceptions of the family also shifted after the Second 
World War, transforming it into a site of repression rather than a bastion of protection for 
individual family members, especially for children. In her analysis of British norms of privacy, 
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Deborah Cohen includes a discussion of how some researchers from the British Tavistock Clinic, 
where John Bowlby was employed, contributed to changing perceptions of the family during the 
1960s. She describes a cultural zeitgeist in which secrecy within the family, for example, 
homosexuality or adoption of illegitimate children, shifts from being seen as a private sanctuary 
to repressive and harmful.11 Similarly, Rebecca Jo Plant describes an anti-maternalist critique as 
figuring prominently in American postwar psychological literature and popular culture. In 
particular, she points to works such as Philip Wylie’s Generation of Vipers (1943), Edward 
Strecker’s Their Mother’s Sons (1947), and David Levy’s Maternal Overprotection (1966) as 
painting mothers as overbearing and emasculating within the home.12 
Similarly, the period between the 1950s and 1970s can be characterized as marking a 
significant change in attitudes of child development experts, policymakers, and the public. 
Increasingly, some women, particularly poor and nonwhite women, were not trusted to be 
sufficient providers of quality care, and therefore child development experts and sympathetic 
policymakers deemed public interventions, led by the child development experts themselves, as 
necessary to promote optimal child development. Denise Riley has written that beginning in the 
1930s British psychologists:  
turned … to the business of giving advice to parents, broadcasting 
on national radio programs, writing articles in newspapers and 
women’s magazines, and generally hurling themselves with 
apparent enthusiasm into the dissemination of their theories.13 
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On the other side of the Atlantic, Rima Apple argues “an ideology of scientific motherhood 
insisted on the primacy of scientific and medical experts and expertise in child care and the need 
to educate mothers. By the 1940s and 1950s psychology had become an even more important 
component of its advice.”14  
Much can be gained from analyzing developments in the child development expertise in 
both countries comparatively. There were many parallels and connections in the research 
conducted by British and American psychologists. For example, researchers in both nations 
viewed mothers as children’s primary caregivers, despite the increasingly common phenomena 
of maternal employment. There were also many connections between the two national 
communities of researchers. John Bowlby was particularly influential on both sides of the 
Atlantic, and many researchers drew on his research to argue that maternal employment was 
detrimental to child well-being. However, this was not always the case, as is discussed further 
below. Others drew on the research evaluations of the American Head Start program, which 
began to provide child care to low-income families beginning in 1965 to argue that state-
sponsored early education was a necessary intervention for poor children’s optimal development.  
 
Bowlbyism 
John Bowlby, the psychiatrist who spent much of his career at the Tavistock Clinic in 
London, pioneered the idea that the mother-child relationship was central to optimal child 
development, and that any separation could have dire consequences. As he famously put it, 
“mother-love in infancy and childhood is as important for mental health as are vitamins and 
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proteins for physical health.”15 In Bowlby’s words, spoken on a BBC broadcast in 1968, his 
work “raise[s] practical questions about mothers going out to work, [and] the age when a child 
should start nursery school . . . Any move that separates young children from their mothers needs 
scrutiny, for we are dealing here with a deep and ancient part of human nature.” 16  
Bowlby’s biographer, Suzan Van Dijken, speculates that his fascination with the subject 
of separation’s negative effects grew out of his personal experiences as a child. Like many 
children raised in London’s upper-middle class families in the early twentieth century, Bowlby 
and his siblings were physically separated from their parents for much of their childhood, with 
the nursery located in a separate area of their home. Their interactions with their parents were 
“strictly regulated.” For example the children were presented to their mother each day “all clean 
and dressed up,” and “after one hour the children returned to the nursery.”17  From oral 
interviews with Bowlby’s relatives, Van Dijken surmises that the departure of a particularly 
beloved nursemaid who had been his primary caregiver until Bowlby was four years old was 
particularly traumatic. Later, Bowlby’s father left the family for almost five years during World 
War I, and Bowlby was sent to boarding school at age eleven. Bowlby’s memories of these 
severed attachments, Van Dijnken asserts, shaped his subsequent intellectual contributions. 
John Bowlby’s theories of attachment and maternal deprivation gained global publicity 
through the 1952 publication of a report commissioned by the World Health Organization. His 
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theory was widely popular, widely disseminated, and highly visible within public discourse in 
both countries via publications in the popular press and in pamphlet form. Many have interpreted 
his contributions as bolstering opposition to public interventions in a child’s early years. For 
example, Jane Waldfogel has written that Bowlby is “widely interpreted as saying that only 
continuous and uninterrupted mother care”18 would build attachment, which was seen as vitally 
necessary for optimal development, and thus no other care arrangement would be adequate. 
Vicky Randall writes that experts during this period believed that:  
Pre-school children should be at home with their mothers. This 
belief…received a new boost and scientific legitimation, in the 
1950s from the arguments of John Bowlby and others about the 
dangers of ‘maternal deprivation’ . . . [and] expressed concern 
about the effects on young children of separation from their 
mothers for more than a few hours.19 
 
Similarly, Gillian Pascall writes that “Bowlby’s ideas of maternal deprivation were used to 
justify minimal social provision for children under five”20 because it was deemed women’s 
responsibility. A Fabian Society pamphlet from 1966 ascribed much of the conservative rhetoric 
decrying women’s work as harmful to children to the popularization of his theories: “The widely 
held belief that considerable psychological damage is imposed on the child if the mother works, 
is largely due, at least in its more sophisticated expression, to the work of Dr. John Bowlby on 
maternal deprivation.” 21 However, despite this insistence that his theory was an intractable 
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obstacle to policy interventions, as we will see, Bowlby’s theories were also adapted to support 
public policy programs for young children. 
Specifically, Bowlby’s theory rested on the notion that children need secure attachments 
as the baseline of healthy development. Historian Michal Shapira explains that Bowlby’s theory 
of attachment differed from Freud in particular in the role of the mother:  
While Sigmund Freud saw the mother as an accidental instinct-
gratifying object that provides food, Bowlby argued that…the 
mother was important in and of herself, not just as a food provider, 
and the child was seen as seeking relationships with others as an 
end in itself…All anxieties [are seen as] connected to the struggles 
and separations of the early attachment to the mother.22 
 
Bowlby thus saw separation from one’s mother as the root cause of adult anxieties. He posited 
five “behavioral systems” as contributing fundamentally to the formation of an infant’s 
attachment to his or her mother. The first two, “crying and smiling,” possess “a signaling 
function” that “activate[s] maternal” responses, and the other three, “sucking, following, and 
clinging,” require the child him/herself to take “an active role in seeking or maintaining 
proximity and contact.”23 These behaviors that create relationship bonds are biologically based, 
and specific to the human species. The absence or negligence of the mother could result in 
“maternal deprivation,” defined as “insufficient interaction with a mother figure,” and Bowlby 
warned that it could result in serious lasting consequences, the “most striking” of which “was 
found to be inability to establish and to maintain deep and significant interpersonal relations.”24  
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Bowlby’s theory of attachment grew out of his professional activities during the Second 
World War, especially regarding the evacuations of children from London. Although biographer 
Van Dijken rightly points out that Bowlby’s interest in the subject predates the war, as he began 
his research and even published during the 1930s, the war seems to have crystallized his earlier 
interest and contributed to the urgency and popularization of his work. Jane Waldfogel has noted 
that “the evidence on which Bowlby based his conclusions came from studies of . . . children in 
orphanages or [homeless] shelters [after the experience of living through the second world 
war]…who were indeed deeply traumatized by their experiences, but not from studies of children 
with working mothers.”25 Shapira notes that Bowlby went so far as to say that separation from 
mothers had been more harmful to these children than the experiences of the war and the 
bombings.26  
These questions about the theory’s generalizability to a broader population were evident 
to his contemporaries as well. One American study drawing on Bowlby’s theories noted that the 
characteristics of his study population have “tended to make [maternal] deprivation operationally 
synonymous with institutionalization.”27 These researchers noted that it was more probable that 
“there is infinite and continuous variation from some condition representing a most desirable 
mother-child relationship to a condition of complete deprivation,”28 and that maternal 
deprivation most likely functioned as a continuum, rather than an absolute. Thus, non-continuous 
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mothering by a single caregiver, they postulated, would have less pronounced negative effects on 
children than the total absence of a mother. 
Thus, Bowlby’s contemporaries understood his recommendations as more mediated and 
complex than other scholars have since depicted. For example, one nursery advocacy 
organization noted a rethinking of his theories as early as 1958, arguing the “separation and 
privation are not synonymous terms” and that the failure to make this distinction may “invalidate 
[Bowlby’s] findings].”29 A 1964 British government working party tasked with assessing 
proposals for nursery education found that “Dr. Bowlby had modified his earlier views about the 
mother/child relationship, which were not held by paediatricians [sic] in general; though it was 
realised that a stable mother/child relationship was essential, it was not true that to breach it for a 
few hours each day had harmful consequences for all children.”30   
Some scholars building on Bowlby’s theories found evidence that could be used to justify 
public interventions after the first two years. For example, one of Bowlby’s students, Mary 
Ainsworth, was born in America and went to college in Canada before joining Bowlby at the 
Tavistock Clinic. She created the “strange situation” experiment to code children’s level of 
attachment. Prevalent to this day in psychology, the methodology is described as: 
A  standardized  series  of episodes occurred in which  it  was 
possible to  record how  close  to  the  mother  the  child remained,  
with  or without  the presence of  a stranger; how  much  
“attention- seeking” the  child  did;  how  the  child  reacted  to 
being alone  when  the mother  left  the  room;  whether  the  child  
would accept comfort  from  a stranger;  whether  the  child  used  
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the  mother  as  a  “safe  retreat”  when  a stranger  appeared; and 
any  changes in  the  kind  and  amount  of exploratory play that  
occurred  with  the comings and goings of  the  mother  and 
stranger.31 
 
American child development experts were interested in this literature, but drew on it to reach 
different conclusions. For example, a 1970 literature review on attachment found that this was 
most important in the first two years—and that too much dependency can actually be harmful. 
Socializing was viewed as an important component for optimal development as well, and 
children with secure bases of attachment were seen as able to make stronger social connections 
with other individuals, such as other children.32 The review’s author, Eleanor Maccoby, in her 
own research found that “high orientation toward adult nursery school personnel  [when the child 
was three] was associated  with high  mother-attachment and stranger-acceptance”33 during a 
child’s second year of life.  
Other scholars were more explicit about rejecting Bowlby’s theory outright. For example, 
in his 1972 reassessment of research on attachment two decades after the seminal WHO report 
was published, Michael Rutter argued that while Bowlby’s assertion of the importance of 
“mother-love” to child development was astute, “unfortunately it led some people (mistakenly) 
to place an almost mystical importance on the mother and to regard love as the only important 
element in child-rearing. This, he continued, was “nonsense” albeit a “widespread” view among 
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child care theorists and practitioners.34 Rutter parsed apart Bowlby’s theories in several ways: for 
example, he asserted that research has shown that children can develop bonds with multiple 
people, not just a single person, and that even if the child is bonded most strongly to one 
individual, “the chief bond need not be with a biological parent, it need not be with the chief 
caretaker and it need not be with a female.”35 Other aspects of the environment also influenced 
child development, including nutrition, and exposure to a variety of visual, linguistic, and gross-
motor experiences. Rutter concluded that because the term “maternal deprivation” had been 
shown to be “heterogeneous” and its effects “too varied,” it had ceased to be useful and “should 
now be abandoned.”36 Put another way in a review by American researchers, “the issue of 
maternal deprivation has generally given way to a reanalysis which emphasized the functional 
significance of environmental stimulation.”37 
Thus, while the ramifications of Bowlby’s theories of attachment and maternal 
deprivation held sway in popular culture at the time, child development experts by the late 1960s 
held a much more nuanced understanding of his contributions. The experts who would go on to 
convince politicians of the merits of child care interventions reinterpreted his theories into a 
justification for a government role in the early years. 
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Rethinking Mothers’ Roles 
Reflecting cultural norms and practices, child development experts in both countries 
consistently assumed that mothers were children’s primary caregivers within the family 
throughout the period extending from the end of the Second World War to the introduction of 
universal child care proposals in the early 1970s. It is important to consider here Michal 
Shapira’s injunction that “we must look beyond later feminist debates that simple labeled 
analysts such as Bowlby…as anti-feminists;”38 like policymakers, child development experts 
were both reflecting on as well as reshaping public discourses on gender roles in society, and 
should be analyzed on their own terms. For example, Bowlby’s original 1952 WHO report 
omitted children’s relationships with their fathers because a mother is “without a doubt in 
ordinary circumstances by far his most important relationship.” Bowlby detailed why he 
perceived mothers’ primacy, and the secondary role which he assumed fathers play in their 
children’s daily lives: 
It is she who feeds and cleans him, keeps him warm, and comforts 
him. It is to his mother that he turns when in distress. In the young 
child’s eyes father plays second fiddle . . . Nevertheless, as the 
illegitimate child knows, fathers have their uses . . .  They provide 
for their wives to enable them to devote themselves unrestrictedly 
to the care of the infant and toddler . . . his value [to the child is] as 
the economic and emotional support of the mother.39 
 
In this equation, fathers’ sole role was tangential to children’s development and only a factor 
insofar as their financial and moral support affects mothers.  
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Somewhat more progressively, American psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner, who 
advocated for increased interventions in the early years such as Head Start and the CDA, wrote 
two decades later that, “setting aside the thorny but important issue of whether women are more 
effective in the care of young children than are men, the fact remains that in our society today, it 
is on the women, and especially on mothers, that the care of our children depends.”40 
Bronfenbrenner expressed sympathy with the contemporary feminist movement, but asserted that 
pragmatically, children’s well-being depended on “the status and power of women in all walks of 
life—both on the job and in the home.”41  
These two visions both assume women’s primacy in terms of parental caregiving 
responsibility and illustrate a subtle shift in thinking about families from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
Bowlby assumed the primacy of mothers is the natural order of family relations; however, 
Bronfenbrenner believed it to be a social construct, echoing how norms about the family changed 
over the intervening decades. Nevertheless, a 1976 British assessment of children’s needs found 
that the mother “plays a fundamental role in the child’s emotional development . . . the old view 
of the mother’s significance in this respect is being confirmed all the time.”42 The primacy of 
mothers remained a constant to researchers across this period, despite changes regarding how 
this was normatively judged. 
The question of mothers’ employment outside the home—an increasingly common 
phenomenon during this period—was thus a controversial subject for researchers. Married 
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women’s labor force participation rates increased across the period in both countries: 34 percent 
of married American women and 35 percent of married British women worked in 1960, 
compared to 68 and 69 percent respectively in 1990.43 As women’s labor force participation rose, 
so too did fears about the whereabouts and conditions in which children were left. In a 1960 
review of the literature on maternal employment, American Lois Stolz summarized the 
arguments that it leads to delinquency:  
It is frequently stated that a child is more likely to become 
delinquent if the mother is employed than if she stays at home. 
One argument on which this conviction is based runs something 
like this: If the mother works, her child will not be adequately 
supervised; therefore, he will have opportunity to taste the 
delights of doing what he is not supposed to do and thus become a 
delinquent. Another argument emphasizes neglect: If the mother 
works, her child will feel neglected, become hostile towards the 
parent, and unconsciously get back at her by doing what she does 
not approve of. A third one points to the father: If the mother 
works, the father will become the disciplinarian and, since his 
discipline will be harsher than the mother's, resentment and 
hostility will lead the child to delinquent acts.44 
 
Although these arguments were common in public discourse about women’s employment, Stolz 
found these assertions to be largely unfounded in the research. For example, the effects of having 
a working or a non-working mother on juvenile delinquency wash away when the sample is 
controlled by family structure (or “broken homes” in the 1960 parlance) or socioeconomic 
factors. Stolz similarly debunked assertions that mothers’ employment has detrimental effects on 
children’s behavior, school achievement, or levels of anxiety across a variety of age ranges. She 
concluded that the results were far more mixed: 
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The studies we have reviewed indicate clearly that children of 
employed mothers are not all alike: some of them are delinquents, 
some are not; some show symptoms of maladjustment, some are 
quite well-adjusted; some do well in school, some have a difficult 
time; some are self-reliant, some overly-dependent . . . The fact of 
the mother being employed or staying at home is not such an 
important factor in determining the behavior of the child as we have 
been led to think. It might be more profitable to focus attention on 
the psychological conditions within the family, especially on the 
personal characteristics of the mother and father and the kind of 
supervision and guidance which they provide.45 
 
Stolz thus argued that results would be inconclusive unless researchers examined the dynamics 
within the household and across different types of employment in a more comprehensive 
manner.  
Similar conclusions were found in Britain as well, demonstrating the interconnectness of 
the American and British child development communities. American Barbara Wallston 
published a similar review in the British journal, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 
thirteen years later, updating Stolz’s findings with more recent research. Wallston found that 
because the research, following Stolz’s recommendations, had become increasingly complex:  
It no longer seems possible or realistic to conclude with a list of 
dependent variables related and unrelated to maternal 
employment . . . Studies cannot determine cause and effect since 
the researchers cannot manipulate which mothers work. 
Therefore, care must be taken in using conclusions about positive 
or detrimental effects of maternal employment on children to 
encourage or discourage mothers interested in working. Until 
causation can be shown, there is danger in drawing implications 
for relevant social action from these studies.46 
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Child development experts thus saw that the previously-assumed link between maternal 
employment and child outcomes instead appeared severed, or indirect at the least. Wallston 
emphasized the importance of cultural factors in shaping the effects of maternal employment on 
children’s development, and asked “will the current rise of the women's liberation movement 
mediate effects on children of those involved?”47 She posited that if maternal employment is 
viewed positively by working women themselves, their husbands (if present), and society at 
large, negative effects on children’s outcomes might be avoided. This research opened a new 
door for potential interventions in the early years: if young children do not require stay-at-home 
mothers in order to thrive, there was a potential vacuum in care that child development experts 
(and the state) could fill. 
 And, indeed, these experts attempted to fill this vacuum: this research filtered in to the 
government agencies responsible for creating child care programs as well. For example, one 
review conducted by the British Department of Health and Social Services in 1962 noted:  
Research suggests that mother working [sic] is only one of the 
many factors impinging on children, and that on the whole it is a 
secondary rather than a primary one as far as child development and 
adjustment are concerned…The effects of mother working on the 
family are apparently determined less by the fact of her working 
than the effectiveness of the arrangements made to compensate for 
it.48 
 
Questions about Bowlby’s original assertion that any separation between a child and his or her 
mother would be detrimental to the child’s current and future mental health laid the ground for 
government interventions in the early years as civil servants and policy makers in the mid-1960s 
began to re-scrutinize the care and education of children under the age of five anew. 
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Medicalization of caregiving practices in the sixties contributed to skepticism about 
whether small children were better cared for in their own homes. As Rima Apple explains for the 
American context, “as education and literacy spread” in the twentieth century, “the literature on 
child care and childrearing grew” but importantly, the “tone of this counsel slowly shifted. No 
longer were women depicted as capable of reading and evaluating this information for 
themselves. Now they were told they need to follow the direction of experts.” Women were seen 
as “passive learners” and the “patriarchal autocratic physician who insists that female patients 
must heed his every instruction” emerged as a new authority figure, especially for working class 
women.49  
Fitting this trend, the proposed universal child care programs would have extended child 
development experts’ influence over American and British children to an unprecedented level. 
Women were not trusted by researchers to be optimal providers of quality care, and therefore 
they and sympathetic policymakers deemed public interventions, led by the child development 
experts themselves, as necessary to promote optimal child development. 
 
Advocating for Child Care Initiatives 
The 1960s also marked an explicit change in how child development experts viewed their 
role in social policy itself. In a 1973 review prepared under the auspices of the American Society 
for Research in Child Development in, Bettye M. Caldwell and Henry N. Ricciuti explained, 
“leaders in the field have historically not considered themselves responsible for whether their 
research findings were utilized or how it is done…In the past decade, however, there appears to 
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have been a general consciousness-raising that has heightened aspirations for the impact of work 
in the field...It is our conviction that there should be a symbiotic relationship between social 
policy and social action of the one hand and child development and its underlying theory on the 
other.”50 Not only were others popularizing and disseminating researchers’ work, but many child 
development experts began directly engaging in the policymaking process. 
 Child development experts claimed that interventions in the early years were crucial in 
several domains. One such strand proclaimed child care initiatives as a tool for fostering 
children’s intellectual and cognitive development. One 1973 British government report 
emphasized this shift from previous interventions:  
To combat ill-health and physical defects the original Nursery 
Schools emphasized the physical care of children. Meals, rest, fresh 
air, hygiene, and while these are still vitally important, with 
increased social and welfare services children are now better fed 
and physically sound…The attention in nursery education is now 
directed more closely to the children’s intellectual and social 
growth and development.51 
 
Similarly, Mia Kellmer Pringle—Director of the British National Children’s Bureau—argued in 
1966 that nursery education was important for children’s “intellectual” development, and that the 
early years are “one of the best periods for learning, and it may be impossible to make up later 
for inadequacy at this stage.” She continued, “a child needs security, new experiences, 
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opportunities for achievement, and responsibility; while these needs were met in a good home, it 
was easier to fulfill them in the wider environment of the nursery school.”52 
Other experts advocated for interventions in the early years as a means to ward off later 
delinquency; for example one British government report found the worry that children would 
become adolescent “drop outs” if the “drives” for establishing emotional stability were 
“thwarted” during the preschool years.53 The widespread student-led protests of 1968 may have 
also increased concerns about the contemporary status of youth, and may have exacerbated 
concerns about children and delinquency. Such sentiments can be found, for example, in 
President Richard Nixon’s statement before the 1970 White House Conference on Children and 
Youth that: 
Never has this White House Conference come at a time of greater 
national questioning. Long held attitudes on such subjects as family 
planning, pornography, health services, school curricula, sex 
education, family structure, drug abuse, moral standards, 
governance of higher education, responsiveness of government—all 
are now openly challenged and debated.54 
 
Perceptions of an impending crisis to the health and welfare of the population inspired calls for 
drastic actions to curb possible negative effects. At this conference, “the need for child care was 
identified as the number one problem facing the American family.”55  
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Child care was also seen as a tool for countering social inequities. As one early Head 
Start administrator explained, “there is critical evidence that the early years of childhood are the 
most critical point in the poverty cycle…for the child of poverty there are clearly observable 
deficiencies in the processes which lay the foundation for a pattern of failure—and thus a 
pattern of poverty—throughout the child’s entire life.”56 Similarly, the 1972 publication of 
Britain’s National Child Development Study, a longitudinal study of children born in 1958, 
attracted much media attention to the relationship between social class and child outcomes. As 
the study’s director wrote two decades later, “the extent of the social, health and educational 
differences which were already so starkly apparent in the nation's children” by age seven 
shocked many, and “prompt[ed] politicians of both major parties to look at the possibilities of 
offering nursery education.”57 Public intervention in the early years was thus seen as a solution 
to contemporary social and demographic dilemmas in both nations, especially for low-income 
or working-class families. 
Child development experts viewed these families in particular as in need of their 
services. Barbara Tizard, in a 1974 review of British research on nursery education funded by 
the British Social Science Research Council shortly after the White Paper’s call for expansion, 
cited one factor contributing to the increased interest in early education as “the widespread 
belief in government and administrative circles that the failure of many children within the 
school system is due to the shortcomings of their parents as pre-school educators.” Whereas 
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class differences in educational attainment were in the past blamed on “either the innate 
limitations” or “inferior educational opportunities,” the “equalization of educational 
opportunity” brought about by the postwar welfare state developments had not by the late 1960s 
“resulted in a levelling of academic achievement,” and thus nursery expansion was seen as a 
way of “compensating” for class differences.58 However, Tizard argued that these future-
oriented justifications were not warranted by the evidentiary base, as she argues, “what is 
needed is a considerable increase in both social and educational services for the under-fives and 
their families. It would, however, be foolish to justify such an increase by the argument that it 
will prevent later educational failure. There is considerable evidence that such an outcome is 
extremely unlikely. The justification for increased services must be the current needs of young 
children and their families.”59  
Regardless of their reasoning, early education interventions gained popularity among 
policymakers in the early 1970s, due in large part to the behest of child development experts. 
One common theme across the literature in both countries was the belief of child development 
experts that the early years were critical ones for child development because development was 
particularly malleable during these years. As a result, early interventions could have long-lasting 
effects. Thus, public policy programs were not only justified but also desirable. As one British 
researcher put it, “psychologists assert that an individual’s achievement in life depends very 
largely upon what he has been helped to learn before the age of five . . . As much development 
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takes place during the first four years of life as in the following thirteen years”60 Analyzing the 
origins of Head Start, Maris Vinovskis cites the importance of Hunt and Bloom’s finding in the 
1950s that IQ is not fixed at birth, and that environmental factors can influence intelligence as 
confirming the importance of early intervention.61 As one American psychologist, Jule 
Sugarman, put it at the U.S. Senate hearings on the CDA:  
We have to start with what is now a well-accepted fact, that the 
very early years of life are the most critical years in the 
development of the child. We have all sorts of evidence now that 
children without a rich background in the early years become the 
failures in the later years, that they do not perform effectively in 
school, that they fail to become a productive part of society, and 
that they constitute a very difficult series of social problems for the 
country over the years.62 
 
This viewpoint reveals an element of paternalism: researchers believed that some 
children would have better outcomes if they attended high quality child care programs than they 
would if solely cared for by their parents, who were seen as inadequate. As Reginald Lourie 
argued at the CDA’s Senate hearings, “there is serious thinking among some of the future-
oriented child development research people that maybe we can't trust the family alone to prepare 
young children for this new kind of world which is emerging.”63This has important racial and 
                                                
60 Johnson, 117 
61 Maris Vinovskis, The Birth of Head Start: Preschool Education Policies in the Kennedy and 
Johnson Administrations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
62 Jule Sugarman, Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971 Part 1. (Joint Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty and the Subcommittee on Children 
and Youth of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Ninety-Second 
Congress, First Session on S.1512). 
63 Reginald Lourie, Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971 Part 1. (Joint Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty and the Subcommittee on 
Children and Youth of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 
Ninety-Second Congress, First Session on S.1512). 
62 
class elements—”bad” parenting seems to be associated most with poverty; in the U.S. poverty 
conflates more explicitly with race, but in Britain intervention is also spoken about with a 
language of fostering more equity between the classes. 
Which children, then, were proposed child care programs meant to serve? One 1970 
study child care utilization in the North-East English town of Gateshead found that the most 
common reason children needed care was that their mothers were single and needed to work.64 
Another British study delineated the specific groups of children who were most in need of child 
care: aside from all children ages three to five, “who need opportunities to extend their 
environment beyond their own homes,”65 the author found that children with psychical and 
mental disabilities, with behavioral problems, from overcrowded homes, or single-parent, low-
income, or immigrant families were in most urgent need.66 This assessment points to the tension 
between proposals for targeted versus universal provisions of care. While many experts proposed 
targeted interventions—these programs would be less costly by virtue of serving fewer children, 
and would reach the children most in need of intervention—others argued that universal 
programs were necessary as well, and that early education programs would greatly benefit 
“normal” as well as “abnormal” children. 
The targeted, rather than universal, Head Start program was created in 1965 as part of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty to provide preschool services to low-income 
children. Its first programs were implemented over the summer, less than a year after the idea 
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was announced. This became a story of the government trying to do too much too quickly: there 
were not enough qualified teachers and quality was uneven across the various programs. As one 
analysis put it, “the emphasis on community involvement, the swift implementation of Head 
Start, and the lack of federal staff led to practically autonomous centers . . . [and] great variety 
among centers,” for example in participant recruiting methods and eligibility requirements, 
program duration, daily operation hours (for example, full-time versus part-time care, pupil-
teacher ratios, and teacher experience and training).67  
The program’s first national evaluation, published in 1969 by Westinghouse, as one 
historian notes, “raised questions about the ability of Head Start . . . to enable disadvantaged 
children to make lasting academic advances . . . [the report] temporarily dampened initial 
enthusiasm for Head Start among policy makers and the public.”68 The Westinghouse report, 
however, was widely criticized: according to one review of the report, after the results were 
announced, the study was denounced by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Robert 
Finch, as “insufficient” and “sloppy,” and the chief statistical consultant on the study “publicly 
withdrew his name from the report.” 69  Harvard University researchers Marshall Smith and Joan 
Bissell found that it was flawed. They criticized the Westinghouse evaluation’s sampling 
procedures for not taking regional and urban/rural composition into account, and raising 
questions about whether the “sample provides a valid basis for making inferences about the 
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‘overall’ effectiveness of the program.”70 For example, they concluded that the Westinghouse 
sample “may well under-represent small centers, centers from sparsely settled rural areas, centers 
from large predominantly black inner-city areas, and centers from predominately middle-class 
areas.”71  
Despite these flaws of the data itself, Smith and Bissell provided their own assessment of 
the Westinghouse data using different statistical measures. Where Westinghouse had examined 
average group performance on cognitive tests, for example, Smith and Bissell focused on 
individuals’ scores. They argued these more adequately gauged the differences between the 
children either participating in Head Start or in the control group. They concluded that some full-
year centers were indeed effective, especially those serving black children living in urban areas. 
This controversy reached the other side of the Atlantic: one British study, for example, 
noted that “pessimism is somewhat manifold as there is growing evidence that the effects of 
early disadvantage or deprivation are multiple and cumulative . . . [for example] the rather 
disappointing long-term results produced by pre-school intervention programmes such as 
Headstart [sic] in the U.S.A.”72 As Secretary of State for the Department of Education and 
Science, Margaret Thatcher directly addressed comparisons between her proposed program and 
Head Start in a 1973 speech to the National Children’s Bureau Conference. Recognizing that the 
Head Start research evaluation was somewhat ambivalent, Thatcher explained how the British 
program would be structured differently to address its shortcomings:  
First, Head-Start staff were trained very quickly in order to open 
short-term programmes for the children in the summer holidays, a 
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month or six weeks immediately prior to their going into their first 
grade. Second, on entering the first grade there was no continuity 
between what the children had been doing in their head-start 
programme and the work which they were expected to do in grade 
one. Neither applies here. In this country we have deliberately 
made the nursery expansion a long-term project. This will give us 
time to increase the number of teachers and assistants with 
knowledge of young children; and it will enable the majority of 
young children to have at least a year of pre-school experience. 
Fortunately we have general agreement on aims and objectives 
among those who teach in our nursery or infant schools. So there is 
continuity in the programme offered. But we are certainly not 
dismissing other countries' ideas and experience; and our own 
research programme will be looking very closely at the patterns of 
educational provision.73 
 
Thatcher thus explained that nursery expansion under her direction will borrow the positive 
attributes from Head Start model, but will restructure and improve its perceived shortcomings for 
the British context.  
Nonetheless, the relationship between policy and the child development expertise was 
controversial. In a 1974 editorial published in the leading journal in the field of child psychology 
shortly after the Nixon veto of the CDA, Urie Bronfenbrenner addressed the increasingly 
awkward division between the realms of social policy and science. Relaying his experience 
testifying before several congressional committees, he stated:  
There was a period, a few years ago, when I found myself 
frequently in a position that turned out to be excruciatingly 
uncomfortable. For a while, policymakers actually did look to me 
for truth and, what is more frightening, for wisdom. What I found 
was that, when they asked for truth, there was little I could tell 
them, at least in answer to the questions they were asking. I felt 
much better when they asked me for wisdom. Here I had quite a bit 
to say. But they interrupted me with an unfair question. They asked: 
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“What's your evidence?” Something happened that is rare in my 
experience: I had nothing to say.74 
 
Bronfenbrenner argued that while his fellow researchers recognized the need for policy to be 
based on science, the objects of study deemed acceptable within child psychology were being 
sealed in a vacuum, distinct from the realities of everyday life, including those realities shaped 
by government policy.  Meanwhile, policymakers asked questions that were too precise for 
psychologists to comfortably answer.   
Researchers also acknowledged the difficulty of evaluating policy interventions. As Jule 
Sugarman explained in 1970, when he was Acting Director of the Office of Child Development 
in the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: 
Political leaders and government administrators increasingly have 
sought advice from the academic community about child 
development programs. The emphasis on performance, budgeting, 
and cost benefit analysis has created enormous pressures for 
evaluation systems which could be used to make decisions as to 
whether programs should grow or die.75 
 
Taking umbrage with the weight thus granted to evaluations, Smith and Bissell in their critique 
of the Westinghouse study argued that “the most useful information evaluations can provide 
concern how social action programs should be carried out, not whether they should exist.”76 One 
1981 review of the effects of enrichment programs, including Head Start, in the British Medical 
Journal concluded that “unfortunately providing scientific proof of the effectiveness or 
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otherwise of a new line of treatment may be extremely costly and perhaps even impossible.”77 
The article concluded on an optimistic note, however, arguing that “only further, long-term 
research can point the best way to achieve what we all want.”78  
Despite the noted limitations of the data, inconclusive nature of its findings, and scholars’ 
discomfort bridging the child development expertise with their real world application, scholars in 
Britain still looked to Head Start for inspiration in creating of a British nursery education 
program. As Tessa Blackstone explained in a 1969 review of research commissioned by the 
government:  
There is a dearth of published work in Britain on the effects of 
nursery education. In the United States there has been considerably 
more work, although most of it is of very recent origin, and 
therefore able to tell us nothing about the long-term effects and 
nearly all of it is related to its effects on culturally disadvantaged 
children…findings are again inconclusive in that various studies 
have produced conflicting results.79  
 
Similarly, a 1974 research proposal to the government from the National Children’s Bureau 
noted that evaluating the effects of nursery education in Britain was difficult because “there is 
surprisingly little objective research evidence from this country.”80 Despite years of theorizing 
about the role nursery education would play, the lack of actual child care supply in Britain 
hindered experts’ ability to test the real world implications of their hypotheses. As we will see in 
chapter three, a new program of research was intrinsically tied to nursery expansion. 
                                                
77 Author Unknown, “Helping The Child At Risk,” British Medical Journal (Clinical Research 
Edition), 282(6277) 1981: 1647 
78 Ibid., 1648. 
79 TNA, Ed 181/269, Tessa Blackstone Report on the Status of Research on Nursery Education, 
September 3, 1969. 




This chapter has attempted to reconstruct this intellectual component of the broader 
climate that made universal child care policies thinkable and even desirable to child development 
experts. The proposed universal child care programs that will be discussed in the next two 
chapters would have extended child development experts’ influence over American and British 
children at an unprecedented level. These experts were increasingly called upon in the policy 
making process and by the public at large to give their scientific opinions on how to best rear 
children. As a result, child development experts and sympathetic policymakers deemed public 
interventions begun in the 1960s, led by the experts themselves, as necessary to promote optimal 
child development. Chapters 2 and 3 will demonstrate how policymakers marshalled the 




The Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971: Education or Welfare? 
The day after President Richard Nixon vetoed the 1971 Comprehensive Child 
Development Act (CDA), his speechwriter and adviser Pat Buchanan sent an apology letter to 
the public relations strategist, Ken Reitz, who was in charge of drumming up youth support for 
Nixon’s 1972 campaign. Buchanan was not apologizing for the veto itself—it did not occur to 
him or anyone else in the administration that early intervention services for children might attract 
the young voters that Reitz was hoping to court, as these same voters, especially young women, 
might be considering becoming parents themselves. In fact, the apology had nothing to do with 
the content of the veto: Buchanan wrote, “My apologies for …[missing] your party…we were 
busily involved in denying to the children of the poor the right to a humane environment for the 
‘first five years of life.’”1 
This message, on one hand jovial and tongue-in-cheek and on the other dismissive and 
condescending, perfectly encapsulates how the framing and institutional lineage of the CDA led 
to its failure. Because the bill was above all framed as an extension of welfare services for the 
poor, rather than a universal educational intervention for all children as the advocates and child 
development experts shaping the bill wished, it led an ascendant right-wing of the Republican 
Party to balk at the language promising access for all children. These conservatives saw the bill 
as encroaching on the sanctity of middle-class family life, overstepping what they saw as 
government’s proper role of intervening only in the private lives of the poor. 
********** 
                                                
1 Nixon, WHSF SMOF Buchanan Box 2, December 1971 2/2, December 10, 1971 Buchanan to 
Reitz. 
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The Comprehensive Child Care Development Act passed both the House and the Senate 
by overwhelming majorities before being vetoed by President Richard Nixon on December 9, 
1971. The CDA went further than any other proposals before or since to create a national child 
care program. Co-sponsored by Democrats Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale and Indiana 
Representative John Brademas, the CDA would have created new public child care centers that 
would have been universally available on a sliding-scale basis (free for poor children and 
available for a fee for other children), and administered at the local level. The centers were 
intended to provide high quality education alongside nutritional and medical services.  
Coming on the heels of the War on Poverty and the creation of Head Start, child care 
advocates saw the CDA as a logical next step in advancing an antipoverty agenda that focused on 
the early years. In his autobiography, Mondale reveals that he was optimistic about the bill’s 
passage when it was first introduced. He explains, “because the focus was on children and the 
emphasis was on opportunity, I assumed this would not be a controversial bill.”2 Even after the 
bill’s bipartisan passage through Congress, Mondale recalls thinking, “we’ve cracked this, we’ve 
found a new strategy to attack poverty and open up opportunities for children, and we can do it 
in a way that wins broad public support. All we needed was Nixon’s signature.”3 This signature, 
however, would never materialize, and in a “surprising” development, Nixon vetoed the bill with 
a message “plainly designed to scare people, poison the conversation about helping families, and 
dip into the nation’s stew of cultural resentments.”4 
                                                
2 Walter Mondale, The Good Fight (New York: Scribner, 2010): 98. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 99. 
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Conflicting visions of child care as an educational intervention versus a welfare service 
complicated the bill’s passage. Because of its institutional history, it was in many ways seen by 
policymakers, advocates, and the public as an extension of the Office of Economic Opportunity’s 
Head Start program. Thus the CDA was still, despite its universal language, considered an anti-
poverty policy, and its veto resulted from controversies surrounding foundering support for War 
on Poverty programs. This is in stark contrast to nursery education in Britain—although British 
policymakers would view child care as a particularly important intervention for disadvantaged 
families, it was viewed as an educational strategy first and foremost rather than a welfare 
provision. 
This chapter first discusses the origins of the CDA in the Office of Economic 
Opportunity, and the transfer of Head Start out of OEO and into a newly created office within the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: the Office of Child Development. This 
institutional shift coincided with President Nixon’s professed national commitment to the first 
five years of life. It also discusses the relationship between child care and welfare reform. It then 
discusses the CDA’s provisions themselves, particularly the targeting of services to families 
most in need, and how this move alienated some of the members of the advocacy coalition. 
Finally, it discusses the veto itself, and how the language it utilized was shaped by fears that 
conservatives would challenge Nixon in the 1972 primary. The administration, spurred on by Pat 
Buchanan in particular, shifted to the right on domestic issues to shore up support that had been 
foundering. The veto message was infused with rhetoric designed to show philosophical 
allegiance to the right wing. Not only did it succeed in securing the support of dissident 
conservatives, but it unleashed a vehement invective against publicly supported child care for 
nonpoor families that would squelch future legislative attempts to create a universal program. By 
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stipulating that direct services could only be provided to low-income children, as well as signing 
the 1971 Revenue Act into law the day after vetoing the CDA, thus reforming the tax code to 
include tax deductions for child care costs, Nixon cemented a two-tier policy strategy on child 
care that exists to this day. 
 
Origins in Head Start 
  Head Start marked the American government’s first major expansion of child care 
services for low-income children after the Second World War. The targeted, rather than 
universal, program was created in 1965 as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on 
Poverty to provide preschool services to low-income children. However, by the late 1960s, there 
was a great deal of uncertainty about the institutional future of Head Start: questions abounded 
regarding whether it would stay in the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), or whether it 
would be re-located to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)—and if 
transferred, whether its rightful place would be the Office of Education, the Children’s Bureau, 
or an entirely new office. As Head Start Director Jule Sugarman wrote to the head of OEO, 
Sargent Shriver, in 1967, “if Head Start is to remain true to the concepts and philosophies it now 
represents, there must be a favorable organizational climate,”5 and he was not sure there was an 
existing location that would be an auspicious fit. 
  The subtext for these discussions about Head Start’s delegation was the future of the 
OEO itself: the OEO was conceived as an agency with flexibility to experiment with new 
programs, and when those programs “mature” they were delegated to more permanent 
                                                
5 NARA, RG 235, 130-66-41-7, Office Files of Jule Sugarman 1967-69, Box 1, Head Start 
Delegation, 1967, Dec 13 1966, Memo from Sugarman to Shriver. 
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Departments; for example, Sugarman suggested to Shriver that OEO be given “a monitoring role 
which could be a model for OEO's future role” in programs other than Head Start as well.6 
 One logical location for Head Start was the Office of Education; however, Sugarman’s 
files reveal a reticence, and even fear, of this proposed move. One main objection may have been 
that all Office of Education programs were run through State Education Agencies: proponents of 
the community-action model OEO had good reason to be reticent about state control given the 
record of many states on civil rights battles. Further, the chairman of the Head Start advisory 
committee and one of the programs architects, pediatrician Dr. Robert E. Cooke of Johns 
Hopkins University, objected to its proposed move to OE, stating “Head Start is an educational 
program, but is far more than just an educational program.”7 As Sugarman explained to a 
congressional aide, “I must emphasize that it is my personal belief that the chances of protecting 
those policies [which govern the Head Start program] will be significantly greater if the program 
is administered outside the office of Education.”8 
Yet the Children’s Bureau was not seen as an appropriate office either: Sugarman 
criticized the office both for its “reluctance to get fully involved in” the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children program (AFDC—often referred to simply as “welfare”) as well as its 
“commitment to an outmoded concept of quality of services [that] has put the Bureau in a 
position of not responding to massive needs.” Further, “its concentration on the child has 
                                                
6 NARA, RG 235, 130-66-41-7, Office Files of Jule Sugarman 1967-69, Box 1, HS Delegation 
Jan-Sept 1968, August 1 68, Memo by Sugarman to Shriver. 
7 NARA, RG 235, 130-66-41-7, Office Files of Jule Sugarman 1967-69, Box 2, HS/OCD March 
69 #2, “Schulze Report.” 
8 NARA, RG 235, 130-66-41-7, Office Files of Jule Sugarman 1967-69, Box 1, HS Delegation 
Jan-Sept 1968, September 13, 1968, Sugarman to Spelts 
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prevented adequate attention to youth, families and community.”9 The Children’s Bureau was 
seen as out of step with the needs of children in poverty because of its focus on the child alone, 
ignoring the integral ways in which child development experts believed family and community 
factored into child development.  
There was also a sense of urgency about “delegating,” or transferring, Head Start before 
the end of the Johnson administration. As Sugarman explained to Shriver, “I believe that the 
apparent attitude of the incoming Administration toward OEO...makes it unrealistic to act on the 
assumption that [HS] can be preserved as part of OEO.” Sugarman considered this especially 
dire because “a consistent theme of President-elect Nixon has been the return of responsibility to 
State agencies. Yet...it would be disastrous to turn Head Start over to state education agencies at 
this point in time”10  
 
Nixon’s Commitment to the First Five Years 
Sugarman’s fears were quickly allayed: just one month after taking office, President 
Richard Nixon issued a new “national commitment to providing all American children an 
opportunity for healthful and stimulating development during the first five years of life.”11 Head 
Start was delegated to an entirely new office within HEW—the Office of Child Development—
and its creation was noted as a new prioritization of the early years. To Sugarman, this was a new 
moment for concentrating resources on children; as he wrote to a potential funder: 
                                                
9 NARA, RG 235, 130-66-41-7, Office Files of Jule Sugarman 1967-69, Box 1, Head Start 
Delegation/OCD Established Jan-Feb 1969. 
10 NARA, RG 235, 130-66-41-7, Office Files of Jule Sugarman 1967-69, Box 1 Head Start 
Delegation Nov and Dec 1968, Sugarman to Secretary Richardson, November 18, 1968 
11 Nixon Speech to Congress, February 19, 1969 
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The establishment of this new Office sets the stage for what may 
well become one of the most significant efforts to improve the 
course of human development. It has struck me that the situation is 
very similar to that which existed when Head Start began, except 
that the implications of this move are perhaps even broader than 
Head Start. I believe that the kind of effort which is contemplated 
may fundamentally affect (a) our whole concept of how one works 
with children and families, (b) the evolution of a system for 
delivering early childhood programs, which may or may not be 
part of our existing education systems, (c) our concepts of the ways 
in which research and training are carried out, and (d) the manner 
in which Federal, state, local, and private groups relate to one 
another.12 
 
Sugarman and Nixon, however, were speaking past one another in terms of which 
population this commitment would serve. Sugarman saw the commitment to all children, and 
saw possibilities for providing services to a greater population of recipients than Head Start 
currently aided. Nixon, however, in a speech two months later emphasized that his commitment 
implied services for the poor. He stated, “for the children of the poor this ability to learn can 
begin to deteriorate very early in life, so that the youth begins school well behind his 
contemporaries and seemingly rarely catches up…it is now fully established that an 
impoverished cognitive environment and poverty in its traditional forms are closely associated in 
the real world.”13 This, he argues, is the cause of the intergenerational cycle of poverty, and thus, 
“Head Start must begin earlier in life, and last longer, to achieve lasting benefits.” This 
commitment then was not to be extended to a broader group of recipients, but rather to the same 
population across a longer time span. 
                                                
12 NARA, RG 235, 130-66-41-7, Office Files of Jule Sugarman 1967-69, Box 3, HS/CB/OCD 
April 1969, Sugarman to Barbara Finberg 
13 Nixon, WHCF SF WE 25: Children files, WE 1 Children beginning - 1231/69, April 9, 1969 
“Statement by the President on the First Five Years of Life.” 
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To Nixon, the private nature of the family was still sacrosanct, and could only be 
interfered with when absolutely necessary. As he stated in his speech:  
There must be ways to protect the privacy of [the relationship 
between mothers and the very young], and the sacred right of 
parents to rear their children according to their own values and 
understandings. But they must also respond to the not less solemn 
responsibility that the full potential of those children—the seed 
beneath the snow that is not seen but is nonetheless there—is 
enabled to come forth. Finding a balance between these 
imperatives will test our moral wisdom as much as our scientific 
knowledge.14 
 
The “balance” that Nixon refers to here, between the “imperatives” of family privacy and 
fulfilling children’s full potential, hints toward what would eventually lead to the CDA’s 
downfall: whereas it was seen as appropriate to intervene in young children’s lives if they came 
from poor families, it was also seen as a fundamental overreach of federal power if those same 
services were made available to the children of the middle-class and higher-income parents.  
The 1965 Moynihan Report is crucial context for understanding this distinction, and its 
explicitly racial dimensions. The poor family—and namely black poor families as nonwhites 
were and continue to be disproportionately likely to be poor even as white families constituted a 
roughly similar portion of the population of AFDC recipients from 1970 to 199315—were 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
15 Sanford F. Schram utilizes data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which sorts 
Latinos into either “black” or “white” groups. He finds that in 1970, 46 percent of welfare 
recipients were black and 45 were white. Blacks outnumbered whites in every year after 1980, 
and in 1993, 50 percent were black and 46 percent were white. Sanford F. Schram, “Putting a 
Black Face on Welfare: The Good and the Bad,” in Sanford F. Schram, Joe Soss, and Richard C. 
Fording, eds., Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 2003): 202. Robert A. Moffitt and Peter T. Gottschalk, utilizing data that do account for 
the Hispanic population but that does not cover the full time period of this dissertation, similarly 
find that the proportion of non-Hispanic white and non-Hispanic black receiving AFDC were 
roughly comparable. For example, “In 1995, White parents constituted 35.6 percent of the AFDC 
caseload, and the respective percents for Blacks and Hispanics were 37.2 percent and 20.7 
percent.” Robert A. Moffitt and Peter T. Gottschalk, “Ethnic and Racial Differences in Welfare 
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depicted as dysfunctional, and social policy interventions in these families themselves were thus 
viewed as necessary for creating a better citizenry. Published in 1965, the report written by 
sociologist and Johnson administration member Daniel Patrick Moynihan assigned blame for the 
“tangle of pathology” on black families’ matriarchal structure rather than the oppressive social, 
economic, legal, and political power structures that shaped black life.16 Its publication signified 
the transfer of this academic discourse to the political arena.17 As legal historian, Dorothy 
Roberts writes, “a persistent objective of American social policy has been to monitor and 
constrain this corrupting tendency of Black motherhood.”18 Similarly, Patricia Hill Collins writes 
that Moynihan accused Black mothers “of failing to discipline their children, of emasculating 
their sons, of defeminizing their daughters, and of retarding their children’s academic 
achievement”19 as well as “emasculat[ing] their lovers and husbands. These men, 
understandably, either deserted their partners or refused to marry the mothers of their children.”20  
This racial ideology was central for justifying interventions into the family, including in 
children’s early years. Moynihan himself continued his political career during the Nixon 
                                                
Receipt in the United States,” in Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell, eds., 
America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences (Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press, 2001): 161. 
16 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Labor), http://www.blackpast.org/primary/moynihan-report-1965 
17 Ange-Marie Hancock, The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen (New 
York, NY: New York University Press, 2004): 57. 
18 Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty 
(New York, NY: Vintage, 1997): 8. 
19 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990): 187. 
20 Ibid., 83. 
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administration, overseeing the President’s Family Assistance Program (FAP), and thus his thesis 
was transferred part and parcel into the administration’s policy proposals. Recent revelations 
about how the Nixon administration framed the War on Drugs also highlight the racial overtones 
of its domestic policy agenda; Nixon advisor John Ehrlichman has been quoted as saying that the 
administration understood African Americans to be their political “enemies,”21 and designed 
domestic public policy in such a way as to punish the black community. 
Welfare Reform: Getting “Mothers Without Husbands” to Work 
The effort to reform welfare shaped the new administration’s approach to early 
childhood. Several excellent works have focused on how War on Poverty programs approached 
the family in ways that perpetuated gender inequalities. Robert Self utilizes the term 
“breadwinner liberalism” to characterize how Great Society social policy programs rested on 
assumptions about the proper hierarchies of familial responsibility.22 Historian Marissa Chappell 
similarly argues that the 1960s “antipoverty coalition's welfare reform and full employment 
campaigns reveal an underlying cultural conservatism that valued social order and promoted 
traditional gender roles and family structure . . . It was liberals' cultural conservatism with 
                                                
21 Dan Baum, “Legalize it All: How to Win the War on Drugs,” Harper Magazine, April 2016. 
Here is the text of the full quote: “I started to ask Ehrlichman a series of earnest, wonky 
questions that he impatiently waved away. ‘You want to know what this was really all about?’ he 
asked with the bluntness of a man who, after public disgrace and a stretch in federal prison, had 
little left to protect. ‘The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had 
two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we 
couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or blacks, but by getting the public to 
associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, 
we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up 
their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were 
lying about the drugs? Of course we did.’” https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/ 
22 Robert O. Self, All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s 
(New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2012).  
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respect to gender and family structure that fatally undermined their generous social democratic 
vision.”23 These analyses, while apt, do not fully consider proposals for child care policies within 
FAP or the CDA, and thus miss a distinction in the rhetoric between poor and nonpoor families: 
the administration saw work as appropriate for poor mothers while their children were in public 
child care settings. 
Writing in the mid-1970s, contemporary policy analyst William Roth discussed the 
“ancestry”24 of the CDA by explaining how the impetus for a federal child care proposal among 
politicians of both parties evolved from attempts at welfare reform. The number of families 
receiving public assistance from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program 
increased rapidly during the 1960s as civil rights legislation and Supreme Court decisions 
removed discriminatory eligibility barriers that various states had enacted, thus making it easier 
for African Americans to access benefits to which they were entitled. Roth writes that 
policymakers seeking to reduce welfare caseloads noted that “if one extended the definition of 
the potential worker to include women involved with dependent children, one would increase 
markedly the number of people who potentially could be taken off welfare, and child care would 
thus be a tool . . . A child-care program so conceived was politically attractive and justifiable.”25 
Such a child care program then would affect poor families alone: it would not change the 
division of labor within higher-income families where men remained the breadwinners and 
women remained the homemakers and caregivers. In a letter to the president of the National 
                                                
23 Marisa Chappell, The War on Welfare: Family, Poverty, and Politics in Modern America 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010): 5. 
24 William Roth, The Politics of Daycare: The Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research on Poverty, 1976): 5. 
25 Ibid., page 5. 
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Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC), a staff assistant to the president 
made clear the connection between the commitment to the first five years and welfare reform, 
saying that the priority of welfare reform was “to strengthen family life,” and that a “major 
expansion of day care” would be tied to these efforts.26  
The Nixon administration’s focus on efforts to move single mothers on welfare to work 
was no accident. As Secretary of Labor George Schulz explained to Nixon, “by and large, AFDC 
is a program for mothers without husbands,”27 including 14% who were already employed under 
the program’s current parameters. The president’s proposals for welfare reform attempted to 
redress the “family dissolution” problems identified in the Moynihan Report, “offer[ing] 
considerable hope of righting a long standing wrong” by “including the working male in rather 
than forcing him out of the home. A man would not have to leave in order for his children to 
eat.”28 If male breadwinner salaries were insufficient for supporting low-income families, it 
would be preferable for the family to earn two incomes rather than split up in order to receive 
public benefits.29  
Schulz argued that in order to move mothers from welfare to work, child care was 
necessary; in his words, “without the provision of child care neither training nor work can take 
                                                
26 Nixon, WHCF SF WE 25: Children files, WE 1 1/1/71-12/31/72, John F. Evans, Jr to 
Evangeline Ward, Jauary 23, 1971. 
27 Nixon, WHCF WE Box 60, WE 10-5 Family Security Plans Begin-7/17/69, George Schulz 
memo to Nixon June 10, 1969. 
28 Ibid. 
29 It should be noted that Nixon’s welfare reform plan also included the Negative Income Tax, 
which would have raised and guaranteed minimum income levels. 
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place”30 for mothers. In this calculation, child care was seen as work support for poor mothers, 
and a crucial component of welfare reform. Child care’s centrality to Nixon’s plan was also 
reflected in financial terms: Schulz estimated that publicly supported child care services would 
cost $386 million in the first year of the program, or roughly a third of the $1241 million 
expenditure on FAP. As need would be “cumulative,” since mothers would continue to need care 
for their children during employment, this figure would only increase as time went on.  
Schulz himself raised the question of whether child care should be tied solely to welfare, 
asking whether a program “confined to the children of public assistance recipients” would 
“create a two-class system of child care,” and whether instead the costs and “goals” should be 
borne by the “broad scale education and health objectives of our national program.” He 
continues, “child care is a somewhat separable issue from welfare,” and beyond solely training 
and employing mothers, it affects children’s development. Schulz also points to the opportunities 
that a potential expansion of child care could pose, including further developing the private child 
care sector and increasing employment for child care workers, many of whom could be “welfare 
mothers themselves.”31  
 
Comprehensive Child Development Act 
Participants at the 1970 White House Conference on Children cited the need for child 
care as the most pressing issue facing American families.32 Several members of Congress and 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Edward Zigler, Katherine Marsland, and Heather Lord, The Tragedy of Child Care in America 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), p 28 
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Senators floated bills on developmental child care around the same time that Nixon’s welfare 
reform plans were being debated. These plans would serve a larger population than that which 
Head Start served. The first iteration of the CDA, S 1512, was introduced for the first time in 
1969 by Senator Walter Mondale as the Head Start Child Development Act.33 An alternate 
version of the CDA, written by House Representatives Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm, 34 
reflected feminist concerns; however, their language which painted day care as a universal right 
for all women was cut out of subsequent versions of the Act. One member of NOW explained 
that “from a pragmatist’s point of view, the Brademas/Mondale bill has the biggest chance of 
passage—especially since both of these men chair the Congressional committees that consider 
day care bills.”35  
Despite its earlier introduction, the details of the CDA were largely crafted outside of 
Congress. In early 1971 Congressman John Brademas approached Marian Wright Edelman, the 
child welfare and civil rights advocate who had helped establish Head Start and who would go 
on to found the Children’s Defense Fund, to ask her and her public interest law firm, the 
Washington Research Project (WRP) to draft a child development bill “that would give priority 
to low-income children and would give control to the community” and that would have a 
                                                
33 Roth, 3. 
34 Deborah Dinner notes that Abzug and Chisholm disagreed themselves about the extent to 
which to target child care to low income families, and argues that the “debate over the 
distribution of finite resources highlighted class-based fault lines within the feminist coalition for 
childcare.” Dinner, 612. 
35 Papers of the National Organization of Women (NOW), Schlesinger Library [Hereafter: 
NOW], MC 496, Folder 202.1 Lathom to NOW Executive Committee, Board Members, and 
Florence Dickler, April 12, 1971. 
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coalition supporting it “so that it would have more political strength.”36 The broad advocacy 
coalition behind the CDA also included the National Women’s Organization (NOW) and the 
National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), as well as unions, churches, professional 
organizations, and other child advocates. As depicted by William Roth, “the fact that a private 
group could have had such important access to the government was a radical last testament to the 
openness of access” of the 1960s.37 This version of the bill was the CDA, otherwise known as 
the Brademas/Mondale bill, or S 2007 after being lumped together with the reauthorization of 
OEO. The tethering of the CDA to OEO was “not only as a political tactic but also as a matter of 
political ideology. [The CDA] was set out in the context of OEO,”38 thus growing out of anti-
poverty efforts  
Most advocates thought it would be a more practical first step to pass a less expensive, 
more targeted bill. While the language of the bill was universal, its provisions were aimed at a 
low-income population, providing services at no cost to families with incomes of less than $6900 
per year; this figure was reduced in the House and Conference Committee bills to $4320, a 
higher cut off figure than the eligibility criteria for either Head Start or AFDC. This strategy was 
perhaps flawed however, as the inclusion of targeted provision lost the CDA a wider 
constituency among NOW and NWRO, and potentially among the public at large: the larger the 
population a particular social policy benefits, the harder it has been to dismantle in the U.S. For 
example, Social Security has been very difficult to modify, while in contrast AFDC was 
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frequently attacked and reviled, and its entitlement to cash assistance was eliminated by the 1996 
welfare reform.39   
While the broad advocacy coalition pushed for services to be targeted to those most in 
need, NOW and NWRO, which represented very different constituencies, both supported 
universal provision benefitting all children and families. Although they were not the most 
powerful or influential organizations within the coalition, it is worth pausing on how they balked 
at the bill’s means-tested targeting of services to low-income families, disproportionately non-
white single mothers. 
NOW’s members were at the forefront of women’s advocacy at the national level during 
this period, and it was the most visible women’s group in the advocacy coalition pushing for the 
enactment of the CDA. Child care in the United States is often envisaged as a service that 
primarily concerns women, as it enables them to undertake paid labor outside the home. Much of 
the public debate about the care of children below school age has focused on women’s social 
citizenship and access to employment rather than on the direct benefits that early care and 
education could provide for the children themselves. Yet, there is a fundamental disconnect 
between these popular conceptions and NOW’s ambivalent advocacy efforts. Although NOW 
espoused rhetoric that child care was central to women’s liberation, their advocacy efforts for the 
CDA were compromised by racial and socioeconomic tensions and structural limitations within 
the organization itself: the primarily white and middle class feminists of NOW became half-
hearted advocates as the bill was targeted to low income families. 
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While child care was nominally an important issue to its leadership, there were several 
factors that led to its ambivalent, and ultimately ineffectual, lobbying efforts on the CDA. 
NOW’s Child Care Task Force Coordinator, Florence Falk Dickler, described the centrality of 
child care to women’s liberation by pointing out “if women are stuck at home w.o.[sic] any 
recourse to child care, then we win hollow victories or worse--we maintain status quo for the 
vast majority of women in America!”40 Despite this strong statement, during its first few years of 
operation NOW did very little to act on the issue at a national level, except to promote rhetoric 
that included these demands as an ideal. Both political strategizing and racial and class tensions 
moved the advocacy coalition that NOW was a part of away from its vision of child care as a 
universal program, and instead NOW for all intents and purposes advocated a dual system of 
care—public provision for the poorest families, but tax deductions for the well-off. As a result, 
its leaders did not press fully for the universal program embodied in the early drafts of the CDA, 
and it was willing to accept a similar division of the issues promoted by Congress following the 
Nixon veto. Because it was more concerned with other feminist priorities, NOW’s leadership 
devolved the advocacy effort around the CDA to volunteers who were poorly organized and 
under-funded, and thus were not capable of either shaping the legislation to their desires or 
successfully lobbying Congress to overturn the presidential veto.  
NOW took a clear stand that it viewed child care as a right for all women, and that 
targeting public child care only to low income families would be insufficient—they were far less 
interested in policies that provided only incremental steps towards this goal. NOW leaders were 
aware that their stake in a public child care program differed from that of many other advocates. 
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As Gene Boyer, one of the founding members of NOW asked in an internal memorandum, 
“shouldn’t we be the ones to keep pointing out that child care services are not just for the woman 
who needs to work or can afford to pay, but are a social benefit for children, parents and 
communities—the common weal—and are, therefore, the responsibility of the total society?”41  
Although targeting services helped NOW attract other allies in the coalition, this concession 
came at a high cost: its leadership lost enthusiasm for the CDA when it became clear that its 
provisions would be targeted to low-income, disproportionately non-white families, despite its 
universal language that all children would benefit from comprehensive services during the early 
years.   
NOW’s organizational structure also negatively affected its efforts to lobby for the CDA. 
In the early 1970s, NOW was still a very young organization. Though its membership had 
expanded rapidly in its first few years, its official staff remained small in number, and it relied 
heavily on the voluntary efforts of members for much of its public action. Most of the work 
around child care was in fact undertaken by its task forces, completely composed of volunteers. 
Although Ann Scott, NOW Vice President for Legislation at the time, described “my job as 
including not only lobbying congress for laws and the Executive for enforcement, but as 
administrative and organization in cooperation with the Task Force Coordinators,”42 she did not 
assume any responsibility for action around child care because it fell into the Child Care Task 
Force’s realm. Laudable as this intention may seem, by relegating responsibility to the task force 
leaders who were volunteers, Scott deprived those lobbying for the CDA of access to greater 
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resources and influence. Further, the NOW archives are riddled with complaints that the task 
forces were under-funded and lacked a clear communication strategy. Finally, as the task forces 
were voluntary, their members at times acted quite unprofessionally. For example, the one NOW 
member who had been granted permission to testify before Congress on one version of the CDA 
failed to appear. One Child Care Task Force member complained, “I am very unhappy that 
Helen Borel of the N.Y. chapter of NOW requested a chance to testify on Sen. Long’s bill, was 
put on the calendar and then didn’t show up. That makes NOW look pretty dumb. It also took 
away the chance of anyone else testifying, because the Committee only wanted one 
representative from NOW.”43 NOW thus did not provide testimony during the CDA hearings, 
though a statement from the task force was submitted to the committee. 
Largely representing poor, non-white, and single mothers, the National Welfare Rights 
Organization held a very different perspective on child care than NOW. Felicia Kornbluh, in her 
extensive examination of the organization has shown that NWRO activists were fighting for the 
“privilege that had traditionally been granted to respectable white women” of staying home with 
their children rather than pursuing low-income work.44 As such, NWRO vehemently opposed 
FAP, depicting the proposed child care facilities as “custodial type warehouses.”45 However, 
Kornbluh does not focus on the CDA, and misses that NWRO was not opposed to the universal, 
developmentally-appropriate services that would have been implemented. In NWRO’s words, 
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the CDA “seems to be one that will meet WRO [Welfare Rights Organizations’] member’s’ [sic] 
needs. It should give WROs the opportunity to run their own childcare centers the way they want 
. . . in their neighborhood, at the hours that they need, for the children that need it, and with the 
least conflict with family life and values.”46 
While supporting universal, high quality child care for all, NWRO leaders worried that 
targeting services to poor families—even though this would focus the bill’s reach on their 
members—would lead to a tiered child care system of poor quality care for its members who 
would continue to be forced to work. As stated in one of their publications, NWRO believed that 
“child care must be seen as a public utility in which everyone has an equal right…No system 
should be allowed that creates two classes of children by putting poor children in daycare 
dumping grounds while others receive quality care.”47 
Within Congress, decisions about how and whether to target child care provision in the 
CDA was similarly fraught with both pragmatic and philosophical concerns. For example, during 
the September 1971 Conference Report writing stage, a member of the staff for the Senate 
Subcommittee of Children and Youth wrote that “there is little justification for having less 
disadvantaged children fill available child care spaces to the exclusion of many of the poorest 
children. Moreover, the federal government should not offer a false promise of free services to a 
broad universe of recipients when it will be able to fund services for only a small portion of that 
universe.”48 Yet notecards dated from the same period, presumably Senator Mondale’s talking 
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points as Chairman of the Subcommittee, argue in favor of a more universal provision, include 
the proviso that “this must be more than a poverty program, with a welfare stigma...tremendous 
needs for adequate day care exist among families above the poverty level.”49 This speaks to the 
tensions between proposals for targeted versus universal provisions of care observed by the child 
development experts who provided the impetus for the legislation, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
While many scientists proposed targeted interventions—these programs would be less costly by 
virtue of serving fewer children, and would reach the children most in need of intervention—
others argued that universal programs were necessary as well, and that early education programs 
would greatly benefit “normal” as well as “abnormal” children. These discrepancies in the 
internal files of Mondale’s staff show the controversial and contested nature of targeting the 
CDA. 
 
Accounting for the Veto  
Bipartisan support for the CDA crumbled in the face of disagreements about the level of 
prime sponsorship, and this technical detail has much to do with its failure. As Elliot Richardson, 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, wrote to Mondale a few weeks before the veto, the 
Administration was concerned about the role of states as prime sponsors under the bill as it was 
finalized in the conference report. He wrote, “in effect [HEW] would be wholly powerless to 
choose a state application over a local application, even if the state application would better 
                                                
Press File; Day Care 1971-72 Press and Conference Report files, Day Care: Conference Report 
1971, Memo on hr 6748 amendments September 13, 71. 
49 NARA, RG 46 Records of the U.S. Senate 92-94 Congress, Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Subcommittee of Children and Youth, Box 2: Legislative Files, Day Care 1971-2: Child 
Development Act 1971, Day Care Mondale Bill 1971. 
90 
assure quality care for children.” 50 Although the CDA had passed both the House and Senate, 
the Senate failed to override Nixon’s veto, and rather voted to sustain it 51 to 36.51  
Aside from this dispute about state versus local administrative control, Nixon’s veto may 
be attributed to pressure from the right-wing of the Republican Party, especially a fear that Nixon 
may be challenged in the primaries during the 1972 campaign. Pat Buchanan, serving as a 
“conduit” between the administration and disaffected conservatives, such as National Review 
founder William F. Buckley Junior and columnist James Kilpatrick, repeatedly warned Nixon 
over the course of 1971 that “we have a serious political problem developing on the Right,” as a 
number of conservatives began “harboring a growing cynicism toward the Administration.”52  
The “on-going and new grievances” Buchanan detailed included a liberal domestic program 
“indistinguishable from what an Ed Muskie or Ed [sic] Kennedy would propose,” including 
Nixon’s commitment to FAP, but also because of foreign policy issues.53 Buchanan cautioned 
that “the infection is spreading,” and that taking conservative support for granted, and assuming 
that they had “no where else to go” would be politically precarious: the breach with 
conservatives was so deep that John Ashbrook was considering launching a challenge to Nixon 
for the 1972 Republican primary.  
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Several months later, Buchanan warned the President again of an impending “attack on 
the White House staff” if conservatives were not brought in to the administration,54 and in July 
he passed along the news that a group “secretly” met to discuss a “suspension of support” for 
Nixon.55 In September, Buchanan wrote, “we are past the point where gestures and rhetoric will 
be sufficient” to appease the right wing, and that “most helpful would be a major political 
confrontation against the Left, where the President was clearly and visibly upholding the Right 
position.”56  
More pointedly, in October he wrote that the “Twelve Apostles,” as he now called them, 
“will want to see some indication that the Administration truly wants to curb federal intervention 
in American society and federal growth on the body politic (OEO-Child Development veto will 
help).”57 As vetoing the CDA would “anger the sociologist lobby,” he continued, the veto 
message should maximize conservative support, and should emphasize “rhetoric about the 
primary responsibility for raising children lies not with the state but with the parent—and the 
camel’s nose of government must not be allowed inside this tent.” More than anything else, he 
argued, the veto message “should be knocked down hard,” and its “sting” “is all important. If 
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strong and tough enough we can knock this thing out of the park—and the President can win 
high marks for protecting the family from a ‘regiment of bureaucratic intruders.” Buchanan thus 
saw vetoing the CDA as key to currying favor with the conservative, and dissident, wing of the 
Republican Party. Several weeks later, he offered to draft the veto message himself.58 Colson 
echoed Buchanan’s concerns: two days before the veto, he wrote to Haldeman that “all of the 
conservatives have made it very plain to us that if the veto message is not on principle, we will 
get absolutely nothing. If it’s on principle, on the other hand, it may be precisely what we need to 
buy ourselves maneuvering room with the right wing.”59 
Buchanan was also responsible for analyzing how the Administration’s policies were 
reflected in the media, and on October 12 sent a memo to Nixon staff members Ehrlichman and 
Cole summarizing several editorials “all of which to me argue for a Presidential veto” because it 
“is too expensive,” and moreover “it is not day care; it is ‘child development.’” To Buchanan and 
the constituency he was, or believed he was, parroting, the CDA “not only would move the 
Federal Government for the first time massively and directly into the raising of children” because 
it could potentially reach the middle classes, but would also introduce “child advocates” as 
“professional meddlers and touble-makers [sic]” into the middle of relationships between parents 
and children. Buchanan saw the CDA as at odds with welfare reform, instead of its extension, as 
he argued “our welfare program is designed to help bring the family together; this thing is an 
incentive for the family to break apart, for each to pursue separate careers—while the State takes 
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over the children.”60 Thus, while it is permissible to intervene in the private lives of poor, mainly 
African American families, intervening in a broader spectrum of the population raised red flags 
for conservatives.  Similarly, Cole wrote to Ehrlichman shortly after, worried that arguments 
against the CDA based on its cost would “position us once again as the cheap Administration 
who doesn’t want to do anything for people.”61 Instead, he clarified, the veto should be on the 
grounds that “what we are talking about here is not Day Care for working mothers, but rather … 
reliev[ing] parents of the responsibility of training and educating their children. Rather ‘Big 
Brother’ will do it for them.”  
Reflecting much of this language, Vice-President Spiro Agnew gave a speech in mid-
November 1971 to the Illinois Agricultural Association which argued that the public policy 
involvement of behavioral scientists went against American trends of liberalism.62 The speech, 
which mainly discussed the Farm Bureau, posited that the interests of the individual were under 
attack (albeit an attack “couched in the language of human benevolence”) by “the ‘futuristic 
planners’ who are so anxious to change our society by tinkering with the individual.” These 
“social planners,” he continued, “believe that the individual is incapable of managing his own 
affairs or, indeed, of even knowing what is best for him,” and that if allowed to direct policy, 
“the family would become an anachronism.”  Agnew does not mention the CDA explicitly, but 
alludes to it as another potential threat, stating “character that was once molded in the home is 
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now more often the product of the classroom, and there are some who would like to take it a step 
further and indoctrinate or condition all pre-school age children.”  He cites Reginald Lourie’s 
testimony advocating for the CDA as evidence that child development experts “admire the 
Soviet system in which the State takes over this function [of childrearing] from the parent.” This 
speech foreshadows both the language of the Veto several weeks later, as well as the vehement 
conservative rhetoric that would forestall future attempts at a national child care strategy.  
Democratic Senator James Allen from Alabama also echoed much of this rhetoric in a 
speech he gave in Congress about a week before the veto. Allen told his colleagues that while he 
would support a bill that expanded private and non-profit day care, public provision would be 
“radical and socialistic. In my judgment, some of the services [in the CDA] are totally 
incompatible with a free society.” He continued, “the pernicious thrust of this bill” would be to 
“undermine the family as the basic unit of society,” and the CDA “would create a gigantic 
bureaucratic monstrosity with near-complete control over the lives of children.” He concluded, 
“what parent wants his child conditioned to perform like an animal in a circus?”63 This rhetoric 
seems unhinged, and even comical, in its extreme misunderstanding of the CDA’s actual 
provisions, but reflects how deeply felt and passionate conservative opposition to public child 
care would become. 
 
After the Veto  
In his veto message, Nixon wrote that the CDA would “commit the vast moral authority 
of the National Government to the side of communal approaches to child rearing over against the 
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family-centered approach.”64 Many have interpreted this as “designed to disarm conservatives 
critical of Nixon’s surprising move to recognize Communist China,”65 and indeed the veto was 
seen as a resounding success by the administration. Just days after, Buchanan met with the 
disaffected conservatives, and reported back that “the nature of that veto clearly established our 
credibility with the conservatives.”66 More importantly, “the conservatives agreed, after 
considerable debate, that Ashbrook—in light of the day care veto—would not ‘move his 
candidacy forward.’” 
However, the statement may also be read as reinforcing an ideology that kept 
responsibility for children’s care squarely within the family, painted parenthood as a female 
enterprise, and tied women’s roles in society to motherhood. That is, except for families who are 
too “pathological” to be trusted to care for their families alone, in the language of the Moynihan 
report: government intervention into family life, according to this ideology, is only appropriate 
for children from poor families—especially non-white families—and thus child care is a 
component of welfare, not education, policy. Thus, beyond a mere partisan policy disagreement, 
this framing of the CDA explains its failure. 
Mondale’s statement on the veto revealed the perplexing hypocrisy he saw in the 
difference between Nixon’s own proposed policy, FAP, and the CDA, as he said  “I don't 
understand how the President can support shoddy day care for the children of welfare recipients 
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who are forced to work, and condemn the provision of developmental day care for the children 
of poor and middle income families who are already working.”67 What Mondale could not 
understand was that if child care is only considered a welfare provision—and not an educational 
intervention, as Mondale, child development experts, and many advocates believed—the 
appropriate population of recipients is limited to the poor.  
NWRO understood this distinction. In its press release following the veto, the 
organization proclaimed that the administration’s “motivations are crystal clear…[they are] are 
only intending to force welfare mothers to work. One penny of income higher than welfare 
eligibility, and you can fend for yourself.”68 The broader advocacy coalition put this less bluntly, 
arguing that with the veto, Nixon “rejected American children and their families. What is more, 
he established a double standard for poor children, whom he would condemn to custodial 
daycare while he forces their parents to work under the guise of ‘welfare reform.'“69  
Historians have depicted the CDA’s failure as dividing the child care constituency along 
class and racial lines, and thus ending all hope for universal child care. Sonya Michel, for 
example, argues that in vetoing the CDA “Nixon succeeded in tainting the concept of universal 
child care to such an extent that for years to come, few Republicans dared to support it.”70 
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Without bipartisan support, there was little hope for passing any universal child care provision 
thereafter. Further she argues that the constituency for child care became fragmented along class 
and racial lines, as direct services were increasingly targeted to low-income families and welfare 
recipients, and tax deductions placated higher-income families. Similarly, Kimberly Morgan 
writes that “the child-care lobby had reached its zenith in 1971 as disparate groups with various 
motives came together around the common goal of passing the CDA. In the years following the 
veto, the coalition fragmented as its latent divisions came to the fore.”71 This was in fact a 
purposeful strategy pursued by Buchanan and similarly-minded conservatives within the 
administration. In his first-person account, Buchanan explains that “In 1971 and 1972, we drove 
wedges through the ideological, cultural-moral, economic, and sectional fissures” within the 
Democratic Party in an effort that “shattered the Roosevelt Coalition and created a New 
Majority.”72 The child care measures passed during the years after the veto—for example, the 
reauthorization of the Head Start program, targeted to the poor, and tax credits for higher income 
families to use for private day care services—were fraught with these tensions on both sides of 
the political spectrum. The disintegration of the advocacy coalition, however, should not be 
viewed as surprising, given the CDA’s institutional lineage and the ways in which it was framed 
as a welfare rather than educational program.  
Child care advocates also lost a crucial ally within the Nixon administration after the 
veto: Edward Zigler was a Yale psychologist who had been brought into the administration as 
the first Director of the Office of Child Development, the agency which would have had direct 
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administrative control of the CDA’s programs. Zigler wanted to resign immediately, as he 
recalled “there was no way I could defend Nixon’s veto,” but Elliot Richardson convinced him to 
stay to help advocate for higher quality child care provisions in FAP by telling him that “you are 
the only person in Washington who is concerned with the quality of child care in that bill.”73 He 
left the administration the following summer after giving up on FAP’s child care component, and 
returned to Yale “licking the wounds of the greatest loss of my professional life.”74 
The CDA represents a missed opportunity to help parents across the class divide resolve 
the dilemma most American parents face accessing high quality, affordable child care for their 
preschool children. Nixon’s veto message unleashed a vehement invective against publicly 
supported child care for the nonpoor—and largely white—families that squelched future 
legislative attempts to create a universal program. Because it was framed as an extension of 
welfare services for the poor, rather than as a universal educational intervention, the ascendant 
right-wing of the Republican Party rejected the language promising access for all children. 
Conservatives claimed that the bill would encroach on the sanctity of middle-class family life—
and overstep what they saw as government’s proper role of only intervening in the private lives 
of the poor. Nixon cemented the two-tier strategy for helping families gain access to child care 
that exists to this day: he argued that direct services should only be provided to low-income (and 
mostly non-white) children, and the day after he vetoed the CDA, he signed the 1971 Revenue 
Act which, for the first time, introduced federal income tax deductions for child care costs. 
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CHAPTER THREE
“Cinderella of the Education System:” Margaret Thatcher’s Plan for Nursery Expansions 
In the summer of 1972, Margaret Thatcher, then Secretary of State for Education and 
Science under the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, sought to persuade the rest of the 
Cabinet to accept a major shift in priorities. Evoking sympathy and nostalgia for members’ own 
childhood experiences, she declared, “nursery education has been the Cinderella of the education 
system since 1944,” when the Butler Act redressed many inequalities by making secondary 
education free of cost.1 The number of publicly funded nurseries had drastically increased during 
the Second World War as part of the emergency measures that drew women into the workforce, 
but the vast majority were closed after the war ended. Although “successive governments have 
had to hold [spending on nursery education] back rigidly in the interests of meeting stronger 
priorities,” Thatcher continued, the time had come to readjust the Department’s allocation of 
resources. She argued that the practical difficulties of teacher supply hitherto facing the 
government could be surmounted and perhaps, more importantly, the program would be 
politically popular.2  
If Nixon in the end abandoned universal child care in favor of programs that would 
support child care for poor, working mothers, Margaret Thatcher took the opposite direction, 
opting, in her years as Secretary of State, for a program that focused on child development.  Her 
position is counter-intuitive. After all, it contradicted deeply held beliefs in private enterprise and 
government non intervention. Yet, Thatcher convinced the Cabinet that it was finally time for 
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Cinderella to attend the ball: nursery education was included as the signature issue of a White 
Paper calling for the realignment of the Department’s priorities.  
However, the prince did not return Cinderella’s glass slipper for over two decades: while 
nursery education garnered more public attention and was slated for considerable expansion with 
Thatcher’s proposal, it quietly receded from the limelight shortly thereafter. Although she did not 
repudiate the policy while Prime Minister, nursery education would not rise to the top of the 
political agenda again until the Labour Party reintroduced the idea in the mid-1990s. This 
chapter revisits this important initiative, arguing that Thatcher was willing to contemplate a high 
degree of state intervention in favor of a policy she always considered as educational rather than 
feminist or redistributive. Although her failed attempt is seldom remembered today, and her 
efforts to promote the care and education of young children are not considered part her 
formidable legacy, Thatcher had dramatically proclaimed to the press, “I want to be remembered 
as the Minister who introduced nursery education for all in Britain.”3  
********** 
While the 1918 Maternity and Child Welfare Act empowered local authorities to provide 
day nursery places for children under five, few publicly maintained child care facilities were in 
place following its passage. In 1938, for example, only 104 nurseries were in place, serving 
fewer than 4,300 children.4 Demand, especially in the evacuation areas, grew acute during the 
Second World War and in 1944 over 1,500 wartime nurseries served over 71,000 children. This 
number dropped rapidly after the war: in 1946 915 nurseries served fewer than 44,000 children, 
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and one decade later in 1956, only 547 nurseries with about 26,000 places remained. This 
reduction in child care supply is correlated with a decrease in the number of working mothers in 
the immediate postwar period.  However, “this drop was not as large as expected” and began to 
increase again after 1950, leading to a mismatch in supply and demand.5 The Ministry of 
Health’s Circular 221/45 which announced the closure of wartime nurseries in 1945 had also 
separated the care and educational components of child care provisions. While the day nurseries 
of local health authorities provided care for children of working mothers, local education 
authorities could provide an educational intervention under the 1944 Education Act. However, 
these local education authorities had limited resources.  
Concerns that increasing the provision of nursery schools would exacerbate the shortage 
of teachers in primary schools led the Department of Education and Science to issue Circular 
8/60 in 1960 under the Conservative administration of Harold Macmillan prohibiting further 
expansion of nursery education.6 An internal memo from 1967 describes why the Circular was 
seen as necessary: “ever since the war, the policy of my predecessors has been severely to 
restrict nursery development, mainly because of the danger of denuding the infant schools of 
badly needed teachers.”7 Describing recent developments, however, he continued, “this policy 
has been slightly relaxed in recent years, but only in respect of new nursery classes which could 
be shown to be productive in terms of teachers—that is, in enabling married women teachers 
                                                
5 Young Fabian Study Group, Womanpower: Pamphlet 11 (London: Fabian Society, 1966): 23. 
6 TNA, ED 207/7. 
7 “Infant Schools” served children ages five through seven. TNA, ED 207/727, Nurseries and 
EPAs: Submission for Ministers on Plowden Recommendations on Nurseries, Leadbetter to 
Cockerill, June 1968. 
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who are mothers of young children to return to teaching.”8 Beyond this small provision for the 
children of teachers, nursery education was seen as “impossible.”9 
The early 1970s represent a crucial transition point in British policies towards women 
and children, with efforts to move one particular type—nursery education—towards more, not 
less, state intervention. The Department of Education and Science, led by then-Secretary of State 
Margaret Thatcher, published a White Paper in December 1972 that called for the dramatic 
expansion of public part-time nursery education with provision for all families with three and 
four year old children who chose to utilize it within a decade. This White Paper, titled 
Education: A Framework for Expansion, assumed a take-up rate for public nursery education of 
90 percent of four year olds and 50 percent of three year olds by 1981, and set out to increase 
provision to meet this demand. This compares to actual participation rates in 1971 of only 4.7 
percent of three year olds and 33.8 percent of four year olds in the Department’s maintained 
schools.10 This latter figure includes “rising fives,” or children beginning primary school shortly 
before their fifth birthday, not just those enrolled in nursery education programs. The actual 
figure should be considered lower. 
Although some additional nursery schools and classes were added in accordance to the 
White Paper, Thatcher’s proposal never came to fruition and was gradually cut back, first by her 
own party and then by the successive Labour government, in the midst of the economic crisis of 
the mid-1970s. However, its proposition challenges our understanding about the formation and 
consistency of both Britain’s child care policy and of Thatcher’s guiding ideology, known to 
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10 TNA, CAB 134/3522.  
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scholars as Thatcherism, with its characteristic emphasis on a free-market economy that 
privileges private enterprise over social service provision. During this period, for reasons 
explored below, Thatcher proposed to extend the frontiers of the state to promote child well-
being during the crucial first years of life. She advocated for state-provided nursery schools and 
classes—framed as education rather than as welfare or as a labor support for women—and even 
resisted calls from her party to charge parental fees. This is a stark contrast to how American 
Republicans viewed child care during the same period: as a welfare provision for the poor rather 
than education for all.  
Unaccountably, not much attention has been paid to the White Paper by scholars 
analyzing the history of British child care policy. While political scientists Jane Lewis and Vicky 
Randall have both provided useful and astute surveys of child care policy during the post-war 
period, neither gives much weight to the White Paper itself nor discusses its development or 
provisions in detail. Randall, for example, only grants one sentence in her book-length 
examination of child care policy to Thatcher’s proposal, stating merely that it reflected the 
recommendations of the Plowden Report (discussed below). Lewis’  discusses the White Paper 
in just one paragraph. 11  Historian Angela Davis provides a detailed account of the theory, 
practice, and experience of child care during the post war period utilizing oral history. However, 
she also  does not discuss the White Paper at length.12 These omissions may have several causes. 
Randall and Lewis approach child care policy with feminist goals in mind (i.e., the care and 
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12 Angela Davis, Pre-School Childcare in England, 1939-2010: Theory, Practice, and 
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education of young children is necessary for women to work) that were not the White Paper’s 
intent, as Thatcher’s proposal framed child care as an educational rather than labor market 
policy. Additionally, these authors seem to assume that serious reforms of child care would only 
come from the Left, and thus do not take the Conservative Party’s policy seriously. For example, 
while noting that it was a “surprising” development, Lewis dismisses it as a political ploy.13 This 
is a mistake: although several female Labour Members of Parliament were among the most 
prominent child care advocates at the time,14 and the eventual expansion of child care in the 
1990s was shepherded by the Labour Party, historians have demonstrated that the Conservative 
Party was more successful in cultivating an electorate among women in the postwar era, 
although these scholars have focused on issues other than child care policy.15 To dismiss the 
White Paper outright omits a central turning point in the narrative of British child care policy. 
The publication of a child-centered, educational justification for preschool intervention denotes a 
major shift in values about the state’s role in the traditionally private realm of the family, and 
                                                
13 Jane Lewis, “The Failure to Expand Childcare Provision and to Develop a Comprehensive 
Childcare Policy in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s,” Twentieth Century British History 24:2 
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deserves closer investigation, especially for how it contrasts with the United States. Although 
both policies fail, the political alignment of child care advocates is distinct. 
Much has been written about Thatcher and Thatcherism. Her once-seemingly dogmatic 
ideology has proven illusory as historians have begun unraveling its genealogy and the 
consistency of its tenets. Biographer John Campbell provides a detailed analysis of Thatcher’s 
tenure as Education Secretary, describing the White Paper as “the last throw not only of 
expansion, but of consensus in education.”16 However, Campbell’s account draws primarily from 
Thatcher’s memoirs and oral interviews with officials who worked with her, rather than from 
engagement with the archival record. As such, he misses how much of the impetus came from 
Thatcher herself, as well as the disagreement between Thatcher and the Conservative Party on 
the issue of charging parental fees (discussed below). Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite has 
persuasively argued that Thatcherism was both coherent and flexible in its tenets, and was 
“driven by a vision of moral rejuvenation” that privileged the place of families.17 As she 
explains, in Thatcherite logic “individuals working in the interests of their family would produce 
a prosperous but also a moral society.”18 In support of this interpretation, during Thatcher’s 
tenure as leader of the Shadow Administration in the late 1970s, the Conservative Research 
Department bundled nursery education into a newly conceptualized focal area, Family Policy. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, this would go on to become a centerpiece of Thatcher’s policies 
as prime minister, particularly the Parents’ Charter which emphasized parental choice of 
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schools.19 Although little expansion would occur during the Thatcher governments, nursery 
education remained conceptually part and parcel of a larger policy agenda of supporting families 
that was at the heart of Thatcherism, albeit one that emphasized parents’ rights over public 
provision. Although nursery education ceased to be a priority for Thatcher, she never disavowed 
it as Prime Minister. 
Nursery education was not the only government policy affecting the care of children 
under compulsory school age during this time.20 The Department of Health and Social Services, 
led by Sir Keith Joseph during the Heath administration, was responsible for both administering 
a separate day nursery program and supporting private play groups to a limited extent. Thatcher 
was often quick to deflect any departmental responsibility for these two programs as they fell 
outside of her purview.21 Day nurseries provided full-time care only to a limited population of 
children with special needs, and most local health authorities administering the provision 
prioritized admission for the children of unmarried working mothers.22 These child care facilities 
explicitly supported women workers, but only those in the most desperate of circumstances. Play 
groups, by contrast, were primarily organized by parents (largely middle class, nonworking 
mothers) and required their participation, and were focused primarily on children’s socialization. 
These two types of programs thus served very different populations and purposes, although 
                                                
19 Conservative Party Archives, Oxford University [Hereafter CPA], CRD 4/23/1-6. 
20 See Davis for a detailed analysis of the differences in theory, practice, and experience among 
nursery education, day nurseries, play groups, and childminders. 
21House of Commons Debate [Hereafter HC Deb] 13 July 1972 [840/1817-38]; she said 
something almost identical in HC Deb, 7 December 1970 [808/1534-56], HC Deb, 12 May1972 
[836/1756-80], and HC Deb, 21 December 1972 [848/1543-64]. 
22 See, for example, TNA, MH 156/52, MH 156/53, MH 156/54, and MH 156/55 for discussion 
of how DHSS and local health authorities determined prioritization for day nursery admittance. 
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nursery education could appeal to families utilizing either type. Indeed, one civil servant in the 
Department of Education and Science commented on a perceived difference between the “need” 
for nursery education in the more disadvantaged communities that were more likely to be served 
by day nurseries, and the “demand” for nursery education “particularly from better-educated and 
more affluent parents,” who were also the parents involved in forming play groups.23  
 This chapter first examines the pressure for nursery reform from advocacy organizations 
and official government committees. It then turns to the inner workings of the Wilson and Heath 
governments of the late 1960s and 1970s, examining nursery education policy itself. The third 
section highlights the rationale for nursery education as posited in Thatcher’s White Paper, 
emphasizing its perceived role in promoting optimal child development and examining its 
relationship to contemporary feminist projects. Finally, the chapter concludes by considering 
how an examination of the White Paper contributes to a growing literature that questions the 
coherence of Thatcherism, revealing fluidity in Thatcher’s ideology during the early 1970s. 
Because Thatcher understood nursery education primarily as an educational intervention rather 
than as a welfare or redistributive benefit or as a work support for women, it was a crucial 
exception to her laissez-faire rhetoric during this period.  
 
Growing Pressure for Nursery Reform 
Civil servants in the mid-1960s began to re-scrutinize the care and education of children 
under the age of five as the publication of several influential reports—the Yudkin, Seebohm, and 
Plowden Reports—came to their attention and as a National Campaign for Nursery Education 
crystallized to push for policy reform. While each publication made slightly different 
                                                
23 TNA, ED 192/211.  
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recommendations about child care, and reflected various constellations of concerns—from 
increases in immigration and the racial composition of British society, to the proportion of 
mothers working and the increase in single motherhood—the significance of all three reports 
arises from their confluence. Taken together, they urged policymakers to consider the needs of 
young children to a greater extent than they had since the war. In addition, various groups, 
ranging from organizations focused solely on the under-five age group such as the National 
Society for Children’s Nurseries and the Nursery School Association, to more general groups 
like the National Union of Teachers, increased the pressure placed on the governments of the late 
1960s and early 1970s.24 
Simon Yudkin, a pediatrician, served on the Council of the National Society for 
Children’s Nurseries and chaired a working party of advocacy organizations and local authorities 
that produced the 1967 Yudkin Report, titled, The Care of Children Outside Their Homes.  The 
purpose of the working party, created in 1964, was “to discuss the whole care of the pre-school 
child, gather evidence, and to press for an official enquiry.”25 It focused mostly on the perceived 
dangers of unregulated child minding rather than on care in formal settings. However, it argued 
that unregulated minders were commonly used because of a lack of supply of the more formal 
and higher quality, arrangements. While the government largely brushed aside its 
recommendations, as it was occupied with the official reviews of policy affecting the under-five 
population taking place under the Seebohm and Plowden committees, the Yudkin Report 
                                                
24 TNA, CAB 134/3522, HS (72)98: 23 August 1972. 
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generated a good deal of publicity.26 The media sensationalized its findings, with dramatic titles 
such as “The Shocking Truth About the Baby Minders” and “The Children Nobody Cares 
About.”27 This attention should be understood in racialized terms: childminding was largely 
perceived to be utilized in West Indian communities in which women with young children were 
more likely to work at low wages. Contemporary analysts Brian and Sonia Jackson, for example, 
explained this animus in their pioneering sociological study of childminding in the 1970s as 
searching for the answer to the question, “Where were the children of all those unmarried West 
Indian girls?”28If single, West Indian mothers were working, someone else must be looking after 
their children—and the Jacksons as well as the Yudkin Report determined that this population 
was relying on informal, often poor quality arrangements. 
The 1968 Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social 
Services, or Seebohm Report, also brought questions regarding the care and education of the 
under-five population to the attention of the public, politicians, and civil service. It recommended 
that all social services for families, including but not limited to day nurseries and nursery 
education, should be housed within the same government department to reduce the ill effects of 
fragmentation. It also addressed the way that social services were aligned within some local 
health authorities. 
Perhaps of most influence was a three year long review of the primary education service 
by the Central Advisory Council for Education (the Plowden Report) published under Harold 
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Wilson’s Labour Government in 1967 as Children and Their Primary Schools. One major 
component of its recommendations was its call to expand part-time nursery education. During 
one of the early meetings, the Working Party responsible for writing the section on the under-
five population was clear that they saw nursery education as distinct from women’s employment, 
as “members urged that the Working Party Report should stress that an expansion of nursery 
provision was not recommended as a means of attracting more mothers to go out to work; 
national economic policy should not determine or influence educational considerations.”29 The 
members expressed concern that the report would be attacked if the recommendations were 
understood as being designed to increase the labor force participation of mothers. Women who 
needed to work in order to support their families, in turn, were not seen as the ones pressing for 
nursery care. Rather, the Working Party believed there was a “discrepancy between need and 
demand: Lady Bridget Plowden said that the council must ensure that nursery provision was 
expanded in the worst areas first; demand would be heaviest in middle class areas.”30 This 
perception that the middle classes were most eager for child care reveals that to Lady Plowden 
and other child care advocates, nursery education was framed not as a welfare provision, but as 
an educational intervention that parents wanted for their children even as it could also be utilized 
to support work or help even the playing field for disadvantaged children. 
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A significant “note of reservation,” signed by eight members of the Council including its 
chair, Lady Plowden, provided an alternative proposal for financing its nursery expansion 
recommendations: charging parents who could afford to pay for services. They explained, “if 
resources were more plentiful we would not favour charges,” but that “without a parental 
contribution we fear that nursery education will not be extended at all and such children be no 
better off than they are today.”31 Knowing that this argument would be countered by claims that 
a means-test would deter the families who most needed care, the authors posited that “new 
traditions can be created. Few parents are now too proud to accept State support for the 
education of their children in universities. If in universities, why not in nursery schools?”32 
While the Conservative Party would take up this alternative proposal, its Secretary of State under 
the Heath administration would vehemently disagree, as will be discussed below. 
The National Campaign for Nursery Education, founded in 1965, organized petitions in 
1967 and 1972 to generate support and publicity for the implementation of the Plowden 
recommendations to expand nursery education.33 The Campaign’s leadership included members 
of the House of Commons and representatives from organizations such as the Nursery School 
Association, National Society of Children’s Nurseries, and the National Union of Teachers. The 
Labour MP Renee Short was its president during the later campaign. 
Demand for public child care as an educational intervention came from explicitly 
Conservative corners as well. Less publicly visible, perhaps, but of great importance to 
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Conservatives like Margaret Thatcher, was the 1966 publication of Elspeth Howe’s pamphlet, 
Under 5: A Report on Nursery Education.34 The report was “based on discussion and research by 
a group of younger Conservative women” convened by Howe, the wife of notable Thatcher 
government official Geoffrey Howe, under the auspices of the Greater London Conservative 
Women’s Advisory Committee.35 In the group’s first meeting, Howe explained the need to write 
such a report because she sensed that while the Conservative Research Department was 
interested in the topic, which was in her words “an extremely important subject” that “had strong 
political appeal” because it would increase families’ “freedom of choice,” its Educational Policy 
Group was neglecting it.36 The resulting report presented a “case for pre-school provision” both 
for child-centred reasons and as a support for working mothers, and decried the “failures in the 
present system,” namely shortages of provision and obstacles for the private sector market to 
compensate for the lack of public places. It recommended increasing the provision of publicly-
provided part-time nursery facilities.37  
Outside of government, advocates were optimistic about prospects for nursery expansion 
during the later years of Harold Wilson’s second government elected in 1966, especially after the 
Plowden Report’s publication. The Nursery School Association (NSA), for example, wrote in its 
1967-1968 Annual Report that “despite serious national economic crises [of devaluation, for 
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example], [this year] augurs well for the development and expansion of nursery education.” Even 
more buoyantly, the NSA labeled 1969 the “year of hope.”38 
 
Government Plans for Nursery Expansion 
 However, inside Whitehall prospects were dim as funding nursery education would 
require reprioritizing the services already provided by the Department of Education and Science 
or increasing the budget to account for new spending. As one civil servant put it, the required 
financial resources necessary to implement the Plowden recommendations were seen as “most 
unsatisfactory” for “there seems to be no escaping the logic of the point that this would in nearly 
every case amount to additional expenditure and therefore in order to get it through the financial 
hoops, the Sec of State ought to be able to offer some compensating economy.”39 In order to 
expand services for children under five, the department would have to reallocate spending which 
had already been promised to other age groups. Following another civil servant’s visit to the 
United States and awareness of its Head Start program, the Department decided upon a strategy 
of concentrating resources in fewer areas rather than spreading them out.40 A small expansion in 
what were termed “educational priority areas,” or EPAs, serving low-income urban populations, 
under the broader Urban Programme, was instituted as an incremental step as the Labour Party 
prioritized policies that would address social inequality. 
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Beyond the Urban Programme, however, in areas where “the social need is less but the 
demand very strong,”41 nursery education fared poorly: it was considered of lesser importance 
than either secondary school reorganization or instituting a single school-leaving age.42 In early 
1970, Labour Secretary of State for Education and Science Edward Short attempted to bring it 
back to the top of the agenda, but quietly agreed after a private meeting with the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer to drop his bid for an expansion that year.43 
 While both parties’ Election Manifestos in 1970 called for an expansion of nursery 
education, both envisioned targeting it to children in need. The Labour Party manifesto touted its 
Urban Programme in the EPAs, especially “inner areas of our large cities” where “shortages 
exist in social resources of all kinds,” and where many immigrants had settled.44 Similarly, the 
Conservative Party manifesto called for nursery places “in areas of social handicap, such as the 
poorer parts of our large cities, where it is so vital to give children a better start.”45 The White 
Paper that would be published just two years later, however, envisioned a universal nursery 
program that would reach beyond these campaign promises—echoing Lady Howe’s framing of 
child care as primarily an educational issue and serving as a testament to the priorities of the new 
Tory Secretary of State for Education and Science: Margaret Thatcher took on the helm of the 
department after Edward Heath’s win of the general election in June 1970. Although spending 
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would be targeted at first as it was slowly rolled out to the EPAs, the White Paper promised to 
expand services to all children under five within a decade. 
During Thatcher’s first few years in her new position, two hotly-contested issues aside 
from child care set the terms of the debate. First, in 1970, Thatcher opposed the prior 
government’s policy of promoting “comprehensive” secondary education, favoring schemes that 
allowed parents and students to choose which schools to attend. Opponents accused her of 
protecting elite privilege that had cemented class division. The theme of “choice” certainly 
resonates with later iterations of Thatcherism. Second, in 1971, Thatcher ended schools’ 
provision of free milk for children who were older than age seven, and was subsequently derided 
as a “milk snatcher” in Parliament and the press.46 The parliamentary contention over the issue 
did not focus on why the age of seven was chosen as a cut-off for the free provision of milk.  The 
debates instead focused on whether children between the ages of seven and eleven still had a 
medical or dietary need for milk, and whether parents or the state should shoulder this cost. This 
silence perhaps signals a widely-accepted assumption that younger children have greater needs 
than their older schoolmates. Thatcher’s position shows that while she was committed to holding 
down government spending, concessions could be made when the youngest children were at 
stake. Even before turning to nursery education, it appears that Thatcher considered children’s 
early years an exception to her drive to roll back state programs. 
Nursery education thus was not central to parliamentary debates during this period, 
although Thatcher did speak in its favor as an ideal on a fairly regular basis both in and outside 
the halls of Westminster. During these years, the Department upheld Circular 8/60, and 
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continued the previous government’s limited expansion of nursery education for low-income 
children under the Urban Programme.  
Behind closed doors, however, Thatcher was more forceful, pushing for a reprioritization 
of her department’s work in order to make room for a nursery intervention. In a note written to 
Prime Minister Edward Heath in advance of a meeting in January 1972, she argued that this issue 
“is my biggest outstanding problem in resource allocation. We shall have failed if, within the life 
of this government, we have not taken a substantial initiative in the provision of nursery 
education. This means something more, and more widespread” than the limited provisions 
provided in the EPAs by the government to date.47 This suggests the impetus for expansion came 
not from Heath but from Thatcher herself. 
Signaling her wish for a broader expansion publicly, Thatcher gave a speech in the House 
of Commons on 12 May 1972. She cited a report by the sociologist A.H. Halsey and a petition 
from the National Campaign for Nursery Education as pushing the issue to the center of 
discourse (literally pushing—the petition’s 350,000 signatures “were wheeled up to me in 
wheelbarrows by some charming small children”).48 Thatcher’s speech recognized the popular 
demand, argued that child development research provided the scientific rationale for the cause, 
and signaled that her department would seriously examine the issue.  She stated, “I accept that 
the demand for [nursery] places far outstrips the supply, and my aim is to let local authorities 
provide more places as soon as possible. But what I cannot do is to will the end without 
considering the means of achieving it,” and at this juncture other priorities laid claim to 
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expenditure.49 Thus while Thatcher indicated her sympathy with those advocating for expansion, 
and supported their cause, she did not frame it as immediately practical. Her classified note to 
Heath, however, suggests that she did in fact personally want to do more.  And publicly, just one 
month after this important speech, as noted above, Thatcher dramatically proclaimed to the press, 
“I want to be remembered as the Minister who introduced nursery education for all in Britain.”50  
Not long thereafter, Thatcher presented her ideas for a new strategy on education in a 
memorandum written for Cabinet consideration. “A new statement of government policy in 
education is needed—and expected by the educational world and informed opinion,” she 
declared. “If we do not make one—and make it soon—we shall have lost the initiative.”51 This 
was especially true for children under five, as “nursery education has been the Cinderella of the 
education system since 1944. Successive governments have had to hold it back rigidly in the 
interests of meeting stronger priorities.” However, the time had come to readjust the 
Department’s allocation of resources. The practical difficulties hitherto facing the government 
could be surmounted, and the program would be politically popular.52  
The funding that Thatcher proposed to make available for this expansion came from 
slowing down the rate of expansion the prior Labour government had set for higher education.53 
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In a memo to the Prime Minister dated about a week before the White Paper’s publication, 
Thatcher admitted that her plan to abandon the government’s earlier commitment to expanding 
higher education “is potentially the most controversial part of the proposals . . . The supporters of 
unlimited expansion of higher education may argue that the Government are expanding nursery 
education at the expense of higher education.”54 However, she argued, it “was much more 
important from the social point of view than further expenditure on higher education.”55 Her 
counterpart in the Department of Social Services, and later her key ally in promoting 
Thatcherism, Sir Keith Joseph, agreed. In discussions of the Department of Education’s higher 
education policy and Thatcher’s proposal to reallocate its funding the summer before, both had 
argued that nursery education was more likely than university education to diminish class 
inequalities, and that the early years were a more appropriate stage of life for public intervention 
than early adulthood.56 Labour would later disagree on this point, as it rolled back nursery 
expansion and returned to prioritizing higher education after 1974. Although both parties by and 
large agreed on the educational need for nursery schools and classes, as explored further below, 
and Labour politicians who criticized the White Paper argued that it was not expanding nursery 
care at a fast enough rate, the real disagreement between parties was about the place and 
prioritization of higher education. To Thatcher and Joseph, very young children who were 
neither autonomous nor able to care for themselves were seen as more worthy recipients of 
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public education services than adult students, who were subject to a more punitive logic under a 
framework of responsibility.  
With somewhat hesitant approval from the Cabinet after it discussed the new strategy in 
late November, as some members worried about the political popularity of reducing the rate of 
expansion in higher education, Thatcher published her White Paper on 6 December 1972, with 
nursery education as one of its signature components.57 The distribution of nursery places was 
meant to match local demand; as it explained, “the Government are not laying down a uniform 
detailed pattern of expansion as they hope that local plans will reflect local needs and resources.” 
58 The White Paper also lifted the barrier to expansion by rescinding Circular 8/60, which had 
curtailed development of the provision.59  
Cost constraints, however, were the biggest barrier to the implementation of Thatcher’s 
new strategy, as nursery expansion required significant new resources, especially for teachers’ 
wages and training. Nursery education had a higher cost per pupil than primary or secondary 
schooling, primarily because of lower pupil to staff ratios.60 Building the actual nursery school 
facilities posed a similar challenge. One approach Thatcher advocated was building additional 
classrooms in primary schools to house nursery classes so that children could be introduced to 
school. In her words, “we think it better that they should be attached to primary schools, so that 
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they can go with their elder brothers and sisters to the primary school, and get used to the idea.”61 
Further, combining nursery and primary schools within the same facility would be efficient; as 
the two could “share overhead costs . . . we may be able to get more for our money.”62 Many 
new primary schools were being built during this period, and Thatcher promoted efforts to 
design schools that could be adapted to include nursery provision.63 This aspect of nursery 
education sharply differs from the U.S., as discussed in Chapter 2, as advocates distrusted public 
schools to provide care in an equitable fashion after the civil rights battles of the 1960s, and thus 
believed schools to be an inappropriate site for child care provision. 
Thatcher estimated that overall costs of implementing the Plowden report’s 
recommendations for a mainly part-time program “would add about £50 million a year to current 
expenditure and involve £100 million worth of capital expenditure.”64 The White Paper called 
for slightly lower expenditures than this initial figure (with a total expenditure of £42 million in 
1971–72 but rising to £65 million in 1976–77).65 Still the costs were significant, and were the 
subject of heated exchanges between Thatcher and Treasury officials.66 They represented a large 
investment in this state provision, as Thatcher refused to accede to Treasury pressure, for 
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example on the number of years that capital investments would be spread out or on parental 
fees.67  
These fees represent a major point of dissension between Thatcher and the rest of her 
party, and signal her personal investment in the issue. The Conservative members of the Plowden 
Committee, the Conservative Policy Group on Education, and Lady Howe’s report had all 
suggested offsetting the public costs by charging fees to parents who wanted their children to 
receive nursery education.68 Internal Conservative Party documents also pressed for fees: the 
Party’s 1968 Education Policy Group noted that “while we recognise that it will be impossible to 
allocate substantial resources to nursery provision, we consider that nursery education should 
receive more serious attention than it has in the past…[P]olicy for nursery provision for the 
foreseeable future must therefore be based upon…the introduction of parental charges.”69 
Breaking from this party line, Thatcher stated in a House of Commons debate that this scheme 
posed “serious practical difficulties,” such as how to develop a sliding scale that would not deter 
poor families from enrolling their children or how to manage the administrative mechanisms to 
collect fees from some families but not others.70 Moreover, and remarkably, she argued that this 
would be objectionable politically, as the Education Act of 1944 had promised free education. 
Because she considered nursery education to be an extension of this pledge of free education 
rather than a welfare provision, in a series of internal memoranda Thatcher trenchantly resisted 
                                                
67 CAC, THCR 1/6/1; TNA, ED 192/211 PGB (72) M6, Minutes from 24 March 1972. 
68 See, for example, TNA, ED 146/93; CAC, THCR 1/6/1; Howe 
69 CPA, ACP 3/16, ACP (68) 52 Conservative Education Policy for the Seventies: a report by the 
Education Policy Group, 11 July 1968. 
70 HC Deb, 12 May 1972 [836/1756-80]. 
122 
the Treasury’s call for parental fees.71 Even in the late 1970s, Thatcher remained opposed to 
charging parents: in a series of memoranda by the Conservative Research Department on the 
formation of educational expenditure policies shortly before the 1979 general election, one staff 
member lamented that “Mrs. Thatcher has said on a number of occasions that she would not 
accept” fees.72  
Thatcher’s program was threatened in 1973 when the government made cuts across the 
board in public expenditure. In July, Thatcher asserted in a House of Commons debate that her 
department would shield the new provision, stating, “the full nursery school programme will be 
retained . . . We have tried to manage this substantial and necessary cut in public expenditure in a 
way which has preserved the essential priorities in the education service . . . I recognise that the 
cuts are serious, but they are not disastrous.”73 In December, she stated again that while the 
department “like other public services, has been affected by the cuts announced by the 
Chancellor on 17 December. As a result, education expenditure for next year has suffered. 
Nevertheless…nursery schools…will go ahead.”74 A general election was held on 28 February 
1974, in the wake of these cuts and a general recession sparked by the Yom Kippur War, a 
miners’ strike, and the introduction of a three-day work week to reduce electricity usage. No 
party won an overall majority, but Edward Heath resigned as prime minister and Harold Wilson 
of the Labour Party took office. Thatcher’s tenure as education minister came to an end on 4 
March 1974.  
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Conceptions of Children’s Needs in the White Paper 
One central question is why Thatcher chose to focus on nursery education in the first 
place. Biographer John Campbell has written that the White Paper “represented the culmination 
of a whole raft of policies the DES had been working on for twenty years. [Thatcher’s] officials 
are unanimous in admitting that she had remarkably little to do with its conception: she was 
merely the midwife.”75 Campbell thus credits the Department of Education and Science’s civil 
servants for forming its ideas and policies. However, he finds that Thatcher’s presence within the 
Department was crucial for creating the focus on nurseries; he writes that expanding nursery 
education “was the long-standing ambition of the department which her officials added to the 
draft White Paper only when they found her unexpectedly sympathetic.”76 Her leadership thus 
was instrumental in translating the program from an ideal to its actualization. Campbell suggests 
that Thatcher’s motivations may have been politically opportunistic (“she seized gratefully on 
the idea of promoting free local authority [nursery] schools as a popular move which would 
divert attention from the storms she had aroused over school milk and comprehensivisation”77), 
and this is certainly a possibility. Biographical accounts of another female politician during the 
period, Labour’s Barbara Castle, emphasize how crucial having a popular “win” within a Cabinet 
department was to her rise to power in the male-dominated political field.78 It is certainly 
possible that Thatcher fixated on nursery education for the strategic and pragmatic purpose of 
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turning around her negative image in the press and gaining standing and influence within the 
party.   
However, a closer examination reveals another, deeper justification as well. Much of the 
rationale for providing and expanding nursery education stemmed from contemporary 
professional beliefs about child development, and the potential role the state could play in 
promoting optimal outcomes, rather than from a desire to support women’s employment. 
Thatcher drew on the contemporary field’s insights from research, such as the above mentioned 
report by Halsey, and outcomes from the United States’ Head Start program for children from 
low-income families. Her arguments for nursery education reveal a belief that it was good for 
children to receive an educational intervention prior to school entry. On one hand, she publicly 
discussed it as an investment in the nation’s future population, for example stating, “Our ultimate 
hope is that these children will be good parents, who will provide for their own children their 
birthright of understanding and affection which they themselves perhaps lacked.”79 On the other, 
the intervention was intended to benefit the children themselves, as she asserted to the public, 
“the crucial importance of the early years in the development of children's abilities is now 
universally recognised.”80 Early exposure was seen as crucial: “Research suggests that half of the 
improvement in an individual’s measurable intelligence—over his whole life—takes place 
between birth and the age of 4 ½; and that it is these early years that intelligence is most 
susceptible to the effects of external stimulation and environment.”81  
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Specifically, Thatcher accepted the findings from child development experts that nursery 
education would improve children’s academic skills. As she explained to the Cabinet, “the 
primary aims of nursery education are to introduce young children to learning to develop their 
basic skills in communication, number and reasoning at an early age and to provide more 
stimulus, through contact with other children and adults, than they are likely to find at home.”82 
Nursery exposure was considered especially important for building early literacy skills, as 
Thatcher stated to the House of Commons “I would single out the development of language as 
the most important, because poverty of language is the most potent source of educational 
handicap.”83 In addition to being a more “systematic stimulus”84 than what mothers could 
provide on their own, experts believed nursery education compensated for less-than-optimal 
parenting, for some children “will not have learned the art of communication and would not have 
learned it unless they have come to school. Mothers don't always spend time talking to the 
children except to a minimum extent possible for ordinary life. They don't spend time reading to 
them.”85 
The memorandum proposing nursery education to the Cabinet continued by identifying 
“compensation for disadvantage” and “early diagnosis of handicap” as “subsidiary aims.”86 The 
first of these aims is akin to a Labour Party argument: Thatcher asserted that nursery education 
can balance the playing field between classes, and, though she does not explicitly state so, among 
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races; or, in her words, “it can be a decisive factor in reducing disparity and divisiveness.”87 
Children, as dependents who cannot be held responsible for their life circumstances, were not 
subject to the more punitive and laissez-faire logics of Thatcherism. For example, she asserted, 
“Although all children benefit from nursery education . . . it is most valuable for those whose 
homes are culturally and economically deprived and for those from all income groups or 
backgrounds who receive less attention than they should from their parents and families.”88 More 
explicitly, Thatcher cited an influential report of the National Child Development Study, using 
data that was collected before the limited expansion of nursery care in the 1960s or 1970s, 
stating that by age seven “on average the working class child is less well off both educationally 
and, for example, in his general health and fitness.”89 As the study’s director put it in retrospect, 
“the extent of the social, health and educational differences which were already so starkly 
apparent in the nation's children” by age seven shocked many, and “prompt[ed] politicians of 
both major parties to look at the possibilities of offering nursery education.”90 Public intervention 
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in the early years was thus seen as a solution to contemporary social and demographic dilemmas, 
especially for low-income or working-class families as well as nonwhite communities. This was 
interpreted as evidence that nursery education could help offset inequities—and Thatcher 
claimed that such intervention would be desirable for government to promote.  
On the second of these “subsidiary aims,” Thatcher also promoted nursery education in 
her public statements as a useful intervention for children with special needs, such as medical or 
developmental disabilities. In her words, nursery education “make[s] it easier for us to identify 
children with special problems at an early stage and to take remedial action before it is too 
late.”91 Similarly, she argues, “If a child has any handicap—a reading difficulty, a difficulty in 
talking or a difficulty in being with other children—the earlier you can spot it, identify it and 
deal with it, the most chances you have of overcoming it.”92 The early years were seen as crucial 
to child development, and addressing issues early could reduce their severity. 
By contrast, the archival evidence on nursery education during this period says little 
about the role of women’s employment, either as a factor in creating demand for early child care 
or as a result of its expansion. In fact, the design of the program reveals a belief that women were 
primarily responsible for their young children’s care, especially for children under the age of 
three, and does not leave much room for maternal employment as the program was to operate 
primarily for half of each day.  
The increasing labor force participation of women during these years points to what 
would seemingly be an increasing demand for child care on the ground. For example,  the 
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sociologist A.H. Halsey found that the labor force participation rate for all women increased 
from about 33 percent in 1951 to almost 43 percent in 1971.93 However, these figures were 
considerably smaller for mothers of young children. A 1968 survey conducted by the Department 
of Employment found that only 5.7 percent of women with children between the ages of 3 and 4 
worked full-time and 13.6 percent worked part-time.94 Helen McCarthy has demonstrated that 
while social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the normalization of married 
women’s employment, this acceptance “had limits,” namely that they “did not stretch to mothers 
of under-fives” and even inhibited policy changes in nursery education during the early 1960s.95 
Although it appears that most women with young children, influenced by the discourse described 
by McCarthy, remained at home, public debates about working mothers also increased during the 
1970s: both the 1970 Equal Pay Act and 1975 Sex Discrimination Act affected the public debate 
as “working mothers, including lone as well as married mothers, moved more firmly into 
focus.”96 
Child care was on the minds of feminists during this period, but it was not a top priority. 
The feminist movements that emerged in the 1960s included a new rhetoric of child care and 
parental responsibility for children’s well-being. The slogan “the personal is political” suggests 
the centrality of women’s practical and personal everyday experiences to political life and 
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challenged the separation between the private and public spheres. However, as political scientist 
Vicky Randall writes, “although second-wave feminism was emerging by the late 1960s and one 
of the four demands of the ‘founding’ Women’s Liberation Conference of 1970 was for ‘twenty-
four hour nurseries,’ the issue was a divisive one, raising many ideological and practical 
problems . . . No national campaign came together until the 1980s.”97 The archival evidence for 
feminist involvement in child care advocacy during the late 1960s and early 1970s supports this 
assertion. For example, one organization of single parents, Mothers in Action, attempted to 
garner support for a campaign for day nurseries in 1968 from women’s organizations in 1968 but 
“none obliged.”98 British feminists were not at the forefront of advocacy on this very issue, 
which by all definitions seems to belong squarely within a feminist agenda.  
Thatcher’s views on the feminist movement were hostile.  For example, when asked 
about “women’s lib” in the press, Thatcher once replied, “I think they are destroying everything 
that is feminine, and cheapening the image of working women in the world today. They are far 
too exaggerated in their claims and do a disservice to women in general. No, I am not in favour 
of them at all.”99 Even when she supported equal pay for women workers during a 1969 debate, 
Thatcher emphasized that women’s primary role was still in the home:  
Many women will still make their main job in life the creation of a 
home . . . Yet others—some married women and some single 
women—will carry out the same jobs with equal competence and 
under the same conditions as men. We must make provision for all 
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of these circumstances, but let us recognise that perhaps the most 
important job of all is the creation of family and family life.100 
 
Further, she claimed that she did not work in politics when her children were young—in 
her words, “I gave up politics while the children were small because I think they need a mother 
more than ever then . . . As soon as they became a little older and able to go away to school I 
decided to try again.”101 Thatcher’s views here reflect her ideological position, though they did 
not reflect her behavior: Thatcher did work as a lawyer during her children’s early years and, 
though defeated, had stood for election when her twins were just two years old. While playing lip 
service to the belief that mothers of young children should remain at home, her policy 
preferences and own practices belied those ideals.  
That said, the nursery education of Thatcher’s White Paper was always conceived of as 
an educational policy and not as the kind of child care provision women’s liberationists would 
have preferred. A part-day rather than a full-time program, it was not intended to directly support 
women’s work. The focus was not on women’s emancipation, but on the developmental and 
educational needs of children. Only fifteen percent of nursery classes proposed in the White 
Paper were intended to provide full-time care.102 Their part-time nature served a practical 
purpose of reaching more children at a lower cost per child—as she put it in a parliamentary 
debate, “one obvious advantage of this half-day provision is that it doubles the number of 
children who can receive nursery education for a given cost.”103 Thatcher also argued that it is 
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beneficial for the children themselves: “there is evidence that many benefit from a more gradual 
introduction to school. Part-time provision is more beneficial for them than sudden full-time 
provision in school would be.”104  
 The part-time provision also deflected criticisms based on contemporary beliefs and 
cultural norms of childrearing and understandings of the family. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
twentieth century was marked by changes in the field of developmental psychology, for example, 
the development and reinterpretations of John Bowlby’s theory of attachment and maternal 
deprivation. The application of Bowlby’s theories was mediated and complex, and child 
scientists supporting early interventions such as Jack and Barbara Tizard of the Thomas Coram 
Research Unit were frequently consulted by civil servants during and after the White Paper’s 
drafting. The working party responsible for crafting the nursery education recommendations of 
the Plowden Report, for example, understood that “Dr. Bowlby had modified his earlier views 
about the mother/child relationship, which were not held by paediatricians [sic] in general. 
Though it was realised that a stable mother/child relationship was essential, it was not true that to 
breach it for a few hours each day had harmful consequences for all children.”105 Following this 
version of revised Bowlbyism, Thatcher asserted on numerous occasions that the intention of the 
program was not to separate children from their families full stop. It was not “about taking young 
children away from their mothers. Three hours a day in nursery class leaves the child in the 
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mother's care most of the time.”106  
 
Nursery Schools and Classes: Education or Welfare? 
In broad terms, the welfare state was losing ground in the 1970s. Although welfare 
provision in some ways reached its peak during this decade, its underlying consensus was 
eroding. As one analyst explains, “poor economic performance undermined both the budgetary 
foundations of welfare states and Keynesian faith in the virtuous links between public spending 
and economic growth.”107 Historian E.H.H. Green has argued that the “triumph of Thatcherite 
political economy in the late 1970s and 1980s was unsurprising” because there had been voices 
within the Conservative Party that had been calling for an end to the postwar consensus about the 
welfare state and “were predisposed to accept a liberal market diagnosis of and prescription for 
their own and the nation’s economic troubles.”108  
This narrative challenges that account, as Thatcher herself was committed to an 
expansion of this specific welfare state provision rather than for retrenchment writ large. Green 
defines Thatcherism as “aim[ing] to ‘roll back the frontiers of the State’ . . . by replacing the 
mixed economy with a private-sector dominated market economy. This in turn was to be 
complemented by a reform and reduction of the Welfare State.”109 This view raises the question: 
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was Thatcher herself not a “Thatcherite,” defined as subscribing to “Thatcherism” as described 
by Green, until she became Conservative Party leader in 1975? Not according to him: Green 
asserts that the 1970-1974 period was “formative” for Thatcher and her close allies, as critics of 
Heath’s leadership and the consensus coalesced into what was called the “Selsdon Group.”110 He 
paints her ideology as becoming more sharply articulated as she fostered relationships with 
similarly minded allies, but stresses its overall continuity by stating, “Thatcher had shown herself 
to be in tune with its essential precepts long before she became Conservative leader and the term 
Thatcherism became part of the British political vocabulary.”111 However, Green ignores 
Thatcher’s plan for expanding nursery education, which we have seen came from her and not 
Heath.  
The early 1970s can best be interpreted as a period of both flux and stability: Thatcherism 
did not yet exist in the form that it would later take, although its precepts were becoming 
apparent in some specific policy realms but not in others. The more pressing question is whether 
state-provided nursery education could have been reconcilable with an agenda for rolling back 
state welfare: was nursery education an exception? Biographer Campbell writes that the focus in 
the White Paper on creating an equal playing field during the early years is reconcilable with the 
free-market ideology later associated with Thatcher, explaining “after the age of five [Thatcher] 
believed that life was a competition which the best should win; but a level starting line was 
within her philosophy.”112 The archival evidence supports this view. Regardless of how much 
her ideology shifted later on—and I will argue in Chapter 4 that it did not shift regarding nursery 
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education—during her tenure as Secretary of State for Education and Science, Thatcher believed 
that extending state provision was appropriate in order to enhance child well-being during the 
crucial first years of life. 
This was the case, however, because Thatcher always thought of nursery provision as an 
educational service distinct from welfare—and this is in stark contrast to how child care was 
seen in the U.S. In the record of a meeting with Heath in late December of 1970, well before the 
White Paper’s publication, Thatcher expressed concern about “the extent of the commitment of 
her Department in the welfare field, on services and functions which were ancillary to the 
provision of education” including “the provision of school meals, educational maintenance 
allowances…and free school transport.”  However, in the same meeting she also maintains that 
she “would like to do more for nursery schools,” and is searching for cost-effective means to do 
so.113 This exchange shows a cognitive dissonance in how Thatcher saw early education: 
whereas she advocated spending cuts in the welfare provisions of her department, she did not 
envisage nursery education as falling into this category. She saw a universal, child-centered 
developmental intervention as an exception to welfare retrenchment—indeed as reconcilable 
with welfare cuts in other areas. 
The early years, thus, were an exception to her argument for laissez-faire policy during 
this period. The British Department of Education and Science, with Margaret Thatcher at its 
helm, conceived of nursery education as serving a developmental and educational purpose for all 
children, quite separate from welfare provisions for poor families, even though it proposed 
targeting initial expansion to areas of social need. It is this crucial, albeit arbitrary, distinction 
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which explains how nursery education was envisaged as an exception. What would later be 
known as Thatcherism, with its attack on public programs writ large, was still inchoate and a 
work in progress during this period. Although nursery education never rose to the top of the 
agenda again during her government, Thatcher also did not repudiate it.114  Examining this 
proposal before her rise to power reveals a potent Conservative argument for public early care 
and education provision that New Labour would take up in the 1990s. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Dissonance and Symmetry: British and American Policy Landscapes  
After Universal Child Care Proposals Fail  
 In early 1981, just three months after defiantly announcing that “the Lady’s not for 
turning,” and directly after “reshuffling” the Cabinet after some of the ministers balked at her 
budget cuts, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher appeared on a television talk show. Answering 
questions posed by a panel of female professionals, she defended her policies, especially on 
women’s issues. One woman on the panel was none other than Dr. Tessa Blackstone, Professor 
of Education at London University and one of the child development experts that the Department 
of Education and Science, under Thatcher’s helm, had relied upon frequently while crafting the 
1972 White Paper. Blackstone provided Thatcher with an opening to back down from her 
previous commitment to universal nursery education, bluntly pointing out that the government’s 
cuts in public expenditure had led to funding cuts for nursery education in some localities. She 
asked, “Were you wrong in 1972 when you put forward these proposals? If you weren't and if 
you were right, why are they being abandoned now?”  
Thatcher did not take the bait. She did not denounce her earlier pet policy. Instead she 
began defensively by explaining, “I think you haven't got the full story with respect.” Thatcher 
continued by repeating much of the same rhetoric about priorities within the Education budget 
that she had held in the early seventies. She valued nursery and primary education over higher 
education because, she said, “I thought it far more important to get in a very good foundation and 
start at the beginning,” but that overall “there's only a certain amount we can put the burden [on 
taxpayers] … and therefore within that amount we have to judge priorities.” While she would not 
increase the Education budget, and in fact would advocate further cuts in the coming years, 
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Thatcher did favor a reprioritization, stating, “I make no secret of it, I would prefer to put more 
in nursery education and primary education.”1   
A fascinating exchange followed between Blackstone and Thatcher about whether or not 
nursery education enabled women to work. Blackstone insisted that in order for women to 
balance work and family, “a much more widespread and universal system of nursery education” 
was needed. Thatcher reiterated her earlier rhetoric here as well, stating that it was only a part-
time provision intended to promote child development, and the conversation dissolved as the two 
women spoke over one another about the hours of care provided and whether or not this was 
sufficient for part-time employment. The moderator, Judith Chalmers, quickly ended the 
exchange and pointed the conversation onto other topics.   
********** 
This conversation would be extraordinary had it taken place on the other side of the 
Atlantic at the same time: no right-wing American politician would have confessed their support 
for public child care for nonpoor families in the heady, early days of neoliberal budget cutting. 
Thatcher’s response exemplifies the crucial difference between conservative rhetoric on child 
care in the United States and Britain despite the seeming symmetry of their respective policy 
landscapes. In both countries, the universal child care proposals offered in the early 1970s failed, 
and the range of potential reforms shifted to the right in both countries during the following 
decades. However, differences in the reasons for failure highlight the distinctions in how child 
care was framed in both countries. In the U.S., child care was always depicted as a welfare 
program, and as such any extension of public services (aside from tax credits) to middle-class 
families was reviled by the right-wing, whereas in Britain it was considered an education 
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program and never attacked as vehemently by Conservatives, but rather funding was gradually 
reduced. These discrepancies explain how the two countries would diverge in the 1990s.  
This chapter examines the aftermath of both failed policies from the mid-1970s until the 
late 1980s, analyzing how proponents of the expansion of public child care conceded rhetorical 
ground and began discussing how to provide child care at lower costs and in the language of 
“parental choice.” Despite these similarities, however, it highlights the distinctions in how child 
care was framed in both countries. It also examines the ways that advocates shifted their 
approaches during the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, for example focusing on employer-
provided child care rather than continuing to emphasize universal approaches. 
Although no major child care measures were implemented during this period in either 
country, policymakers and advocates on both sides of the Atlantic were engaged in political 
battles on a range of other issues regarding families, women, and children. In the U.S., for 
example, in addition to the political flux after the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation, 
many of the same figures who had supported the CDA were occupied with the aftermath of the 
1973 Roe v Wade Supreme Court case and the 1976 Hyde Amendment; federal and state 
lobbying for the Equal Rights Amendment; action around the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act; and pursuing legal cases against employers accused of sex discrimination. The Republican 
Ford administration created the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in 1975, an antipoverty 
measure intended to incentive work for low-income individuals, especially those with children as 
the credit increases according to the number of depending children claimed. In Britain, 
politicians were occupied by rising unemployment and inflation, culminating in Labour’s 
“Winter of Discontent” in 1978 after unfavorable negotiations with unions. Family policy 
specifically came into flux as well, with the passage of the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act for 
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example. Further, family allowances and child tax allowances were replaced by the universal 
child benefit in a 1977 after a political scandal: a civil servant from the Home Office leaked 
Cabinet minutes to Frank Field of the Child Poverty Action Group in protest of then-Labour 
Prime Minister James Callaghan’s attempt to make the child benefit means-tested.2 Thus, 
although child care policy in this period appears relatively stable, family policy was anything but 
when considered in this broader context. 
 
Aftermath in the U.S.: “Can the Government Take Away Your Children?” 
One way to characterize the decade following Nixon’s veto of the 1971 Comprehensive 
Child Development Act (CDA) might be that it highlighted Senator Walter Mondale’s (D-MN) 
indefatigable persistence against an ultimately insurmountable conservative attack on any 
proposal to extend public child care to the nonpoor. Mondale, however, was not alone in his 
efforts, and was even joined by colleagues from across the aisle at points—Representative Bella 
Abzug (D-NY) continued to reintroduce her child care bill (discussed in Chapter 2) at the 
beginning of every Congressional session after the CDA failed,3 and bills on child care were also 
introduced by Representatives Ogden Reid (R-NY until 1972, when he joined the Democratic 
Party) and John Brademas (D-IN), and Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY). In early 1972, Mondale and 
Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI) reintroduced a bill that they thought would be satisfactory to the 
CDA’s detractors. As Mondale emphasized in the press release accompanying the bill’s 
introduction, “This bill reflects our willingness to resolve reasonable differences between the 
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Administration and Congress, and our desire to end the heated and irresponsible rhetoric which 
surrounded the previous bill and its veto.” These differences included tackling the controversial 
issue of prime sponsorship by increasing states’ roles, and therefore ceding arguments about 
local control by reducing the criteria that allowed local organizations to directly control federal 
funds. The bill also included explicit language about “family supporting provisions,” making it 
even clearer that only families who requested services would receive care. Finally, the bill 
included a “25% reduction of funding” as compared to the CDA. 4 
Tensions within Congress came to a head shortly after the veto. In March 1972, the 
Senate Child and Youth subcommittee that Mondale chaired organized a hearing with the 
purpose of “provid[ing] an explicit opportunity for individuals who opposed this legislation to 
express whatever concerns, questions, and recommendations they might have.”5 Behind closed 
doors, the strategy of this approach was to trip up CDA’s opponents like Senator James L 
Buckley (R-NY). According to Mondale’s top aide, the hearing was intended “to force [Buckley] 
to defend some of the outrageous statements” he had made before the veto.6  During the floor 
debate before the bill’s passage, Buckley joined other conservatives such as James Allen and 
Strom Thurmond, in decrying elements of the CDA. After casting doubts on the evidence 
marshalled by child care advocates on the presumed demand for care and unanimity among child 
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development experts on the bill’s virtues, Buckley presented the CDA as a slippery slope 
towards authoritarianism: 
It seems to me that if the Federal Government has the authority to 
enact this type of bill, it has the authority to enact absolutely 
anything. What is the use of having the Bill of Rights as a 
safeguard against unwarranted governmental intervention when 
we establish a program that puts the Federal Government into the 
business of determining the nature and quality of child rearing in 
the United States? How can we possibly deny the Government 
entrance at the front door when we welcome it with open arms at 
the back? Why should we want to deny the Government the right 
to eavesdrop on our conversations when we admit it warmly into 
the nursery? Why raise the hue and cry about ‘thought control’ in 
the public school classroom because of school prayer, only to 
embrace ‘cognitive developmental services’ in the nursery 
school?7 
 
Although Mondale and his colleagues had empirical evidence on their side, it was difficult to 
compete with the emotional and dystopian concerns stirred up by these right-wing politicians, 
and granting them a hearing provided them with an additional opportunity to stoke these fears. 
The vehement reaction against these efforts took Mondale and other advocates by 
surprise, and was reflected outside the halls of Congress as well. The Senate Subcommittee on 
Children and Youth collected examples of right-wing media coverage of the CDA, and much of 
this material reveals the conservative backlash against public child care proposals as Soviet-like 
intrusions into the sanctity of private family life. They also depicted an unease with the role of 
                                                
7 NARA, RG 46 Records of the U.S. Senate 92-94 Congress, Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Subcommittee of Children and Youth, Box 7: Child and Family Services, 
Correspondence and Topical Files, CFS- Documents, Congressional Digest May 1972, 
“Controversy over Expanding the Federal Role in Day-Care and Child Development.” 
142 
experts having authority over children, via anti-intellectual screeds against “social engineering.” 
An editorial in Human Events, for example, warned that “Big Brother wants your children.”8   
Similarly, a cartoon published on the front page of the anti-Communist, right-wing 
newsletter Common Sense founded by Conde McGinley and accompanied by a full page of text 
decrying the CDA depicted an almost hysterical overreaction. Three crying children are 
separated by what looks like jail bars from a cluster of women, presumably their mothers; the 
children are pressing their small bodies against the bars with outstretched arms. Above the jail 
cell wall is a sign labeled “H.E.W. COMMUNE,” for the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, and one of the women, looking indignant, is accompanied by a speech bubble declaring 
that “YOU DON’T HAVE TO GO TO RUSSIA TO SEE THE IRON CURTAIN!”9 This 
rhetoric seems unhinged, and even comical, in its extreme misunderstanding (or deliberate 
misrepresentation) of the CDA’s actual provisions—above all, that participation was voluntary. 
However, it reflects how deeply felt and passionate the opposition to public child care had 
become for conservatives, and it foreshadows the obstacles that future legislative efforts—such 
as the 1975 and 1979 versions of the Child and Family Services Acts—would face. 
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 Concerns about familial privacy pervaded the U.S. in the 1970s, fostered by a burgeoning 
conservatism. Natasha Zaretsky, for example, argues that fears about family decline, especially 
the crisis of the nuclear family, were at the center of fears about national decline in 1970s, and 
that these worries were mutually constitutive.10 Anxieties about the health of the American 
family were heightened by the sheer number of crises facing the nation: the Viet Nam war; rising 
inflation and unemployment, along with increased global competition, and the oil crisis, with its 
accompanying shock that the economy was dependent on a commodity whose supply was 
suddenly uncertain. Zaretsky concludes that these concerns contributed to a reemergence of 
“traditional” family values, and a refocusing on the family as a private sphere that needed 
protection from state infringement.  
At the same time, as historian Matthew Lassiter notes, the “populist revolt of the Silent 
Majority” occurred when “millions of white homeowners who had achieved a residentially 
segregated and federally subsidized version of the American dream forcefully rejected race-
conscious liberalism as an unconstitutional exercise in social engineering.”11 Although Lassiter’s 
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focus is primarily on racial integration in education and housing, fears about “social engineering” 
were also prevalent in conservative rhetoric against child care. Similarly, Natalia Mehlman 
Petrzela focuses on the how the “erosion of family authority and the erection of an invasive, 
liberal state bureaucracy often appeared to reinforce one another.”12 These forces were even 
more prevalent after Watergate. Donald Critchlow argues that “only the emergence of cultural 
issues—abortion, feminism, prayer-in-school, and homosexual rights—revived the Right”13 after 
Nixon’s impeachment. 
In 1975, Mondale attempted again to resurrect provisions from the CDA that he thought 
could garner bipartisan support. This bill adopted specific language designed to allay 
conservative opposition. For example in a joint memo, Mondale and New York Senator Jacob 
Javits assured their colleagues that “the bill contains extensive safeguards to ensure that services 
are provided only when parents request them.”14 However, conservatives were once again able to 
harness and weaponize grassroots opposition to the bill. Appearing on a radio program in an 
attempt to counter this opposition, Mondale explained that “literature” that had been spread 
about the bill contained “not a shred of truth.” An array of flyers, pamphlets, and editorials had 
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been circulated by unknown actors which constituted “a totally dishonest and inaccurate 
campaign is being conducted by organizations or individuals who we can’t even identity because 
they refuse to sign their names to the literature.”15 The anonymous yet well-organized efforts to 
discredit the bill deeply unsettled its advocates.  
The propaganda campaign tapped into fears about state encroachment into the private 
family that echoed Cold War tensions. One representative version of this propaganda was a 
pamphlet titled “They’re After Your Child” which warned that the 1975 Child and Family 
Services Act would “take the responsibility of the parents to rearing [sic] their children and give 
it to the GOVERNMENT.” Posing the question, “CAN THE GOVERNMENT TAKE AWAY 
YOUR CHILDREN?????”, it characterized the 1971 CDA as “SOVIET-STYLE system of 
communal child rearing” that is once again being “pushed” by “DO GOODERS AND HOME 
BREAKERS.” The pamphlet lists several specific, but factually incorrect, proposed provisions in 
the bill and details what the consequences of these would be. For example: “‘Children have the 
right to freedom from religious or political indoctrination.’ That means that you have no right to 
insist on taking them to church, if they do not wish to go.” The document continues by warning 
that although Nixon previously vetoed this legislation, it has enough votes now and that readers 
needed to “take the trouble to write [Congress] or suffer the consequences of your silence.” 16  
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Proponents of the bill were perplexed by these accusations, calling them both “totally 
fraudulent” and a “totally dishonest propaganda campaign.”17 John Brademas, for example, 
declared “never in my 17 years as a Representative in Congress have I seen a more systematic, 
willful attempt to smear both me and my work.”18  What made this smear campaign especially 
virulent was its reach. Edward Zigler recalls that “each day, between two thousand and six 
thousand incensed and hysterical letters poured into congressional offices.”19 Because of the 
“unusual circumstances” and “unusually broad circulation of extremely inaccurate and 
misleading information,” Mondale had to ask the Committee for Labor and Public Welfare to 
print more copies of the Senate bill and its “background materials”20 in order to respond to 
requests for information.  
The advocacy coalition that had pushed the CDA to the top of the agenda in 1971 was in 
disarray and unable to effectively counter this propaganda campaign, and the Child and Family 
Services Act never made it out of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Sonya 
Michel has argued that the constituency for child care became fragmented along class lines, as 
direct services were increasingly targeted to low-income families and welfare recipients, and tax 
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deductions placated higher-income families.21 Similarly, Kimberly Morgan writes that “the 
child-care lobby had reached its zenith in 1971 as disparate groups with various motives came 
together around the common goal of passing the CDA. In the years following the veto, the 
coalition fragmented as its latent divisions came to the fore.”22 These divisions were so deep that 
not even the virulent, non-factual conservative attack on child care could bring the coalition back 
into action. 
One issue further dividing advocates around the 1975 Child and Family Services bill was 
a move by the President of the American Federation of Teachers, Albert Shanker, to place 
proposed preschool education in public schools.23 As discussed in Chapter 2, many advocates 
were reticent about the role of state-level education agencies given their record on civil rights 
battles in the 1960s. Other advocates saw this as a power grab by Shanker, and a way to provide 
jobs to his constituents. Edward Zigler, Yale developmental psychologist and former head of the 
Office of Child Development, wrote that “my own view is that Shanker had little sympathy for 
preschool education until it looked like such programs could be a vehicle for jobs for 
unemployed teachers.”24 This apprehension about the role of schools in providing public child 
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care is one of the sharpest differences between the U.S. and Britain, as the latter’s Department of 
Education was the agency responsible for nursery education, and placing nursery classes in 
primary school facilities was seen as a cost-effective and favorable strategy. Deeply fraught 
tensions over busing and desegregation during this period exacerbated American child care 
advocates’ reticence over the role of schools in providing care.25 
The National Organization for Women (NOW) took a back seat in the advocacy coalition 
after the CDA’s failure. In addition to the structural challenges in regards to its underfunded, 
voluntary task forces, and the racial and class tensions which led its members to be ambivalent 
about targeted measures. As historian Maryann Barasko, in her analysis of the history of NOW, 
argues, NOW’s opposition to incremental policy measures in either the CDA or successive bills 
stems from its organizing paradigm. She explains, “NOW would have trouble formulating and 
implementing a ‘working-family friendly’ strategy: [because] any legislative result would 
inevitably be a product of compromise… NOW’s reluctance to compromise and its readiness to 
antagonize even its allies is practically an organizational hallmark… NOW’s willingness to stand 
apart, even from progressive allies, is a legacy of its founding commitment to being a vanguard 
and politically independent organization.”26 NOW thus backed away from actively supporting 
legislative proposals for child care that provided incremental gains for some women, namely 
poor mothers, rather than universal approaches, despite still including rhetoric in favor of child 
care in its mission.  
Thus, although NOW continued to support expanded child care proposals, it did little to 
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lobby or advance proposals at the national level. For example, a 1973 newsletter of NOWs Child 
Care Task Force stated its dedication to “the creation of a national network of high quality 
developmental child care programs, including health, nutritional and educational components, 
free of sex role stereotypic and prejudice based on race, color, creed and religion. Child care 
centers must be opened at flexible hours, available on a sliding fee scale with free services to low 
income families and include infant care, preschool programs, and care for children with special 
needs. They should serve the community on the same basis as public schools, parks and 
libraries.” However, Sally Gruschkin, listed as the contact person for federal legislation, believed 
chances for legislative progress were low, and recommended that the task force turn its attention 
elsewhere. She wrote, “The reports that I'm receiving regarding passage of Federal Child Care 
legislation during the administration are dim… [As] the legislative front is at a stand still...we 
can utilize the time” for other activities, especially compiling information on child care and 
building consciousness around the issue “so that when our president has another chance to sign a 
child care bill, the public won't stand for a veto!”27 In 1975, Child Care Task Force Coordinator 
Mary Grace Plaskett stated that while “child care will be a controversial political issue this year,” 
she deemed the proposed Child and Family Services Bill as very unlikely to pass, and although 
she had met with Mondale, she favored a strategy of “developing model child centers and 
feminist curriculum.”28 NOW favored a strategy of promoting “model” centers at the local level 
that would be directly aligned with feminist principles over an incremental, national approach 
that it deemed unlikely to succeed.   
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Although NOW backed away from advocacy for child care, other organizations put 
women front and center in their campaigns for child care legislation. The National Welfare 
Rights Organization continued to press for comprehensive legislation, calling Nixon’s veto a 
“cruel blow to the nation’s working mothers” and arguing that “the growing number of women 
who want to, and need to, work either to support their families or satisfy the need for greater self-
fulfillment has made it imperative that we create quality day care facilities.”29  
Other advocates focused their rhetoric on the gains from child care for children and 
families. Arvonne Fraser of the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL), testifying at a hearing 
on the 1975 Child and Family Services Bill, explained that “WEAL believes that day care is a 
children's problem and not solely a women's problem.” Further, she argued that while “Child 
care is usually viewed as a 'women's issue' and, indeed, it is a central factor in the liberation of 
any working mother--whether she works inside or outside the home. However, we testify for this 
bill not only because we are looking for liberation but also because we care about children.”30  
These issues were raised again in 1979, known in this iteration as the Child Care Act, or 
Cranston Bill after Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA). This time the bill “avoided” the “politically 
damaging” issue of prime sponsorship, ceding battles around local control by designating states 
as the only recipients of federal funding.31 It also was a much less costly proposal, authorizing 
$90 million in its first year as compared to $1.2 billion as the CDA had. Mondale was then 
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President Carter’s vice-president, but still the bill failed to progress through Congress: Zigler 
recalls that “Mondale graciously kept his distance for fear his support would rekindle the right” 
and their fervent opposition.32 Historian Mary Frances Barry writes that the legislation was 
doomed to fail because President Jimmy Carter did not support it. She explains, “Carter was 
neither religiously, ideologically, nor politically interested in attacking accepted gender roles.”33 
Without strong support in the White House, there was not much incentive for policymakers to 
support the bill, especially without grassroots encouragement. 
Advocates also took an ambivalent stance on the Cranston Bill. A legislative memo of the 
National Women’s Policy Caucus noted that “the child care coalition which worked to pass the 
Child Care Bill eventually vetoed by President Nixon has re-assembled,”34 and this support was 
seen as crucial—a newsletter from the Women’s Equity Action League warned that the Cranston 
bill “will die in committee unless it receives grass roots support.”35 This support, however, was 
not forthcoming: Zigler remembers that among advocates, “the only thing this group shared was 
a desire for child care legislation. When it came to exact features of the bill, everyone had a 
different hobby horse.”36 After it appeared that the bill would fail, WEAL explained to its 
members, “Legislatively, the child care issue has sadly collapsed... In the 'Year of the Child' anti-
feminists argue that it costs too much to take care of needy children, that federal controls are 
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anathema, and that the whole idea of a national program for day care weakens the already 
crumbling unity that sustains this nation's nuclear families.”37 Advocates thus blamed the right, 
but Zigler remembers that there was little agreement among themselves about the shape child 
care policy should take. Little movement on national child care policy would take place until the 
campaign for the Act for Better Child Care (ABC) Bill, almost a decade later.  
 
Aftermath in Britain: “Savage Cuts” 
The failure of the British 1972 White Paper that proposed nursery expansion was much 
less dramatic than the failure of the American CDA. Its demise was more gradual and subtle, as 
both major parties’ continued to pay lip service to its alleged benefits for children even while 
shuffling priorities away from its implementation. For example, although the Queen’s speech in 
1974 promised that the new Labour government would give “particular attention” to “the 
development of a fully comprehensive system of … nursery education,”38 no new resources 
would be made available for nursery education under the Labour governments of Harold Wilson 
and James Callaghan, even though Labour ministers had criticized the Conservative white paper 
and argued that its provisions did not go far enough.  
Britain was in the midst of a recession during the mid-1970s and facing high inflation 
rates. Thatcher had foreshadowed the difficulties of the later half of the decade during the 1974 
general election campaign: 
This Election is being held against a background of uncertain 
economic factors. The prices of foodstuffs, raw materials, and oil, 
which we have to buy from overseas have risen at an 
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unprecedented rate over the last two years, and are now the largest 
component in rising prices at home. The cost of these essential 
imports has not been matched by the prices which overseas 
customers are paying for our exports, and we have therefore a 
serious balance of payments problem . . . For a time we may have 
to moderate our expectations of a rising standard of living, while 
we learn to live within the nation's means. In the longer term, the 
prospects improve as oil begins to flow in larger quantities from 
the seas around our shores. But the next 5 or 6 years will be very 
difficult for any Government.39 
 
The nation even sought a loan from the International Monetary Fund in 1976 to help stay afloat. 
There were cuts made in existing public expenditure programs, and the acting Labour 
government between 1974 and 1979 no longer shielded nursery expansion from budget cuts, as 
Thatcher had during her tenure as Education Secretary of State.  
In early 1976, in fact, expenditure was cut further in what one civil servant termed a 
“savage cut” that “postpones indefinitely the completion of the nursery school building 
programme announced in the 1972 white paper.”40 This was in contrast to plans set forth in the 
Labour Party annual conference program for 1976, which had proposed speeding up nursery 
expansion so that its target of serving 90 percent of four year olds by 1980 instead of 1982 with 
an additional £100 million in spending over the White Paper’s provisions.41 However, memo 
written for Prime Minister Wilson stated that “the nursery programme has fallen well behind the 
targets put forward in the Labour Party Manifesto,” and that while “for some time [provision for 
under fives] has been a high priority for expansion in the Labour Party's education programme, 
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but progress has been slow. The recent cuts in public expenditure have further stemmed the 
advance of the nursery education expansion programme.”42 
Labour ministers preferred a more comprehensive model of child care than the part-day, 
part-time care promised in the White Paper, but the government lacked the resources—or the 
political will to re-channel existing resources—to such a program. Its inaction also allowed the 
party to dodge the controversial topic of whether mothers of young children should work outside 
the home. A Labour draft of a green paper on education in 1977, for example, couched its 
description of the program in ambivalent terms, stating “nursery education is valuable for all 
children, but it should supplement, not replace, what a child learns at home.”43 Others were more 
direct about wanting to support working mothers; Dr. Tessa Blackstone in her capacity as a  
member of a government working group on education, for example, complained that “the 
programme for the expansion of nursery education takes insufficient account of the needs of 
working mothers.”44  
A third element leading to Labour’s reprioritization of nursery education was a 
continuing struggle over when and how it was appropriate to aid children.  A memorandum 
drawn up by the Cabinet’s Social Research Coordinating Unit in 1975 challenged the focus of 
policy on the early years. The author wrote, “the phase of being a young child, or the parent of a 
young child, is but one short phase . . . There is no reason to assume that the most effective, or 
most cost-effective, interventions designed to aid small children and their parents will fall 
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exclusively or even mainly within the 0-5 period of a child’s life.”45 This interpretation of the 
child development literature is vastly different than the conclusions drawn before the White 
Paper was issued that the early years were the most formative for later outcomes, and therefore 
the most efficient period of the life cycle for social policy to address.  
Labour’s inertia is especially surprising given that Shirley Williams became Secretary of 
State for Education and Science under Callaghan in 1976, as she had been an active member of 
the National Campaign for Nursery Education. However, her tenure seems to have been 
especially fraught, with the Department coming under criticism internally for issues such as the 
increasing number of unemployed. Williams herself recalls in her autobiography that although 
she “envisaged maintained nursery schools” as “central hubs” for young children’s care and 
education, “I was not in the Department long enough to see my ideas [about nursery education] 
bear fruit.”46 Moreover, “my championing of comprehensive schools had by this time made me a 
highly controversial politician,” as Conservatives fought against ending school selection and the 
eleven-plus exam, and this issue was a higher priority for the department.47 Williams also blames 
the economy for Labour inaction, stating that Callaghan “was soon unable to devote any more of 
his time to education or indeed to anything much other than the country’s economic plight,”48 
especially after the 1976 loan from the International Monetary Fund.  
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 Out of office, Conservatives continued to support nursery education, but increasingly 
used the language of “choice,” emphasizing parental authority over state prerogatives regarding 
children. This is in contrast to American conservatives, who used a rhetoric of coercion during 
this period when referring to public child care for the nonpoor; American advocates for child 
care would increasingly use this rhetoric in an effort to appease their opponents in the 1980s. The 
Conservative Research Department bundled nursery education into a newly conceptualized focal 
area, Family Policy. As Chris Mockler of the Conservative Research Department put it,  “family 
policy is a politically attractive way of selling some of our already existing policies.”49 This 
would go on to become a centerpiece of Thatcher’s policies as prime minister, particularly the 
“Parents’ Charter” which emphasized parental choice of schools, especially regarding battles 
over comprehensivation in secondary education.  
As early as 1974, Norman St John-Stevas, then-Shadow Secretary of Education and 
Science, argued that the Conservative Party should focus on the theme of “parental choice” in the 
next election, and frame nursery education along those lines. He wrote,  “we should seek to 
associate parents with the running of the nursery school system in order that it does not become a 
glorified state baby-sitting service.”50 In this conceptualization, nursery education is similar to 
playgroups, which were decidedly less expensive for the state to administer as they relied on 
mothers’ time and resources.51 Similarly, the Education Steering Committee of the Conservative 
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Party wrote in 1975 that “the main theme in our thinking on education has been to strengthen 
family responsibility, freedom and choice consistant [sic] with financial restraint;” this would 
become the basis for the “Parents’ Charter.”52 The “guiding principles” of a subcommittee of this 
group that was to be chaired by Anthony Steen and Lady Elspeth Howe and focused on 
preschool-aged children  was “the importance of family units and cost effectiveness.”53 As 
Shadow Secretary for the Department of Health and Social Services, Patrick Jenkin declared that 
“Day Care for the Under-5s must be firmly linked to family life and to the local community. It 
must not be allowed to become yet another arm of the bureaucracy.”54 
This language emphasizing parental choice was carried forward when the Conservatives 
came back to power at the end of the decade. A Working Group focusing on young children that 
was part of a broader Children’s Committee wrote in a 1980 publication, “parents bear the 
primary responsibility for bringing up their own children...Whatever form of help is extended to 
families, whether it is given as financial aid from the State or as guidance from the statutory and 
voluntary agencies, the Working Group believes that it should be offered in such a way that the 
ability of parents to look after the well-being of their own children is enhanced, not diminished.” 
However, this did not mean that they did not see any role for the state in providing care: the 
Working Group warned that “there is a growing tendency in current public debate to assert that 
the State must provide services only in those special family circumstances where the parents 
evidently cannot cope.” However, the Working Group worried that this line of reasoning was 
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creating a false dichotomy that nonpoor parents or non-working parents did not need any 
support—rather they believed that there was a middle ground in which all families could use 
some form of child care services.55 
Even as leader of the Conservative Party after 1975 and Prime Minister after 1979, 
Margaret Thatcher maintained a persistent and supportive position on nursery education. For 
example, a 1977 Conservative Research Department memo noted that “because of Mrs. 
Thatcher’s commitment and because this is a popular concept, further reductions [to Labour’s 
cuts] would not politically be worth the amount saved.”56 This same language was repeated 
almost verbatim two years later when Thatcher was Prime Minister: in a meeting on public 
expenditure and education, Thatcher stated that she “did not believe that it would pay to cut 
down on nursery education.”57 Further, just as Thatcher had resisted calls from the Treasury to 
charge parental fees for nursery education in her 1972 White Paper, she continued to push 
against her party on this issue. Shortly before the 1979 election, Nigel Lawson, who would 
become Financial Secretary to the Treasury, wrote a proposal for education expenditure; 
discussing this paper, members of the Conservative Research Department noted that “Mr. 
Lawson advocates charges for nursery education. Mrs. Thatcher has said on a number of 
occasions that she would not accept this, chiefly on the practical grounds that it would be 
difficult to charge parents for education until the age of five and then stop suddenly” but also 
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because Thatcher believed this politically unpalatable.58 However, despite this stability of her 
opinion on nursery education, her government did not prioritize nursery education above its other 
goals. For example, a deputation from the National Union of Teachers and the National 
Campaign for Nursery Education was disappointed to hear from Lady Janet Young, a Minister of 
state at the Department of Education and Science, that “the Government cannot afford to inject 
resources on the scale into the education system where there are so many claims competing for 
priority.”59 The Conservative government, however, was quick to deflect criticism from Labour 
politicians about the effect of retrenchment policies on nursery education. For example, a brief 
on education policy by the Conservative Research Department in 1983 asserted that “contrary to 
Opposition assertions, the number of children in nursery education has increased under the 
present government.”60  
 
Lower Cost Alternatives and Their Critics 
 In both states, policymakers sought lower cost alternatives after the failure of universal 
child care approaches. In the U.S., Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP), which had been 
introduced in Congress as HR.1, was seen as a preferable solution to conservatives uneasy with 
the idea of public child care for middle-income families. They were willing to consider child care 
for poor women as a means to increase work for women who would otherwise use welfare. In 
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Britain, a conference held in Sunningdale in 1976 assessed possibilities for providing care to 
under-fives in the context of economic recession. Both FAP and the proposals put forward at the 
Sunningdale conference emphasized cost reductions. Advocates for the failed universal 
approaches were horrified by their approach. 
American advocates criticized FAP on many of the same grounds in which they criticized 
Nixon’s veto. The bill, which was introduced in 1969 and defeated in 1972, proposed replacing 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a guaranteed minimum income for 
families with children, including low-income workers, and required recipients to work or engage 
in job training activities. In a speech to NWRO, one of FAP’s most adamant foes, Bella Abzug 
revealed her disdain for the proposal’s child care plans: 
Mr. Nixon doesn’t approve of child care centers in which children 
from all walks of life learn together and play together. He only 
wants child care centers as dumping grounds for the children of 
welfare mothers so that they can be forced to work out their 
welfare checks. They are not even to have the dignity of getting 
decent jobs at decent pay, or the opportunity to get into educational 
and training programs that will give them some hope of emerging 
from desperate poverty into an adequate standard of living.61 
 
Abzug decried the creation of a two-tier child care system in which poor, non-white families 
were to be eligible for public child care while higher income families received tax credits 
instead.  
NWRO voiced these criticisms as well, and in 1973 planned protests titled “Children’s 
Survival March[es]” in cities such as Chicago, Louisville, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, and 
New York as well as proposed other cuts such as to Social Security Title IVa, which provided 
small amounts of funding for child care. As they declared in a press release, “the cumulative 
                                                
61 Abzug, Box 140 Child Care—Abzug—Speeches, Statements, Testimony, Congressional 
Record Remarks, Speech to NWRO July 12, 1973. 
161 
effect of these proposals is to erode public confidence in the ability of government to understand 
and support the needs of children and their families. They create divisions in the communities; 
they pit the welfare poor against the working poor, single parents against married couples, black 
against white and state against state, in competition for the federal dollar.”62 More bluntly, 
elsewhere NWRO also termed FAP “barbaric and inhumane” in provisions that it argues “sets up 
a new slave class with its slave-fare and children who are beaten and starved are easier to 
control; they make better servants later on.”63 This language is dramatic and extreme, and 
reflects the anger advocates felt at the apparent hypocrisy that while the Nixon Administration 
would decry the CDA as an invasion of familial privacy, it would simultaneously propose a 
welfare program that would compel poor, mostly non-white, mothers of young children to work 
and provide only custodial, rather than high-quality, care for their children. 
Similarly, Elinor Guggenheimer, founder of the National Day Care and Child 
Development Council, made an eloquent case against low cost child care provisions that only 
provided custodial care. She explained that “the subject of day care continues to be highly 
controversial-perhaps because it threatens, or appears to threaten, the concept of the nuclear 
family and women's place in the home.” She continued that while many of her contemporaries 
envisioned a breadwinner model type of family, and “among those who hold this comforting 
vision is President Nixon, a substantial number of his advisors, and a decreasing number of 
federal legislators,” this image does not fit with 1970 Census figures on divorce rates, single 
parent families, poverty, educational attainment, or child abuse. Cumulatively, “all of these facts 
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add up to an urgent need for daycare services. Wishing the Kodak family into existence doesn't 
bring it to life, but continuing neglect of children destroys any possibility of developing this type 
of picture in the future.” She posits that arguments against comprehensive child care are in fact 
the ones that are “far fetched,” especially those that draw comparison to Soviet Russia. Leaders 
like Nixon who accept the need for day care “only for the purpose of cutting back welfare 
rolls...are talking about...a program that is diametrically different” from the one envisioned by 
child advocates. FAP, she concluded, represented the “total ghetto-ization of children in day 
care” that “will ensure not only economic but racial segregation at the earliest age.” This 
provision would miss “the entire point of the reason for day care.”64  
On the other side of the Atlantic, policymakers and stakeholders considered alternatives 
to universal child care as well. They gathered in early 1976 at the Civil Service College in 
Sunningdale Park for a conference titled, “Low Cost Day Provision for the Under-fives.” The 
conference title alone shows the inauspicious aims of the government as they relate to nursery 
education. Political scientist Vicky Randall is correct to note that what is most “revealing” about 
Sunningdale “were the low expectations of those taking part.”65 The British Association of Early 
Childhood Education66 was not even invited to the proceedings, and wryly noted that “the 
underlying trends of the Conference had been distinctly unfavourable towards nursery school 
education and standards.”67  
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Despite recognizing the high demand for child care, with 87% of mothers of three year 
olds and and 91% of four year olds “desir[ing]” day care,68 the conference largely provided a 
legitimizing framework for curtailing the growth of nursery education. For example, Lady 
Bridget Plowden, breaking with the recommendations of her eponymous 1967 report, argued that 
that since not many mothers of young children were working, the government should focus on 
supporting private playgroups rather than providing public care.69 Mia Kellmer Pringle of the 
National Children’s Bureau argued that demand for day care was high because of a cultural 
“devaluation of motherhood” as infant care “is simultaneously over-romanticised and under-
valued.” Although one might expect this to be grounds for a call for higher pay for child 
caregivers, Pringle instead saw this as evidence for supporting mothers to stay home. She 
continued, “to bring children into the world without one parent being willing to devote at least 
three years to their full-time care should come to be regarded as selfish indulgence,” and she 
warned that “there is danger now that children are being made pawns in the quest for economic 
prosperity in the battle for women's liberation.”70 
The policymakers, experts, and advocates gathered at Sunningdale were not unanimous 
in their abandonment of universal policies, however. Jack Tizard, Professor of Child 
Development at the Thomas Coram Research Unit, and frequent consultant with the Department 
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of Education and Science during the drafting of the 1972 White Paper, disagreed with his fellow 
conference-goers and voiced a strong dissent. As he stated, “I do not share the widely held view 
that we have no choice but to cut back on the nursery programme.” Further he argued that 
expanding lower cost alternatives like playgroups would be insufficient to meeting families’ 
needs. He also pointed out that while the framework coming out of Sunningdale was justifying 
the Labour government’s budget cuts “on economic grounds,” they were also reflecting 
“political priorities,” rather than responding to the research findings he cited that showed how 
“mothers of young children have an exceedingly hard time of it” but nursery education “are a 
boon both to them and to their children.71 He provided counterarguments to common 
rationalizing explanation for cuts, for example debunking Bowlby’s attachment theory, and 
providing evidence that mothers of young children sought work for reasons beyond financial 
need.  
This critique echoed outside of Sunningdale as well. A Working Party of the Trades 
Union Congress organized shortly after Sunningdale also provided a critique of this alternative 
policy direction—providing another source of tension between the unions and the Labour Party. 
The Working Party declared, “it seems to us to be wrong-headed to believe that ‘low cost’ 
provision for the under fives should be an objective of any national programme for this age 
group. The high standard of services which must be our aim must inevitably be expensive.”72 
This rhetoric would be repeated by a very different author over a decade later: the Conservative 
MP Tim Rathbone, and great-nephew of Eleanor Rathbone, countered arguments that nursery 
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education was too expensive by eloquently stating in a Tory Reform Group publication that 
“ignorance is always more expensive than education.”73 
  
Conclusion: Advocates Acquiesce  
 Following this narrowing of political possibilities and shift of the policy landscape to the 
right, by the 1980s advocates on both sides of the Atlantic began to adapt, and no longer 
pressured policymakers for universal approaches. Instead they focused on more limited 
provisions, like tax incentives for employers to provide child care. One NOW Child Care Task 
Force Coordinator even termed employer child care a “very hot item.”74 In the U.S., for example, 
the Organization for Women Office Workers, which changed its name in 1983 to 9 to 5: National 
Association of Women Office Workers, lobbied individual employers to provide vouchers to 
their workers and referral networks to assist employees’ search for care arrangements.75 The 
organization argued that employers should be doing much more to assist their workers in the 
absence of more universal approaches to care. In the U.S., this shift to the right was also 
reflected in a new advocacy campaign for a public voucher system for care that would allow 
parents to utilize a private child care provider of their choosing. This campaign led to successful 
legislation: the 1990 Act for Better Child Care, and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Similarly, the British National Federation of Women’s Institutes (NFWI) developed a 
campaign calling for Workplace Nurseries. Entailing letters to the media and to various 
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government officials, NFWI representatives argued that “in the present economic climate, it 
seems to us only reasonable to encourage not only the government but also employers to take a 
responsible attitude towards the provision of nurseries.”76 Not only does this rhetoric provide a 
case for employer-provided care, it also reveals an admission of the futility of campaigning for 
new public expenditure in the early 1980s. Even this limited campaign, however, was 
unsuccessful. A Treasury official responded negatively to an inquiry on the possibility of 
exempting employer nurseries from taxation by stating that “while I appreciate that taxing these 
benefits may seem hard, it would be wrong to treat the benefit of subsidised nurseries differently 
from other benefits.”77 
 In sum, while the policy landscapes of both countries followed similar contours following 
the failure of universal approaches to take hold, there were sharp differences in how child care 
was framed, especially given the disparate reaction by conservatives in each state. In the U.S., 
because child care was considered part and parcel of welfare policy, conservative Republicans 
balked at proposals for extending public provisions to nonpoor (and white) families. Because the 
White Paper, on the other hand, was framed as an educational intervention and had come from 
the Conservative Party and Margaret Thatcher’s Education Department specifically, 
Conservative politicians did not renounce it. Even in the context of reshaping public expenditure 
and adopting laissez-faire ideology during the early years of Thatcher’s government, the Iron 
Lady still voiced a partiality towards nursery education, revealing the early years as an exception 
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to retrenchment. This dissonance would lead to the second turning point in these two countries’ 






When President Bill Clinton signed the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, otherwise known as welfare reform, into law, he did so saying 
“It should give people the child care … they need to move from welfare to work without hurting 
their children.”1 This promise—not harming their children—sets a low bar for child care 
standards. It is also far different from his perhaps most reviled predecessor’s, Nixon, unfulfilled 
claim almost 30 years prior to undertake the “solemn responsibility that the full potential of 
[young] children—the seed beneath the snow that is not seen but is nonetheless there—is enabled 
to come forth.”2 The difference is stark, too, between President Clinton and his ally across the 
Atlantic.  New Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair dramatically expanded nursery education for 
three and four year old children as part of the party’s War on Child Poverty. Standing in Toynbee 
Hall in 1999, Blair announced a “historic aim that ours is the first generation to end child poverty 
for ever.”3 Moreover, he declared: 
Social justice is about merit. It demands that life chances should 
depend on talent and effort, not the chance of birth; and that talent 
and effort should be handsomely rewarded. The child born on a 
run-down housing estate should have the same chance to be 
healthy and well educated as the child born in the leafy suburbs.4  
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More than just rhetoric, this contrast is reflected materially in the numbers of children served by 
public child care expenditure in each country: one calculation found that in the mid-2000s, 0.49 
percent of Britain’s gross domestic product (GDP) was spent on child care and early education, 
compared to 0.28 percent of the U.S.’ GDP.5 Although both of these contributions are small 
relative to the total economy, the British investment in children’s early years is nearly double 
American expenditure. This difference resulted from the two countries’ divergence in policies 
during the 1990s. 
***** 
This chapter juxtaposes New Labour's War on Child Poverty against the creation and 
expansion of the American child care subsidy system for low-income families. New Labour’s 
policy included a universal child care program, as well as community-based comprehensive 
services for young children in disadvantaged neighborhoods, expanded parental leave, increasing 
financial support for families through changes in the tax system, and more. American policies, in 
contrast, created and expanded a child care subsidy system in which low-income families are 
eligible to receive vouchers to utilize in a private child care setting of their own choosing. 
These further entrenched American reliance on the private market.  I argue that because 
Conservative governments never denounced nursery education in Britain the British 
Conservative Party was more willing to accept the universal provision that the Labour Party 
introduced.  In the U.S., on the other hand, conservatives took issue with universal provisions, so 
child care advocates were more limited in the provisions that were politically possible, even 
under a Democratic administration. 
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The rhetoric of parental “choice” was a key and potent factor in both countries’ policy 
changes during the 1980s and 1990s. However, families in Britain were much more likely to 
have a true choice among child care arrangements because both the public provision of care as 
well as parental leave were much more generous than in the U.S.: six months paid and six 
months unpaid leave versus twelve weeks of unpaid leave. Child care advocates in both countries 
also increasingly responded to the growing rate of women’s employment. Although child care 
was considered an antipoverty strategy in both countries, and thus a form of welfare, the 
educational case for early intervention was more salient in Britain, and New Labour’s child care 
strategy provided care for all.  
 
U.S.: Formation and Expansion of the Child Care Subsidy System 
At the core of the changes enacted in the 1990s was a debate that flourished during the 
Reagan administration around the nature and desirability of public child care: did the lack of 
public support inhibit parents’ choices, or would the presence of such a provision limit families’ 
choices by making stay-at-home motherhood unsustainable? This debate that finally culminated 
in the success of the Act for Better Child Care (ABC), signed by President George H.W. Bush in 
1990 and expanded in 1996. Still framed as a welfare provision, in that the ABC bill provisions 
were targeted to the poor, the ideological shifts of the Reagan years turned the conversation 
around child care from its educational benefits to one about motherhood and the suitability of 
mothers’ work outside the home.   
The Reagan administration presented an abrupt shift in the direction of social policy, 
unsettling advocates for stronger safety net programs and leading them to pursue more 
incremental and tightly targeted expansions of services rather than the broader, universal 
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strategies that had seemed possible in the decade following President Johnson’s declaration of 
War on Poverty. Contemporary economists John Palmer and Isabel Sawhill depicted Reagan’s 
approach as “a counterrevolution” opposed to the New Deal settlement and social programs 
established since the 1930s, favoring instead a “philosophy of more limited government.”6 In just 
the first year of the Reagan administration, they continued, “the nation is engaged in a 
retrenchment and reformation of social policy,” which included measures to reduce the domestic 
portion of the federal budget, shift responsibility for domestic programs away from the federal 
government to state and local governments, encourage greater reliance on the private sector and 
free market, and more narrowly target benefits of social programs to “the truly needy.” 
Intrinsic to these changes is a moralistic vision of welfare receipt as a sign of individual 
failure, and even a sense of disgust.7 Reagan himself coined the phrase “welfare queen” in 1976, 
conjuring an image of welfare recipients as fraudulently abusing taxpayers’ hard-earned income 
to support a lazy, indulgent, and sexually licentious lifestyle. This depiction was all the more 
insidious given its racialized coding, and welfare receipt was thus further stigmatized. Set against 
this backdrop, even liberal advocates accepted the precept that it was the government’s 
responsibility to encourage low-income individuals to work instead of relying on cash assistance 
through the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  
By the late 1980s, two other social policy developments set the stage for a change in 
child care policy. First, although not successfully signed into law until the Clinton administration 
in 1993, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was first introduced to Congress in 1984 
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and reintroduced every year until its passage. The bill, which eventually guaranteed twelve 
weeks of unpaid leave to new parents and other caregivers who fit specific employment criteria,8 
was persistently blocked by Congressional Republicans during the Reagan years and then vetoed 
twice by President George H.W. Bush. This extended fight not only involved many of the same 
actors inside and outside of Congress, but also demonstrates the success of a limited and 
incremental policy for supporting families. The provisions granted by FMLA pale in comparison 
to other nations’ paid parental leave policies, for example.  
Second, the 1988 Family Support Act (FSA), which passed with near unanimous, 
bipartisan support, amended AFDC to guarantee child care for welfare recipients engaged in job 
training, or workfare programs. This is best seen as a continuation of efforts to require welfare 
recipients to work—efforts that were strongly opposed by earlier child care advocates, especially 
NWRO, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4. Although policy analyst Ron Haskins notes that while 
the FSA did allow states to require mothers of preschool children to work, few governors 
imposed these work restrictions,9 Senator Ted Kennedy later described this bill as “not a radical 
idea,” and instead “sound and sensible policy…appropriately acknowledged[ing] the critical link 
between child care and work.”10 Public provision of child care thus continued to be 
conceptualized across the political divide as a work support for welfare recipients—not as a 
child-focused educational intervention.  
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Many of the same advocates who had supported the CDA in the early 1970s remained 
concerned about child care in the 1980s, and began to regroup and organize for an ultimately 
successful but incremental legislative victory. Elinor Guggenheimer and Jule Sugarman, both 
then working at the Day Care Council of America, tried to start a “Child Care Crusade” in late 
1982, appealing to individuals from a wide array of women’s and children’s organizations, 
foundations, and media outlets.11 Guggenheimer and other advocates were especially worried 
about potential cuts to AFDC’s day care funding as well as cuts to AFDC grants themselves and 
cuts to health care spending.12 This coalition gradually snowballed over the course of the decade 
into a new child care coalition—including several groups, such as Guggenheimer’s Child Care 
Action Campaign, as it was renamed, the Act for Better Child Care Alliance administered by 
Marian Wright Edelman’s Children’s Defense Fund (CDF), and the Ad Hoc Day Care Coalition. 
They finally achieved success with the passage of a comprehensive child care bill, the Act for 
Better Child Care, or ABC Bill, which was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush as 
part of a budget reconciliation bill on November 5, 1990.  
The ABC bill reveals how far to the right child care advocates had to shift in order to get 
any child care legislation through Congress. The bill was introduced in the Senate by Chris Dodd 
(D-CT) and John Chafee (R-RI) (Chafee was later replaced as a cosponsor by Orrin Hatch [R-
UT]), and in the House by Dale Kildee (D-MI) and Olympia Snowe (R-ME). The bill created the 
Child Care Development Block Grant, a new source of federal funds ($750 in its first fiscal year) 
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granted to states for the purpose of supporting child care for low-income working families. The 
first States were given flexibility for determining precise eligibility criteria (which could not 
exceed 75 percent of state median income) and the mechanism through which services would be 
provided.  
Press releases from the bill’s cosponsors emphasized that demand for child care exceeded 
supply because mothers were increasingly employed outside the home. In his press release on the 
bill’s introduction in 1987, Kildee emphasized that the need for child care reflected demographic 
change, as he argued: “we should not be legislating for the families of the 1940s or 50s, when the 
father usually worked and the mother stayed home, or when there were far fewer single parent 
families.” Further, “the child care system we have now simply is not working. It almost punishes 
low and middle income mothers for holding down a job. These mothers are trying to build a 
future for their kids.”13 Echoing this sentiment, Snowe declared, “with this legislation, we 
recognize that many private sector solutions to the child care shortfall are effective—but 
incomplete.”14 Although this provision extended beyond welfare recipients by assisting low-
income working families, this accomplishment fell far short of the universal strategy outlined by 
the CDA almost two decades earlier—even though many of the same individuals and 
organizations were active in both lobbying efforts. 
Child care advocates believed that the ABC bill would now be widely supported by the 
public, and would have bipartisan support in Congress. In June of 1988, CDF staff circulated the 
results from a public opinion poll that showed an “undeniable mandate” for increasing federal 
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support for child care. Interpreting the results, they argued “The American people recognize the 
need for a serious federal investment in child care. They recognize that the price tag on ABC is 
small when compared to the costs of doing nothing.” The survey recorded a strong perception 
that the supply of quality, affordable child care paled in comparison to demand, and 63 percent 
of respondents—including 83 percent of working mothers—believed that the federal government 
had a responsibility to assist working families. The survey also found that two-thirds of 
respondents preferred a bill that included comprehensive federal health and safety standards for 
child care settings. However, these standards were eventually removed from the final bill to 
garner Republican support for passage.15 
 Advocates’ language was also explicit about the need for child care to support working 
mothers’ employment. The press release of the Women’s Equity Action League when the ABC 
bill was introduced, for example, stressed that “the time for child care is now”16 because of an 
increasing number of working mothers.  A Children’s Defense Fund publication with an almost 
identical name— “Child Care: The Time is Now”—included an entire page of statistics on 
working mothers. Most pressingly, their data reveal that the percentage of preschool-aged 
children with mothers in the labor force had increased from 29 percent in 1970 to 49 percent in 
1985. They predicted that 65 percent of these children’s mothers would work in 1995.17 
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The advocacy coalition was joined by professional organizations representing social and 
medical science researchers in child development, as well as individual researchers. Jay Belsky, 
a Pennsylvania State University developmental psychologist, had caused a controversy in his 
field over a research report on some of the negative effects of poor quality child care on child 
outcomes. However, in a Philadelphia Inquirer opinion article, Belsky clarified his statements 
and declared his support for expanded public provision of care: 
To conclude that day care is inherently bad for children is to 
throw the baby out with the bath water. To conclude that only 
mothers can care for baby is to stick one's head in the sand and 
believe that the idealized family of yesterday is somewhere on the 
horizon. Our economy is so dependent upon female labor that, if 
for no other reason, this is surely not the case. 
The time has come for America to make a commitment to the 
future by enacting into law federal legislation that increases the 
child-rearing options available to families and enhances the 
quality of day care.18 
 
Belsky’s passionate call for federal legislation was cited by Senator Dodd during the ABC’s 
bill’s Senate Hearing in 1989, and the full article was included in the hearing’s record. The ABC 
coalition also included groups such as the National Association of School Psychologists, who 
claimed that increased provision would '“result in greater mental wellness and reduce 
delinquency, learning difficulties, and school dropouts…Better child care is our investment in 
the future: it can reduce welfare, enhance worker effectiveness, and guarantee that our nation 
will have skilled citizenry.”19 Similarly, the American Psychological Association declared that 
“child care quality was a greater influence on a child's sociability and considerateness than 
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family background.” The Association warned that the current child care policy was “in the 
process of creating a two-tiered system,” with higher quality care reserved for higher income 
families with low-income families relegated to poor quality, custodial arrangements.20 
Just as Conservatives in Britain utilized a language of parental choice in their plans for 
expanding nursery education, American advocates for child care emphasized that increased 
provision would allow families to make meaningful choices about the arrangements that best 
suited their needs. While Republicans referred to choice in terms of mothers choosing to remain 
home and care for their children themselves, advocates believed that “your average working 
family does not have choices” along these lines. 21 Providing families with a voucher, they 
believed, would thus increase families’ ability to make a real choice. 
Republicans opposition to the ABC followed four general patterns that both also utilized 
a language of “choice.” First, because the bill prohibited providing federal funds to religious 
organizations in order maintain the separation between church and state, they argued that 
families who desired child care arrangements under religious auspices would be left out. Phyllis 
Schlafly, for example, testified that the ABC bill was in her view “among the most bigoted, anti-
religious regulations ever imposed.”22 Representative Clyde Holloway (R-LA) similarly argued 
that the ABC bill “restricts choices for women” because it would “narrow their range of choices” 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
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by subsidizing public child care over “private, church-run, and home-based” arrangements. 23 In 
her correspondence with other child care advocates, Marian Wright Edelman regretted that this 
line of debate had been pursued, lamenting that it “opened a Pandora's box which should never 
have been opened.”24 Even liberals recognized that this was a touchy point of contention that 
would lead to passionate opposition—and this prohibition was eventually abandoned when 
CCDBG was expanded in 1996. 
Second, they argued that it would encourage families to abandon the male breadwinner 
family model. As Holloway argued, the bill “makes it more difficult for women to choose full-
time motherhood.”25 This critique, while not supported by empirical research, was intended to 
elicit an emotional response from Republican constituents, and play into a narrative of a “cultural 
war” in which traditional families needed to be defended. Reflecting on this type of critique, 
Irene Natividad of the Child Care Action Campaign lamented, “there's a far larger problem that 
really goes beyond any particular bill, and that is the general view of the women's movement of 
not being supportive, or cognizant, of the plight of the homemaker.” This, she recognized, had 
long been a flaw of the women’s movement, and one with which “women leaders are trying to 
grapple.” 26  
Third, conservatives opposed expanded public child care as a violation of familial 
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privacy that also echoed the child care opposition discussed in Chapter 4. Schafly again is 
illustrative here, labeling the bill an attempt to “sovietiz[e] the American family.”27 Fourth, 
Republicans also opposed the bill’s setting of standards as an infringement on state rights, 
although these standards were removed before the bill’s passage. 28 
A report by Robert Rector of the conservative Heritage Foundation is illustrative of this 
language along all of these lines. He warned, “Touted as a ‘pro-family’ measure by its sponsors, 
the bill in fact amounts to a direct attack on the traditional American family… The overall effect 
would be to discourage American parents from raising their own children, turning the 
government into a ‘substitute parent’ for future generations of infants.”29 Further, Rector  adds, 
“the Act for Better Child Care represents the industrialization and bureaucratization of child 
rearing. ABC is based on a belief that the family as an institution for raising infant children is 
obsolete and inefficient.”  
Rector’s hostility is ironic, as the Republican’s own Family Security Act had allowed 
states to require poor mothers to work and encouraged day care use. He seemed to find 
objectionable not the fact that children might be in nonparental care but which children might 
find themselves there. He made this clear in successive comments, arguing at one point that 
“ABC discriminates against traditional families. The ABC legislation would hurt low-income, 
traditional families in which the father works while the mother remains at home to care for the 
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children.” He also echoed the criticism against not allowing religious organizations to take 
vouchers, saying “ABC would undermine religion. Any day care center that actively sought to 
teach religious values to young children would be denied funds under the ABC bill. Thus parents 
who want to reinforce traditional religious values would receive no help from ABC.” Rector 
instead proposed additional tax credits for families to offset child care costs.  
Clinging to the male breadwinner model of family life, Rector argued that “low-income 
traditional families are America's forgotten families; few politicians and commentators recognize 
that they even exist.” These families are the ones who he believed needed support the most, not 
families utilizing daycare. In this vision, child care is not a service intended for child education 
or development in the least: it is a work support for women who would otherwise be on welfare. 
The possibility that “traditional families,” which seems to be code for white, Christian families, 
would abandon conservative social and moral tenets opposing women’s employment because of 
the miniscule economic gain the ABC vouchers would grant them was too much for 
conservatives like Rector to bear. 
  Faced with this virulent, emotional opposition, child care advocates who had failed to get 
child care legislation for almost two decades started using the language of “choice” to counter 
their opponents, and accept the neoliberal precepts embedded in such rhetoric. The child care 
provisions embedded in the ABC Bill and the resulting subsidy program were limited to a 
population of low-income working families, and disbursed through vouchers that allowed parents 
to select a private caregiver rather than by direct public provision of child care. Without a 
minimum set of standards, and without an incentive for providers to accept the child care 
vouchers, the quality of care that parents could access was uneven at best. 
181 
This rhetoric was revisited again just a few years later when the child care subsidy 
program was expanded as part of the 1996 welfare reform. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act (PWORA) has been described as “the most fundamental change in 
American social policy since the Social Security Act of 1935.”30 Seeking to “end welfare as we 
know it,” the act eliminated Aid to Families with Dependent Children and replaced it with 
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF)—a restricted provision of cash assistance that 
required recipients to work and set lifetime time limits for benefit receipt. TANF recipients and 
low-income parents who were now working because they were ineligible for cash assistance 
were given vouchers to navigate the private market for care on their own.  
In his firsthand account of the bill’s passage, policy analyst Ron Haskins explains the 
impetus for reform came from along two lines. First, Republicans drew from a growing 
consensus in the party and in some avenues of social science research that employment was the 
most efficient anti-poverty strategy. As he writes, “Beginning with the debate on the Family 
Support Act of 1988, conservatives adopted the mantra ‘What works is work.’”31 Second, 
accepting the precepts of the Moynihan Report written three decades before, conservatives 
viewed single-mother families as pathological and at the root of the intergenerational cycle of 
poverty. PWORA thus aimed to tackle illegitimacy. Haskin explains, “National policymakers 
also put the force of the federal government behind a movement to encourage more responsible 
sexual behavior and sent a much clearer message than in the past that it was wrong to have 
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children outside marriage whom single parents could support neither emotionally nor 
financially.”32  
What did this moralistic vision of family life portend for young children? Haskins is clear 
that conservatives understood that their vision for welfare reform entailed taking benefits away 
from children, stating, “It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Republican bill did 
increase the risk that children could lose” benefits they had been entitled to under AFDC. This 
was justified, he argued, because, “the point of the bill was to require, and where necessary 
force, parents to become self-sufficient and leave the welfare rolls.” These “measures,” he 
continued, “were the only way to jolt the system into something more consistent with American 
values.”33 If families behaved as Republicans wished and undertook low-wage employment, they 
would be rewarded with several new benefits: an expanded Earned Income Tax (EITC), 
expanded Medicaid coverage, and an expansion of public child care. 
 This child care expansion would not come, however, in the form of direct public 
provision, but instead through an expansion of the subsidy system created in 1990, the Child 
Care Development Block Grant (CCDBG), which was appropriated approximately $2 billion in 
for its first fiscal year. Maximum eligibility criteria were expanded from 75 percent to 85 percent 
of state median income. States were not required to provide child care subsidies to all eligible 
families, however, and funding levels were, and remain to this day, inadequate for meeting the 
needs of even the limited population the program is designed to benefit.34 Although Haskins 
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reveals that “no argument was more divisive or involved more passion on both sides than child 
care,”35 Democrats battled with Republicans less over the form and content through which 
federal funds would be channeled to young children, than over the amount of money that would 
be added to CCDBG.  
Democrats justified the need for expanded child care in terms of offsetting the AFDC 
benefit cuts. Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) explained “60 percent of the people on welfare have 
children under the age of 5. Of the 14 million people on welfare, 5 million are adults, 9 million 
or 10 million are children. So what we are talking about here is a simple enough notion; that is, 
to provide some sort of a safe setting for children as we move their parent or parents into the 
work force.” Further, he argued, “if you had to pick one issue, one issue that is critical for 
moving welfare recipients to work, it is child care.” 36  
Summarizing social science literature, Dodd believed that “the greatest obstacles to 
moving from welfare to work [is] the lack of child care.” Dodd saw these research findings as 
completely relatable to any parent, and thus appealed to the sympathy of the public in general, 
noting “Anyone with young children, regardless of their economic status, who works or desires 
to work, understands completely the anxiety that another person would feel when going to work 
without some safe, adequate place to leave their children. It is just unrealistic to assume that you 
can reasonably move someone from welfare to work without accommodating that need.”37 To 
Dodd, then, expanding child care was a reasonable approach to mitigating the effects of the new 
restrictions to cash assistance. Although he asked his colleagues to imagine how any parent 
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would feel about the lack of child care, the proposals Democrats made to ensure an expansion of 
child care provision were limited to those that would serve the welfare and working poor 
populations.  
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), ever the “liberal lion,” proved one of the staunchest 
advocates for child care in Congress during the debates on welfare reform. During the Senate 
debate on the bill, he slammed the Republican’s proposal as the “Home Alone Bill,” after the 
popular Macaulay Culkin film, because he believed the bill “is more likely to leave children 
home alone than in quality child care programs that can give them a decent head start in life.” 
Kennedy implored his colleagues to take his pithy dig seriously, saying “Home alone is not a 
joke or a Hollywood film. It is a real life tragedy for American families pressed to the wall.”38 
His refrain throughout his speech asked, “who will care for these children?” Undercutting 
rhetoric on “choice,” too, Kennedy argued that the choices families faced were dire, and worse 
than those one imagined about which type of child care arrangement to select. He noted  “Today 
and every day, millions of American families face impossible and heart-wrenching choices—
between the jobs they need and the children they love—between putting food on the table and 
finding safe and affordable care for their children.”39 It should be noted that while considerations 
about the quality of child care utilized via the subsidy system were largely ignored, as 
Republicans were staunchly opposed to federal standards, separate policy debates on preschool 
education at the state and local level were more concerned with quality.  
The Republican response to such criticism reveals a bifurcated vision of the role of 
government in the private lives of the poor. They asserted that it was in the best interest of poor 
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families to demand that poor mothers of even the youngest children enter paid employment. At 
the same time, they did not believe it was their responsibility to provide or determine the quality 
of their child care. Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) responded to Kennedy’s criticism by saying 
that the bill allowed states to allocate resources to child care as they saw fit, giving them 
flexibility to adjust to local market conditions, and allowing parents greater choice “without 
onerous regulatory burdens,” including the ability to use federal funds for religious child care 
arrangements. He also believed that welfare reform would lower the price of child care. In sum, 
he argued “Our bill allows us to move beyond the point that Government is the answer to every 
problem and that only Government can solve our social problems.”40 However, he neglected to 
note that “our bill,” of course, allowed the government to force low wage mothers to work. 
Despite liberal criticisms, PWRORA passed with bipartisan support and President 
Clinton signed it into law, compromising to fulfill a campaign promise to reform welfare. The 
question remains: why did so many Democrats and advocates who had previously called for 
universal child care cooperate with the Republican’s shift of social policy to the right? Why were 
they satisfied with so little, whereas twenty years before it had been so close to a far more 
generous, universal approach? Contemplating these questions in the aftermath of welfare reform, 
a member of NOW noted during a brainstorming session that “we are working in an environment 
where few efforts of the advocacy groups have any impact on public policy and that, as a result, 
we are all victims of a conservative, decades old attitude that child care must be provided by 
mothers in the home or by low paid child care workers.”41 Universal measures had failed, and 
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advocates felt incrementalism was their only viable approach: they were able to slightly increase 
the bill’s expenditure on child care by agreeing to the bill’s general premise of promoting work. 
This strategy, however, failed to affect the overall framing which bound public child care 
services as a welfare provision limited to the poor.  
 
Britain’s War on Child Poverty 
As in the Reagan administration, the Conservative governments, which lasted from 1979 
to 1997 under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major, reassessed the role of the 
welfare state in contemporary society. The government’s rhetoric emphasized individual 
responsibility, privatization, and moral rectitude. However, historians Ben Jackson and Robert 
Saunders argue that “for all the radicalism of Thatcher’s rhetoric, the welfare state remained 
largely intact…proposals for radical welfare reform were largely ignored.”42 They continue by 
asserting that taxation as a percentage of GDP fluctuated and at certain points actually rose while 
she was Prime Minister, from 38.8 percent of GDP in 1979 but 43.7 percent at its height in fiscal 
year 1981-1982. Public expenditure rose during the early years of her government before 
reaching a height at 48.5 percent before falling to 40 percent in 1990. Thatcher frequently 
asserted, too, that the National Health Service was safeguarded. At the same time, major changes 
did occur in areas such as the reduction of the state’s direct control of industry and the housing 
stock. 
Within this context of contradictory policy directions, the Conservative governments’ 
policies on nursery education were quite stable. Although demographic changes led many to 
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begin arguing that more child care was needed to support women’s employment, Conservatives 
consistently argued against expansion on the grounds that it was the employers’ responsibility, 
and a matter of local choice. As we have seen, Thatcher did not disavow its importance. 
However, in 1990 she did state that she was opposed to full-time care for all children: in an 
interview with Radio 4’s Woman Hour, Thatcher drew an explicit comparison between a 
“national child care policy” and the Soviet Union. Describing how she had observed families 
dropping their children off at a crèche, she stated “I don’t think you can have a child in a nursery 
all day.”43 She preferred, instead, a home environment.   
However, child care advocates increasingly began to argue that it was no longer realistic 
to rely on the private family to provide care because the economy required women’s greater 
labor force participation. Political scientist Vicky Randall explains that during the late 1980s, 
policymakers began discussing options for more comprehensive child care because of worries 
about a potential “demographic time-bomb:” decreases in the fertility rate led to an ”inference 
drawn that the government and employers must seek to persuade mothers of young children, 
especially those with skills in short supply, to resume paid work.”44 However, she continues, the 
“government reaction had been more show than substance.”45 These demographic changes led to 
increased discussion of child care that would contribute to an increase in women’s labor force 
participation, although the government resisted such changes. 
Tensions rose between those who wanted to encourage women’s employment, and those 
in the Conservative government who believed it was not the state’s responsibility to provide 
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care. For example, an exchange between the Conservative Secretary of State for Employment, 
Michael Howard, and Labour Member of Parliament Ron Leighton in 1990 demonstrates both. 
Leighton asked, “Does the Secretary of State understand that child care is an idea whose time has 
come, because the overwhelming majority of new entrants to the labour market will be women? 
We shall recruit them only if we take the right steps now. The Government should not have a 
hands-off policy.” To Leighton, and several of his colleagues who asked follow up questions, 
child care was primarily a matter of supporting women’s employment and thus bolstering the 
economy to adapt to demographic changes. Howard, however, deflected Leighton’s concerns, 
repeatedly stating “the provision of child care facilities is primarily a matter for employers,” 
much to Leighton’s chagrin.46 At a separate debate, Labour Member of Parliament Angela Eagle 
pointed out that “Women are at work despite social policy, Government legislation and the 
Government's response to change rather than because of it. We could do much to improve 
women's ability to work, have careers and provide for themselves and their families.”47 To Eagle, 
the government was not in control of the demographic composition of the labor force, and 
needed to take a new direction in order to support these new workers. 
Several Labour politicians criticized this view that it was the responsibility of the private 
sector to provide child care. In 1995, Labour Member of Parliament Hilary Armstrong criticized 
this element of Tory policy, stating:  
The Government's dogma is such that they want any [nursery] 
expansion to take place purely in the private sector. That is my 
suspicion. I hope that I am wrong because the most effective 
delivery of early years child care and education will be achieved 
through a partnership approach, bringing together the talent and 
commitment of the private, public and voluntary sectors to develop 
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the highest quality of opportunity. None of us should rely on 
dogma or return to it to avoid making the commitment that young 
people deserve.48 
 
This denunciation of “dogma” foreshadows New Labour policy to come. The party distanced 
itself both from the Labour policies of the past and the policies of Conservatives to carve out a 
new direction of social policy that relies both on a strengthened private market and on the 
increased provision of government services. In the same debate, Labour Member of Parliament 
Margaret Hodge criticized reliance on the private sector alone to provide child care, arguing “too 
often the reality” of private settings were “an extremely poor physical environment where there 
is absolutely no educational focus to their activities. It is child care on the cheap, not quality 
nursery education which gives future generations a better start in life.”49 
The other major argument Conservatives put forward against nursery expansion during 
this period was that it was a local matter. This contrasts with the increasing centralization in 
other domains during the Thatcher years, especially the national government’s curbs on the 
power of (often Labour-controlled) local governments.50 In 1993, Secretary of State John Patten 
emphasized again that “nursery education is provided as a matter of local choice,” and that the 
central government would not require local authorities to provide public provision for children 
under five.51  
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However, Labour Member of Parliament Hilary Armstrong passionately rebutted this 
view, stating that local authorities simply did not have the resources on their own to expand 
nursery provision even if they wished to do so, especially in the wake of recent Tory budget cuts: 
The Budget has put a squeeze on public spending, which means 
cuts in many of the services that ordinary families and the 
vulnerable in our society depend upon. In particular, local 
government spending has been very savagely hit. That will mean 
that the expansion that we require in nursery education will not 
happen...We desperately want nursery education, smaller classes in 
our primary schools and leisure facilities to help to promote the 
health and well-being of the population. It will be much more 
difficult to provide all of those.52 
 
Given this stalemate between calls for nursery expansion and Tory resistance, Prime 
Minister John Major took “almost everybody by surprise” in late 1994 by announcing that the 
government would move towards universal provision.53 This announcement led to much 
confusion and controversy within Whitehall and Westminster, as his proclamation preceded 
formal preparations of the policy. Just as Thatcher before him had personally viewed universal, 
part-time nursery education in a favourable light, John Major accounts for this policy by 
describing the impetus as coming from himself personally. He writes in his autobiography that “I 
wanted [nursery education] available for all four year olds by 1997, and to extend it to three-year 
olds thereafter. There was a ferocious battle in Whitehall when my intentions became clear. The 
Treasury was alarmed at the resource implications, and the Department of Education did not see 
nurseries as a central priority.”54 Whereas Thatcher let this settlement stand during her tenure as 
Prime Minister, Major challenged it. 
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Yet Major’s program was much less generous program Thatcher’s White Paper had been: 
a nursery voucher system was announced in 1995, reflecting similar rhetoric to the American 
subsidy system described above. Randall asserts that “interest in child daycare began to re-
emerge in the context of the government’s welfare dependency concerns.”55 However, the 
voucher scheme differed in Britain from that in the U.S. in that it was made available 
universally. All parents of four year olds were to receive a voucher for £1,100 to spend in their 
choice of nursery or playgroup arrangements. Only four local education authorities agreed to 
pilot the scheme. An evaluation of the nursery voucher system minced no words, declaring that it 
“failed to meet its key objectives of creating parental choice, diversity in the pre-school sector, 
and high educational standards…More significantly, the scheme failed to meet the needs of 
parents and those of wider society.”56 
The New Labour Party of Tony Blair came to power in 1997 self-consciously declaring 
that it represented a sharp break with the past. Its manifesto promised that “in each area of policy 
a new and distinctive approach … one that differs from the old left and the Conservative right. 
This is why New Labour is new.”57 The manifesto distinguished itself more specifically by 
stating “The old left would have sought state control of industry. The Conservative right is 
content to leave all to the market. We reject both approaches. Government and industry must 
work together to achieve key objectives aimed at enhancing the dynamism of the market, not 
undermining it.” This distancing of the party from its own past is significant in that it was 
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reshaping itself by taking on some of the tenets of the Thatcher and Major governments’ 
ideology. As Jane Lewis has noted, it is “possible to detect the ‘Blairite’ faith in market 
competition” in New Labour policies.58 It sought to appeal to the center, saying “Some things the 
Conservatives got right. We will not change them…We have no intention or desire to replace 
one set of dogmas by another.” As was the case in the United States, the policy landscape had 
ultimately shifted to the right, and New Labour did not seek to pull it back to its original center. 
Rather, it accepted the free market focus of Thatcherism. However, the party also envisioned a 
more active state role in managing the social safety net—especially in education, including 
nursery provisions, which it listed as its top priority. 
The Labour manifesto did make explicit criticisms of Tory policies on the family. 
Echoing Thatcher’s infamous assertion that, “there's no such thing as society. There are 
individual men and women and there are families,”59 the manifesto responded that “Society, 
through government, must assist families to achieve collectively what no family can achieve 
alone.” Moreover, it insisted that “Labour does not see families and the state as rival providers 
for the needs of our citizens… Families cannot flourish unless government plays its distinctive 
role.”60 Following this line of criticism, New Labour critiqued the ways that the Thatcher and 
Major governments had reformed social policies—not only for cutting services and provisions, 
but also for failing to account for the country’s changing demographic profile.  
For example, Tony Blair stated, “They failed to tackle the fundamental weaknesses of the 
welfare state. They left unreformed areas that had become outdated such as the inadequacy of 
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childcare support for working women. They failed to create a modern welfare state fit for the 
modern world.”61 Thus, on nursery provisions specifically, the 1997 manifesto stated that 
“Nursery vouchers have been proven not to work. They are costly and do not generate more 
quality nursery places. We will use the money saved by scrapping nursery vouchers to guarantee 
places for four year olds…We will set targets for universal provision for three year olds whose 
parents want it.”62 
In describing the new government’s first budget, Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown, announced “the biggest ever investment in child care” of £300 million, and 
declared that “A national child care strategy is no longer the ambition of workless parents; it is 
now the policy of this country's Government.”63 This national child care strategy was set out in a 
1997 Green paper, Meeting the Childcare Challenge, and its signature element was the 
introduction of universal part-time nursery education for all four year olds. This provision was 
extended to all three year olds in 2004.  
Although care was provided only part-time, the amount of time families were entitled to 
gradually expanded over time. In 1999, free nursery provision was available for 12.5 hours per 
week; it was expanded to 15 hours in 2010 and 30 hours in 2016 for employed families.64 This 
expansion of nursery education was part of a comprehensive strategy that also included tax 
credits for low-income working families, expanded parental leave, the community-based 
program Sure Start (discussed more below), and initiatives for school-aged children as well. As 
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policy analyst Jane Waldfogel notes, “government spending on early learning and child care 
quadrupled between 1997-1998 and 2007-2008, when it reached more than £5 billion per 
year.”65 
New Labour’s strategy included a combination of both targeted and universal 
components. Tony Blair declared “These will always be a mix of universal and targeted help. 
But the one is not ‘superior’ or ‘more principled’ than the other…Our reforms will help more 
than the poorest children. All parents need help. All children need support.”66 The targeted 
component, Sure Start, was introduced in 1998 for low-income families. Tessa Blackstone, now 
a minister of state in the Department of Education and Employment, explained to the House of 
Lords that the new program was intended “to provide comprehensive support for those pre-
school children who face the greatest disadvantage. It will include childcare and play; primary 
health care; early education; and family support.”67 Just as the 1972 White Paper focused on 
disadvantaged localities as “educational priority areas,” Sure Start too was focused in 
communities where the need was perceived to be the highest. The difference between the two 
proposals, however, was that New Labour provided services to these communities at the same 
time as it also offered a child care provision for all.  
While the CDA failed in the U.S., universal part-time nursery education for three and 
four year olds in Britain was implemented, and later even expanded. Jane Waldfogel draws an 
explicit comparison between Britain’s War on Child Poverty to the U.S. War on Poverty of the 
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1960s, as she notes that “breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty by raising the skills of 
the next generation was a key goal” of both initiatives.68 The clear distinction, however, between 
these two “wars” is the place—and success—of universal provisions for children under five. 
Although the rhetoric the Labour Party used in the late 1990s discussed child care in terms of 
welfare, the educational argument for intervening has held, and the universal programs have 
even been expanded. It is the more targeted provisions that have been threatened in recent years. 
As historian Angela Davis notes, the coalition government of 2010-2015 closed Sure Start 
centers in order to finance an expansion of nursery education for a targeted population of two 
year olds.69 
New Labour’s rhetoric on early education demonstrates how women’s employment had 
become thoroughly accepted as a reality to which policy must respond. No longer did 
policymakers fear that they might, however inadvertently, encourage women one way or the 
other. As Jane Lewis states, “the Labour Government of 1997 ditched the idea that mothers’ 
employment was harmful to children, and actively promoted an adult worker model family.”70 
Government-published data from 1998 showed that the proportion of women with dependent 
children ages 0-4 and who were employed had increased from 32.3 percent in 1987 to 51.1 
percent in 1997.71  As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown revealed “I have always 
believed that the proper provision of child care is not just a good social policy, but integral to a 
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good economic policy. It is not a side show; it is central to the way in which we conduct our 
economic affairs.”72 Child care was necessary in this calculation to a strong economy because of 
the integral role played by women’s—and even mothers’—employment. 
Conservative opposition to New Labour’s child care plans were much more muted than 
one might expect, given the party’s ambivalence to expansion during their own tenure and given 
the vehement reaction of the American right to much less generous policies. When Sure Start 
was announced in 1998, for example, Conservative policymakers in both the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords critiqued it less for its objectives and mechanisms, and more for how it 
characterized the previous government’s record on education.73 This is not to say that they were 
pleased with the new initiatives, per se—Labour Member of Parliament Derek Foster 
characterized them as spewing a “churlish and mean-spirited diatribe from the Opposition Front 
Bench,” and noted that “Members on the Tory Benches look as sick as parrots while everyone on 
the Labour Benches looks over the moon.”74  
The tenor of Conservative criticism, however, was more defensive than focused on 
content. During this debate, the Shadow Secretary for Education and Employment, David 
Willets, raised concerns about the future of the private child care sector and whether they would 
“lose out to state provision,” and questioned the feasibility of some of the program’s promises. 
He also worried about the over-involvement of the state, saying “Everyone involved in education 
will of course welcome the increase in expenditure, as I do, but they will not welcome the 
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Secretary of State's desire to interfere in every nook and cranny.”75 This reflects some 
philosophical differences between the parties regarding the degree of state involvement, but not 
over the right and indeed the responsibility of the government to provide universal nursery 
provision. For example, Conservative Member of Parliament Caroline Spelman, a member of the 
Tory front bench, noted that regarding concerns that public provision of care would cause private 
providers to close their doors, “Real partnerships can be achieved without that sort of heavy-
handedness and strangulation by state nurseries…It is possible for private and state provision to 
co-exist happily in a real partnership. It is a symbiotic relationship that allows parents a real 
choice.”76 This type of cooperative relationship between the private and public sector was seen 
as beneficial to both parties. 
Supporters for increased nursery provision in Britain often drew on American research to 
substantiate the benefits they argued it would bring to children and society at large. For example, 
in a 1995 debate, Labour Member of Parliament Margaret Hodge argued that the “The most 
recent American research revealed…investment in the early years pays later” by reducing future 
expenditure on income supports and the criminal justice system.77 This echoes many of the 
arguments made by the Nobel-prize winning economist, James Heckman, discussed in the 
following epilogue, and utilized as well by American advocates of preschool education. Further, 
Jane Waldfogel notes how British policymakers cited the American experimental studies of the 
Perry Preschool and Abecedarian programs to demonstrate the long-term benefits of early 
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education;78 these studies tracking recipients of early interventions over thirty years were central 
to Heckman’s case as well. Yet, in Britain, these arguments yielded more generous and universal 
results than they did in the U.S. because both parties accepted some measure of public 
responsibility for child wellbeing in the early years, and viewed child care as an educational 
intervention rather than solely a welfare provision. 
 
Conclusions 
American and British policy trajectories remained relatively parallel until the mid-1990s, 
with the national government in both countries adopting a subsidy voucher system and resisting 
calls for universal options. Child care advocates in both countries during the 1980s and 1990s 
used language about parental choice, women’s employment, mitigating the effects of poverty, 
and investing in the early years to make the case for increased child provision. However, policy 
in the mid-1990s diverged sharply, with New Labour adopting a program of universal nursery 
education that exceeded the proposal outlined in Thatcher’s 1972 White paper in terms of both 
the numbers of children served and the financial commitment.  
While this development looks surprising at first glance, the subtle differences in 
American and British conservatives’ rhetoric about child care explain the two countries’ 
divergence. American conservatives’ vehement and emotional opposition to public child care 
presented it as an attack on “traditional” families, whereas British conservatives accepted the 
educational justification for nursery education but were ambivalent about the role of the national 
state mandating how local authorities allocated their spending on education. In order to pass any 
expansion of child care provision in the U.S., advocates accepted an incremental approach even 
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as they reified an overall framing of public child care services as a welfare provision limited to 
the poor. New Labour accepted a shift in the policy landscape to the right as well by emphasizing 
the need for private-public partnerships to provide child care, but also greatly expanded the scale 
of public provision. This dissertation’s concluding section follows, examining how public child 





Child Care: Education and Welfare 
“It is so hard to be a woman…” The words hung in the air as my colleague, a young 20-
something male, and I drove away from the home of one of our interviewees for a study on the 
ways in which low-income working families in two American cities make “child care choices.”1 
We learned over the course of the study that such choices often place families between a rock 
and a hard place.  
Conducted in two waves, and coincidentally capturing a before- and after-snap shot of the 
Great Recession of 2008 that catapulted Barack Obama to the White House in the U.S., our 
interviews with 80-some families (largely headed by single, non-white mothers) revealed the 
inadequacies of the American patchwork system of child care. Need greatly exceeds supply as 
waitlists for child care subsidies jeopardize parents’ ability to accept work opportunities, or 
pushes them to accept child care placements whose quality they doubt. In the U.S. the subsidy 
system punishes families for earning too much during any particular pay period, such as during 
the holiday season when their retail employer offers extra hours, by kicking them off and 
resigning them to the bottom of the waitlist once more. Or, they lose the subsidy when single 
mothers reunite with their children’s father and subsequently raise the combined household 
income level. Many parents work unpredictable, variable shift schedules, making traditional 
child care centers that operate on a 9-to-5 schedule impossible to utilize, even if these facilities 
were willing to accept public vouchers. Many high-quality centers do not accept vouchers, as 
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their tuition costs may not be reimbursed if parents are kicked off the subsidy program rolls. 
Parents thus turn to relatives—often their own mothers—or family day care providers, such as 
older women in the neighborhood who are willing to watch their children for the promise of a 
low rate of state reimbursement. 
One woman’s story from our study is etched into my memory. A home health care 
worker, she had five children and an unstable marriage—her husband, a gas station attendant, 
was in and out of their home. I interviewed her during both waves of our study, in both the 
winter of 2008 and fall of 2009. Her bubbly demeanor during our first interview turned darker in 
the next, as she hinted towards domestic disputes that had turned violent over the course of the 
year. Her work schedule, determined largely by her elderly clients’ precarious health, was 
unpredictable, but her preference was for family day care as she alleged her eldest son had been 
molested in a center when he was a toddler. She gushed about her provider, a woman who 
allowed her children to sleep over at her home when she worked overnight, and who was there 
for her and her kids unconditionally. A long-term, and loving care provider was hard to find, and 
this mother was afraid of reuniting with her husband not only because of his volatility. The threat 
of losing her subsidy, given the rules governing her access to child care, and losing this care 
arrangement which had provided her family the stability she desperately craved for her children 
thus kept them living apart even during the happier moments of their relationship. 
These interviews, conducted in families’ homes and lasting about two hours on average, 
were intimate—the woman described above told me she wanted me to come again the next year 
as she found our talks akin to therapy. Towards the end of every interview, after rapport had 
been established and the question would hopefully feel less invasive, we asked parents what their 
ideal child care arrangement would be if they didn’t have cost or logistical obstacles—in other 
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words, if their choice was a genuine choice.  We were shocked that the most frequent answer—
by a landslide—was that these mothers would stay home.  
Child care to them was framed so completely as a work support enforced on them by the 
government as a means for economic survival—that rarely did they see its potential to provide 
educational benefits for their children or empowerment for themselves. This makes sense, as 
they did not have access to high quality care settings, or to work opportunities that would 
increase their sense of self-esteem or self-satisfaction. Their answers pointed me towards a void 
in our societal norms and moral values: how did we end up with such an inadequate system of 
care, with such a mismatch between the demands of the state and employers, and the market for 
care? How had caregiving itself become so devalued that we were surprised that women 
genuinely wanted to perform that labor themselves—a task that would have seemed not only 
normal and acceptable at the start of the postwar period, but preferable? How did we get here? 
  ***** 
This dissertation has attempted to answer these questions, and has found that the 
development of disparate rhetoric around child care in the U.S. and Britain in the 1970s has 
shaped the political possibilities and limitations for the expansion of universal early education. In 
the U.S., child care has been primarily understood by policymakers as a tool for combating 
poverty and thus an extension of welfare services, and therefore proposals to extend federally-
funded services to higher income families are seen as a violation of familial privacy. In Britain, 
on the other hand, nursery education was conceived by the Conservative Party as an educational 
intervention, and although not prioritized, it was also not demonized. Both major political parties 
in Britain proposed expansions of nursery education at different points over the last fifty years.  
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The remainder of this epilogue first traces developments in both countries’ child care 
policies since the late 1990s. It concludes by discussing how this dissertation’s comparative 
analysis contributes to literature on welfare state policy more broadly construed.  
 
American Child Care Policy Since Welfare Reform 
The American federal government has continued to follow the two-tier strategy of 
supporting low-income families with subsidies or via Head Start, and higher-income families via 
tax credits. The Child Care Development Block Grant (CCDBG) remains low-income working 
families’ main support, although only 1 out of 6 eligible families received assistance according 
to a 2017 report.2 Its 2014 reauthorization underfunded the program, and led to a reduction in 
families receiving assistance: in 2015, 1.4 million children received subsidized care, as compared 
to 1.8 million in 2006, or “a 21 percent reduction in the average monthly number of children 
served over 9 years.”3 As black and Hispanic children are more likely to be in poverty than white 
children, the cuts in child care assistance disproportionately affect non-white families.4 A 
bipartisan budget deal announced in February 2018 will provide an additional $5.8 billion to 
CCDBG, and allow 230,000 more children to receive child care assistance.5 This incremental 
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policy gain materially assists children most in need, but the program’s framing as a welfare 
service leads to its continued stigmatization and vulnerability to future budget cuts.  
A growing movement of state and local governments has implemented universal 
preschool programs. Historian Elizabeth Rose details a change in the messaging about child care, 
writing that “children's advocates [in the 1980s and 1990s] shifted course by defining the issue in 
terms of preschool education rather than of child care.”6 As debates governing the developing 
subsidy system gradually sidelined questions about quality, this separate movement emerged. 
Georgia was the first state to develop a universal program for all four year olds in 1995 under 
Democratic Governor Zell Miller. It grew out of a pilot program developed in 1992 that was 
targeted to low-income children and financed out of lottery dividends that were controlled by an 
independent commission rather than the legislature.7 Facing criticism from the left that the 
universal provision would take services away from the neediest families, and from the right that 
the program would be too costly, Miller and his administration drew on rhetoric to define the 
program as an educational rather than welfare service—much like rhetoric used in Britain. Rose 
notes that the staff administering it saw the necessity of “convincing the public that Pre-K was an 
educational program rather than a babysitting service,” and that they “presented Pre-K as an 
ambitious experiment in school choice—a cherished part of the conservative agenda.”8 They also 
recognized that its universality was central to its success—the support of middle-class families 
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has protected the program in subsequent years: nearly 60 percent of four year old children in 
Georgia were enrolled in state pre-kindergarten in the 2015-2016 academic year.9  
 Georgia is not the only state with a universal prekindergarten program: according to the 
National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER), in the 2015-2016 academic year 
“nearly 1.5 million children attended state-funded preschool, including nearly 1.3 million 4-year-
olds.” This amounts to “almost five percent of 3-year-olds and 32 percent of 4-year-olds” 
nationwide.10 The states serving the highest percentages of four year old children that year were 
Florida, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin; each of these programs served over 70 percent of four year 
olds.11 Several localities also have their own programs; the District of Columbia led the NIEER 
rankings, serving more than 81 percent of four year olds and 70 percent of three year olds.  
In his 2013 State of the Union address, Barack Obama seemed to turn a corner on 
universal, public child care provision, declaring his support for early education and a pledge that 
“[we] make sure none of our children start the race of life already behind.”12 The Obama 
administration announced its Preschool for All Program shortly thereafter. This program 
supported the growth of preschool programs through a federal-state partnership, for example 
granting eighteen states Preschool Development Grants to support the expansion of preschool 
services during its first year. It was permanently authorized in the 2015 Every Student Succeeds 
                                                
9 National Institute for Early Education Research, The State of Preschool 2016 (Rutgers, NJ: 
National Institute for Early Education Research, 2017): Table 2. 
10 Ibid., 8. 
11 Ibid., Table 2. 




Act. However, as Brookings Institute senior fellow Russ Whitehurst rightly points out, this was a 
“bait and switch,” as the grants are focused on targeting resources to low-income families rather 
than increasing universal provision. Whitehurst rightly points out that “the Obama 
administration’s preschool plan is consistent with the federal role in education and human 
services since the Lyndon Johnson administration: targeted assistance for services to the 
economically disadvantaged.”13 As this dissertation has demonstrated, child care provisions in 
the U.S. are always seen as primarily serving a welfare function. 
The burgeoning advocacy for these preschool programs since the 1990s has been driven 
by social-investment rationales—especially sparked by arguments made popular by the Nobel 
prize-winning economist James J Heckman. The general thrust of this rhetoric is that supporting 
human capital development during the early years pays off in the long-term by increasing 
educational attainment and workforce productivity and reducing costs in other social policy 
domains, such as crime and teen child-bearing. Heckman makes an explicit argument for 
targeting services, on the grounds that “the returns to early childhood programs are highest for 
disadvantaged children who do not receive substantial amounts of parental investment in the 
early years.”14 This language echoes some of the more paternalistic justifications for early 
intervention discussed in Chapter 1: family income was correlated with what analysts perceive as 
subpar parenting practices. Heckman is more direct with his criticism of parents, however, than 
earlier analysts, stating: 
Gaps in both cognitive and non-cognitive skills between the 
advantaged and disadvantaged emerge early and can be traced in 
part to adverse early environments, in which a growing proportion 
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of children are now raised. The proper measure of child adversity 
is the quality of parenting—not the traditional measures of family 
income or parental education…We should not repeat the mistakes 
of the War on Poverty…Giving money to poor families does not, 
by itself, promote social mobility…The scare resource is love and 
parenting—not money.15 
 
Heckman, however, does not see the intrinsic value in advocating for all children to benefit from 
early education, as child development experts who supported the CDA and White Paper did, 
such as Tessa Blackstone, Barbara and Jack Tizard, or Edward Zigler. Although he does not 
identify in this piece how he would target families if not by income, he also dismisses universal 
options. He writes, “One could make the programs universal to avoid stigmatization. Universal 
programs would be much more expensive and create the possibility of deadweight losses 
whereby public programs displace private investments by families.”16 The benefit of universal 
programs to Heckman is the avoidance of stigma for lower income children, rather than the 
potential gains for all. Thus, even carrying out Heckman’s agenda for expanding child care does 
so because it is framed as a welfare rather than educational service. 
Feminist analysts have critiqued the child care programs inspired by Heckman’s analysis 
as neglecting women’s needs and the needs of working parents, as many provide only part-time, 
part-day, and/or part-year services. As sociologist Susan Prentice points out, these “new 
arguments…originate outside feminist, child, or family advocacy, arising instead from corporate, 
medical, and private sector settings.” 17 Further, “the drive to realize maximum returns from 
childcare has led some to argue that even a very small degree of childcare service will achieve 
                                                
15 Ibid., 42-43. 
16 Ibid., 36 . 
17 Susan Prentice, “High Stakes: The ‘Investable’ Child and the Economic Reframing of 
Childcare,” Signs 34(3), 2009: 688. 
208 
the desired child outcomes. Thus…calls for part-time and part-day programs are displacing the 
longer-day services that more readily accommodate parental (maternal) employment and that 
better enable work-family reconciliation.”18  Put more bluntly, “mothers’ needs are being written 
out of the central purpose of childcare.” 19 Similarly, legal theorist Robin West declares, “I don’t 
understand why [potential gains to women] isn’t part of Heckman’s equation.”20 West argues 
that taking into account the increased income or schooling mothers could accrue while children 
are in preschool would increase “both the equity and the efficiency side of the case for early 
intervention.”  
However, this dissertation has shown that “mothers’ needs” were never central in the 
rhetoric advocates used for child care, except as a strategy to move low-income mothers from 
welfare to work: child development literature provided much of the justification for the 1971 
Comprehensive Child Development Act, and feminists’ foot-hold in prior child care advocacy 
was tepid. This “new” turn to social-investment justifications has not curtailed former arguments 
about mothers’ rights, because those arguments were never central to policymaking about child 
care. 
 
British Child Care Policy Since the War on Child Poverty 
The child care policy landscape in Britain is quite rosy by comparison to the U.S., 
although not without controversy. Sixty-five percent of three and four year old children in a 2017 
                                                
18 Ibid., 700. 
19 Ibid., 702.  
20 Robin West in James J Heckman, Giving Kids a Fair Chance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2013): 57. 
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Department of Education survey received nursery education through the government’s free 
entitlement.21 However, it is the targeted portions of New Labour’s child care policies that have 
been vulnerable to austerity measures. Sure Start centers have been closed, for example, while 
the universal preschool entitlements set during the Blair government have since been expanded 
by the Conservatives: a 2016 law extended the entitlement of free nursery education for three- 
and four year olds from 15 to 30 hours for working families.  
Despite the partisan battles over the place of the welfare state and welfare provisions in 
Britain, there remains a consensus in both parties that the government does have a responsibility 
for promoting child well-being across classes. Before becoming Prime Minister, then-Shadow 
Minister for Women and Shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Theresa May 
declared that when it came to the goal of eradicating child poverty, “We can disagree about the 
approach that has been taken and the lack of progress that has been made, but we should all 
recognise the importance of setting out that ambition.”22 However, Angela Davis, looking back 
on government departments’ history of deflecting accountability for various child care programs, 
and differentiating between programs that provide “care” versus “education,” has astutely 
warned advocates to be vigilant, for “improved child care provision is every politician’s 
aspiration, yet no one’s responsibility.”23  
                                                
21 United Kingdom Department of Education, Parents’ Views and Demand for 30 hours Free 
Childcare (London: Department of Education, 2017): 8. 
22 HC Deb, 20 July 2009, c611. 
23 Angela Davis, “Childcare Funding in Times of Austerity: Historical Lessons for the Childcare 
Bill 2015-2016,” History and Policy Blog, February 1, 2016. 
(http://www.historyandpolicy.org/opinion-articles/articles/childcare-bill-2015-2016). On 
deflecting departmental responsibility, Chapter 3 of this dissertation demonstrated how Thatcher, 
as Secretary of State for Education and Science, differentiated nursery education from day 
nurseries and playgroups, which were funded by the Department of Health and Social Services. 
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Another way in which British child care policy has differed from its American 
counterpart has been in the state’s vision for how it supports women’s employment. In the U.S., 
child care subsidies are tied to low-income parents’ actual work hours, leading many recipients 
with variable or nonstandard work schedules towards poorer quality informal arrangements. In 
Britain, child care policy has a stated goal of supporting parents’ time with their children. For 
example, the 2004 Treasury publication Choice for Parents, the Best Start for Children: A Ten 
Year Strategy for Childcare stated:  
A policy that gives too much emphasis to helping parents to work 
could come at the expense of the needs of children, or of parents’ 
desire to spend more time with their families. This may create 
short term economic gains, but at a social and economic cost in the 
future. On the other hand, supporting parents to enter and progress 
in work is critical to the economy and tackling child poverty. To be 
successful, the needs of children and families cannot be traded 
against the demands of the labour market, but must be advanced 
together.24 
 
Rather than viewing public child care provision solely as a tool to support women’s employment, 
this statement of policy rationale recognizes the importance of supporting families in a more 
holistic manner. In the government’s words, “parenting and work are complementary 
activities,”25 rather than incompatible, diametrically-opposed vocations. This is a departure, too, 
from the earlier child development rhetoric discussed in Chapter 1 which justified early 
interventions in both countries as a means to correct subpar parenting practices.  
This difference is also reflected in statistics on the incidence of part-time employment. 
Part-time labor, particularly for married women and women with children, is significantly higher 
                                                
24 United Kingdom Department of the Treasury, Choice for Parents, the Best Start for Children: 
A Ten Year Strategy for Childcare (London: Department of the Treasury, 2004): 5. 
25 Ibid. 
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in Britain than in the U.S. or other countries. For example, in 1980, for example, 29 percent of 
married American women worked part-time compared to 55 percent of married British women.26 
More than 60 percent of British women with two or more children worked part-time in 2000, 
compared to just over 20 percent of American mothers with two or more children. The Treasury 
report admitted that while this may be a matter of women’s choice, it also may reflect barriers 
outside of individuals’ control, stating “to some significant extent this is a consequence of the 
more highly developed part-time labour market in Britain. But it may also reflect the fact that 
there are obstacles to mothers participating in the way that they would like.”27 Part-time work 
may also be detrimental to women’s professional advancement more generally, if, for example, 
employers overlook part-time workers for promotions or salary increases. 
Women’s choice to take on part-time work is also affected by the availability of care. The 
Department of Education fielded a survey published in early 2017 assessing parents’ views on 
and demand for nursery education, in order to assess how the 2016 law increasing the hours of 
free entitlement had impacted work or child care patterns. The study found that more than 80 
percent of parents who already utilized 15 hours of free child care were likely to utilize the 
increased entitlement.28 Of those parents, about one-third reported that the most important 
benefit of the increased entitlement would be that it would lower the cost of child care that they 
were already paying, and another third reported that it would allow them to increase their 
                                                
26 Diane Sainsbury, Gender, Equality, and Welfare States (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996): 109. 
27 Ibid., 13. 
28 United Kingdom Department of Education, 10. 
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availability to work.29 Sixty-five percent of all families interviewed revealed that they would 
change their work schedule to take advantage of the extra hours of care, and 60 percent of 
respondents not currently working were likely to look for work in order to utilize the care 
entitlement. These results show that the availability of free, public child care was a major 
influence on parents’ decision to undertake paid employment, and that women who have decent 
child care do choose to work. 
 
Comparative Conclusions 
Assessing the child care policy landscapes of these two nations together enables parsing 
apart the differences and similarities in Anglo-American ideological frameworks: while public 
policy in both countries elevates values of personal responsibility and individual choice over 
communal approaches, the two countries distinguish between private and public very differently. 
Child care in the U.S. is framed as a matter of individual responsibility, and left to the family to 
arrange and pay for on its own—unless, of course, the family is low-income and would 
otherwise revert to welfare: then the parent is forced to work. Child care is always viewed as a 
welfare service. In Britain, the state has since the mid-1990s increasingly taken on responsibility 
for the care of preschool children, seeing a role for itself in helping parents balance child care 
and work, although it still emphasizes parental choice. The government views child care mainly 
as an educational intervention but one that also can support work and families in socioeconomic 
need.  
This dissertation has emphasized the dichotomy in how policymakers conceptualize child 
care as either an educational or welfare intervention, although policy developments in both 
                                                
29 Ibid., 13. 
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nations have increasingly utilized rhetoric intermingling the two justifications. This difference—
between education or welfare—is weighted with both practical and normative considerations. On 
the practical side, concerns over cost and budget constraints have typically led public child care 
provisions—even those developed as educational interventions seeking to support optimal child 
development—to be targeted to the low-income families that are least able to afford care without 
assistance. When these programs are targeted in this way, it is easy to see how it can also be 
understood as a welfare program, and indeed these programs are also touted as tools to address 
the effects of poverty and inequality. Normatively, child care programs touted as educational 
services for all tend to appeal to broader constituencies and are thus less stigmatized and, once 
implemented, more likely to be insulated from austerity measures.  
Policy analysts Irwin Garfinkel, Lee Rainwater, and Timothy Smeeding have posited that 
rather than a dichotomy, education should be considered a component of broader welfare policy. 
After all, they ask, “What better way to equip citizens to cope with the economic insecurity 
produced by a vibrant capitalist economy than to educate them?”30  They argue that literature on 
welfare state policy that omits education misses a key component of both American social policy 
history and a major source of the country’s economic prowess. Further, they point to the specific 
ways in which the U.S.’ failure to invest in child care as early education not only harms children 
but also the economy: 
Despite its early lead in mass education, the United States now 
lags in the development of early education and childcare. Those 
who mistakenly believe that the United States has always been 
slow to develop social welfare programs are prone to dismiss the 
current lag in education and childcare with the argument that 
lagging may be a good thing…But if one of the main reasons why 
the United States is the world's richest nation is that it has been a 
                                                
30 Irwin Garfinkel, Lee Rainwater, and Timothy Smeeding, Wealth and Welfare States: Is 
America a Laggard or Leader? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 23/ 
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world leader in developing mass public education—and if it has 
now relinquished that lead—this is surely a cause for worry.31 
 
In this conceptualization, then, child care is thus considered both education and welfare. 
However, perceiving of education as a form of welfare program can have unintended 
consequences. Analysts of American education Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe trace the 
development of public education policy from the New Deal to No Child Left Behind, arguing 
that the “belief in the capacity of public education to redress unequal opportunity and eliminate 
poverty is one of the most distinctive features of American social policy.” Starting with the War 
on Poverty, programs were “aimed not to protect the least advantaged from the inequities and 
uncertainties of the labor market, but rather to develop individuals’ human capital,” or in LBJ’s 
words, to give a “hand-up not a hand-out.”32 While this helped redress massive inequalities in 
educational access for minorities and other disadvantaged groups, it also “reduced pressure on 
the state” for programs that would more directly ameliorate poverty. Further, relying on 
education alone leads to “disillusionment” with public provisions for “failure to solve problems 
that are beyond its reach,”, thus sparking interest with more market and business oriented forms 
of education.33 As Britain increasingly draws from American research to justify its educational 
interventions for preschool-age children, it mirrors much of this language which Kantor and 
Lowe argue could undermine support for public provision. Calls for public-private partnerships 
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to provide child care, for example, pragmatically utilize private sector arrangements that 
previously exist but also could potentially undercut public initiatives. 
One major way in which the U.S. and Britain differ is in their institutional structure: 
Britain is far more centralized than the federalist U.S., where states design and administer social 
policy programs. These differences became even sharper during the period studied, as Reagan 
policies further decentralized social policy and assigned responsibility to the states, while the 
Thatcher government consolidated the control of the national government.34 Kimberly Morgan, 
however, points out that “neither centralized nor decentralized government offers avenue” for 
advocates outside of government to successfully lobby for change in child care policy. She 
continues, “Although in Britain the highly centralized state apparatus makes it difficult for 
outside organizations to have influence, the more porous political system in the U.S. has given 
access points to some advocates, but only for effecting incremental change.”35 New Labour’s 
policy changes in the 1990s, then, can be seen as emerging from within the halls of Whitehall 
and Westminster rather than from outside, and the American advocates have been bound by the 
parameters of an increasingly neoliberal system that resists radical reform. 
As different as these two states thus have become, they are both still portrayed as liberal 
welfare state regimes in the comparative policy literature, leading to the question of whether it is 
still useful to think in terms of welfare state typologies. Jane Lewis rightly points out that in 
Britain, “the explicit acceptance of the role of the state in developing and financing 
childcare…does not mean that childcare in England came to resemble the coherent, 
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comprehensive, universal childcare systems of the Nordic countries, France, or Belgium.”36 
There are still major differences between Britain and countries fitting either the social 
democratic or corporatist models. Daniel Wincott elucidates on these differences, pointing out 
that “whether as a result of active promotion by the state or a legacy of minimalist residualism, 
the role of the private sector…[can] lock a welfare system into a liberal format.”37 He continues 
by asserting that: 
While the British welfare state has hardly become ‘social 
democratic,’ neither is it simply ‘liberal’ in character. Perhaps the 
most important insight is that the British welfare state combines 
features characteristic of more than one regime type…Theories of 
welfare state retrenchment and reform need to allow more scope 
for politics and policy entrepreneurship. Moreover, these 
institutional legacies themselves are complex and contentious. As 
with other countries, Britain’s welfare settlements have been 
complex, contested, and contradictory38  
 
Wincott thus asserts that welfare state typologies cannot quite reflect the messiness of their real 
world cases, and calls for a reassessment of welfare state theory.  
Kimberly Morgan and Ann Shola Orloff’s recent call to view the “many hands of the 
state” rather than conceptualizing of them as “unitary actors”39 provides such a revision. They 
call for a theory of the state that “highlights the violent, messy, and historically contingent 
processes by which states are made or unmade. The study of states as works of progress also 
helps analysts avoid reifying them, eschewing a sharp demarcation of state-society boundaries, 
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for instance, and instead examining the processes in which such boundaries get defined.”40 The 
boundaries of the state are thus continuously shaped and refined by dynamic social actors rather 
than fixed, unchanging, or eternal constructions. 
This dissertation has focused on how the American and British states have defined one 
such boundary by tracking changes in how policymakers and advocates viewed public 
responsibility for the care and education of young children. Both nations in the early 1970s 
contemplated, and very nearly implemented, universal child care provisions. The failure of these 
proposals were marked by different rhetoric: conservative politicians in the U.S. held a very 
different view on public responsibility for young children than their British counterparts, even 
with the turn to neoliberal ideologies about state retrenchment. This shaped the resulting political 
landscape, leading to divergent policies in the 1990s.  
What might child care look like if it were depoliticized, and taken out of partisan tug-of-
war spats? What if we valued caregiving instead of denigrating it as low-wage, women’s work? 
What if we valued all children enough to provide early childhood education regardless of 
parents’ work histories?  Answering these questions requires looking back at how the policy 
landscape has been molded, and the alternative avenues that were closed off by historically 
contingent debates. Advocates must articulate a rhetoric about child care that balances the needs 
of children for high-quality, developmentally appropriate care but also the needs of working 
families, particularly the needs of mothers who are still by and large held responsible for the care 
of young children. While incremental, targeted policies focusing on child care as welfare may 
improve material conditions for some, the historical record demonstrates that a broad-based, 
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comprehensive vision of child care as a universal educational intervention holds more promise in 
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